The only gay in the village?

The colours of Pride

Photo by Steve Johnson on Unsplash

The only gay in the village became a household phrase in the UK thanks to the long running Little Britain sitcom TV and radio series (which has been broadcast by the BBC since 2000).

Daffyd Thomas claimed to be the only gay person in a small, Welsh village (actually he wasn’t), but in some respects his catchphrase reflected the isolation that many people in the LGBTI communities experience – either in their personal or professional lives.

The reason that I mention this topic is because, last week, the LGBTI campaigning organisation, Stonewall, published research about the most inclusive LGBTI friendly employers in the UK (Newcastle City Council topped the list). That said, for many LGBTI employees, an inclusive work place is still a far off dream.

Please find a link to a story on the Sky News website about one employee’s decision to hide his LGBTI identity from his colleagues:

https://news.sky.com/story/i-felt-i-had-to-hide-my-lgbt-identity-at-work-so-i-decided-to-do-something-about-it-11920174

Links to Stonewall’s findings (and a Sky News article) can be found below:

https://www.stonewall.org.uk/system/files/2020_top_100_report.pdf

https://news.sky.com/story/stonewall-reveals-its-most-lgbt-inclusive-employers-11919950

A person’s sexual orientation is, of course, a protected characteristic in terms of Section 12 of the Equality Act 2010. Such individuals should not be subjected to direct discrimination (Section 13); indirect discrimination (Section 19); harassment (Section 26); and victimisation (Section 27).

Many years ago, I remember teaching a group of students who were studying for a professional qualification. Many of them were employed by recruitment agencies and it was my task to highlight the relevant provisions of discrimination law at that time. One evening, we had a discussion about discrimination on the grounds of a person’s sexual orientation – particularly in the context of the ban on gay and lesbian people serving in the UK Armed Forces. This ban would eventually be lifted in 2000 – following the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in Smith and Grady v UK (1999) 29 EHRR 493.

One of the students asked me what protection existed for gay and lesbian people in employment law generally. Very little was my response. Before the introduction of the Scotland Act 1998 and the Human Rights Act 1998, the work place could be very hostile for LGBTI people (see Macdonald v Lord Advocate; Pearce v Governing Body of Mayfield School [2003] UKHL 34).

Yes, admittedly, the UK was (and still is in spite of Brexit) a signatory to the European Convention on Human Rights. In particular, Article 8 of the Convention recognises the right to family and private life. It was this Article which was used to overturn extremely restrictive laws on same sex relationships which existed in Scotland, Northern Ireland, the Isle of Man and the Channel Islands. Reinforcing Article 8 is Article 14 of the Convention is Article 14 which contains a general prohibition on discrimination.

The late 1960s are often referred to as the key period of the start of gay liberation in the UK with the passing of the Sexual Offences Act 1967 which decriminalised homosexual relationships between consenting adults (aged 21 or over) and as long as such conduct was in private. What is often overlooked is that the 1967 Act applied to England and Wales only. The picture was very different (and would remain so for over a decade – sometimes longer) in various parts of the British Isles.

Homosexual relationships were decriminalised in Scotland in 1980; in Northern Ireland in 1982; the UK Crown Dependency of Guernsey in 1983; the UK Crown Dependency of Jersey in 1990; and the UK Crown Dependency of the Isle of Man in 1994. The age of consent was set at 21 for all these parts of the British Isles. Things have since moved on.

In the last 20 years, the influence of the European Union has been particularly profound regarding measures to combat sexual orientation discrimination.

In 1999, as a result of the Treaty of Amsterdam, the EU adopted two Directives which considerably expanded the scope of its anti-discrimination laws (the Racial Equality Directive (2000/43/EC) and the Employment Equality Directive (2000/78/EC). Of particular interest to this discussion is the Employment Equality Directive which made it unlawful to discriminate against a person on grounds of sexual orientation. Admittedly, this Directive was limited because it covered the areas of employment and vocational training only.

It did not extend to the provision of goods and services, so had the case of Bull and Another v Hall and Another [2013] UKSC 73 had occurred when the Directive was transposed into UK domestic law, the same sex couple who were refused a double room at the guest house in Cornwall would not have been successful in their claim for sexual orientation discrimination.

On 1 December 2003, the Employment Equality Directive would eventually become part of UK law in the form of the Employment Equality (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2003. The Regulations were repealed and replaced by the relevant provisions of the Equality Act 2010 (which came into force on 1 October 2010).

Shortly afterwards, the Civil Partnerships Act 2004 would give legal recognition (and protection) to gay and lesbian people who chose to enter such relationships. These rights would be further underpinned by permitting same sex couples to marry (in England and Wales in 2013 and in Scotland in 2014). Currently, Northern Ireland is the only part of the UK not to permit same sex marriage – although this will change from next week onwards (see link below):

Same-sex marriage: Couple ‘excited but nervous’ to become first in NI

Robyn Peoples and Sharni Edwards will celebrate their wedding on Tuesday in Carrickfergus.

This change to the law has come about as a result of the introduction of the Northern Ireland (Executive Formation etc) Act 2019 passed by the UK Parliament (in the absence of of a functioning devolved government for nearly the last 3 years).

The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) is also worthy of comment. Article 19 prohibits discrimination by reason of a person’s sexual orientation and, notably, this provision is hardwired into UK law by way of the Equality Act 2010. Article 19 extended legal protection to gay and lesbian people more generally – over and above the limited areas of employment and vocational training which the Treaty of Amsterdam and the Employment Equality Directive had originally addressed.

The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (although Poland and the UK had negotiated some opt-outs) contained significant provisions on equality and non-discrimination, namely, Article 20 (equality before the law) and Article 21 (the principle of non-discrimination).

Finally, if employers want to do more to create an inclusive work place, they could start by using Stonewall’s inclusive toolkits (see link below):

https://www.stonewall.org.uk/best-practice-toolkits-and-resources

Conclusion

As a society, the UK has certainly moved on from the overtly hostile attitudes towards members of the LGBTI communities over the last 50 years or so. The legal rights and protections which LGBTI people now enjoy would have seemed unthinkable in 1967 when a limited form of tolerance was ushered in as a result of the Sexual Offences Act (in England and Wales). More recently, the UK and Scottish Governments have issued pardons to those individuals who were convicted of criminal offences under the previous laws (in 2017: the Policing and Crime Act 2017 in England and Wales (known as Turing’s Law after Alan Turing, the Enigma Code Breaker) and, in 2018, the Scottish Parliament followed suit by passing the Historical Sexual Offences (Pardons and Disregards) (Scotland) Act 2018).

Postscript

On Friday 7 February 2020, Phillip Schofield, the British TV celebrity announced that he was gay at the age of 57. Mr Schofield is married with 2 children and had lived a heterosexual life – until now. He likened hiding his sexual orientation to being in prison and being consumed by it.

A link to the story on the Sky News website can be found below:

http://news.sky.com/story/phillip-schofield-comes-out-as-gay-11928156

If anyone doubts that homophobia still exists in the UK, please see the story below:

Homophobic graffiti daubed on Polo Lounge entrance in Glasgow

Police have launched an investigation after they were alerted to the vandalism at the Polo Lounge.

Related Blog Articles:

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2020/01/04/pansexual/

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2019/12/31/civil-partner-i-do/

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2019/12/08/different-standards/

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2019/12/06/biased-blood/

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2019/10/04/a-very-civil-partnership/

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2019/02/20/love-and-marriage/

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2019/02/08/the-gay-cake-row/

Copyright Seán J Crossan, 15 February 2020

Cash flows?

Photo by Didier Weemaels on Unsplash

Here, in the United Kingdom, the Brexit saga seems to be drawing to the end of stage 1 i.e. ratification of the withdrawal agreement that the EU and British Government of Boris Johnson have negotiated. The European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Bill is likely to pass through the House of Lords this week or early next week.

Meanwhile in the rest of the EU, business seems to be going on fairly normally and, it was with some relief this week that I read about a forthcoming decision of the Court of Justice concerning the operation of the Single European Market – and not about Brexit.

The Republic of Hungary, a fellow EU member state – for the present time anyway, may be on course to lose this case which, at its heart, addresses the free movement of capital. Essentially, Hungarian law may well be incompatible with the operation of the Single European Market and, as well we know, EU Law enjoys primacy over domestic law:

  • Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen [1963] ECR 1
  • Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585, 593
  • HP Bulmer Ltd & Anor v J. Bollinger SA & Ors [1974] EWCA Civ 14
  • Case 148/78 Pubblico Ministero v Ratti (1979) ECR 1629
  • Defrenne v Sabena [1976] ECR 455, [1976] ICR 547, [1981] 1 All ER 122
  • C-106/77 Simmenthal [1978] ECR 629
  • C-106/89 Marleasing [1991] ECR I-7321

‘Stop Soros’

In 2017, Hungary passed a law which compelled non governmental organisations (NGOs) to declare their sources of funding to the Government (this information would then be available via a publicly accessible website). If a group received funding from a foreign individual or organisation above the value of 500,000 Hungarian Forints (or €1500 euros), this had to be made public. Furthermore, groups finding themselves in receipt of such funding had to declare themselves as ‘organisations in receipt of support from abroad’ on their websites and in their official communications.

The measure became popularly known in Hungary as the ‘Stop Soros’ Law – a reference to the antipathy of the Government of Hungary towards George Soros, the Hungarian-American billionaire. Soros is an energetic supporter of liberal social values which are often at complete odds with the right wing and ultra conservative views of the Hungarian Government.

A link to a story about the background to the Law can be found on the Reuters’ website below:

https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-hungary-orban-ngos/civil-organisations-in-hungary-brace-for-government-crackdown-on-ngos-idUKKBN1HW1ZL

The Advocate General’s Opinion

Advocate General Campos Sánchez-Bordona has just issued an Opinion about the legality of Hungarian law in this respect. The controversial Hungarian Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán, has long been hostile to groups in civil society who are opposed to his Government’s aims and objectives and which receive funding from abroad.

According to the Advocate General, Hungarian law potentially breaches the free movement provisions of the Single European Market in relation to capital – as well as data protection, freedom of association and privacy rules contained in the European Charter of Fundamental Rights (see Case C-78/18 European Commission v Hungary).

A link to the Advocate General’s Opinion can be found below:

http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=222223&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=15406

This Opinion is not the end of the matter because it is always worth remembering that the Court of Justice may not approve it when it makes its decision on the matter. As the Advocate General currently sees things, Hungarian law disproprotionately discriminates against those individuals and organisations who are not Hungarian. It is a barrier to the legitimate, free flow of capital across the borders of EU member states.

Project 1992

The Single Market (or Project 1992) came into existence on 1 January 1993. The Project saw the 12 member states of what was then the European Communities (the Coal and Steel Community, Euratom and the EEC collectively) implement ambitious plans to ensure frictionless trade. It was said that British businesses would find it as easy to sell goods or to provide services in Madrid as they presently were able to do so in Manchester.

The Single Market was based on 4 fundamental principles:

  • Free movement of persons
  • Free movement of goods
  • Free movement of services
  • Free movement of capital

Over the years, a huge amount of case law has built up around free movement of persons, goods and services, but it is rarer to see a decision of the Court of Justice regarding free movement of capital or money. Yet, free movement of capital is an essential corollary to the smooth operation of the Single Market.

How, for example, would consumers of goods and services in one member state pay for these if legitimate or honest money cannot flow back and forth across borders? Please note that I am not advocating the removal of all barriers to free movement – I am all too aware of the necessity to combat the money laundering activities of organised crime. Anyone who has read Misha Glenny’s excellent and terrifying book, McMafia: Seriously Organised Crime (2017: Vintage), will appreciate the real challenges that free movement of capital represents for law enforcement agencies across the EU.

Put simply, the 3 more prominent freedoms of the Single Market would grind to a halt if money was subject to all sorts of unrealistic barriers e.g. member states being able to impose very restrictive limits on the amount of money citizens could move in and out of the country. With the globalisation of financial services, many of us will either have forgotten these types of restrictions – or never experienced them.

When speaking to younger people, it often strikes me that many of them, who do travel regularly to Europe, have any real concept about things like tariff barriers, currency restrictions or passport controls. Brexit (and all its ramifications) may well be something of a wake -up call.

Admittedly, the original founding Treaty of the European Economic Community or the EEC (the Treaty of Rome) did envisage free movement of capital.

One of the first cases that I remember from my studies in EEC Law was Case 286/82 Luisi and Carbone v Ministero del Tesoro [1984] ECR -00377. At that time, Italy operated currency restrictions which meant that its citizens were limited to the amount of money that they could take out of the country. Luisi and Carbone were both fined by the authorities for taking more money out of the country than they were permitted under current domestic law. They argued that Italian law was in breach of the Treaty of Rome because it prevented them from going to another member state in order to receive services (and to pay for these). The Court of Justice was of the view that the restrictions imposed by Italy were unduly excessive.

Conclusion

In the 21st Century, we often forget that restrictions on movements of people, goods, services and capital were very common place. It is the direct influence of the European Single Market that consigned many of these barriers to trade to the status of historical curiosities.

Copyright Seán J Crossan, 15 January 2020

Presumption of innocence?

Photo by Kay on Unsplash

A deeply embedded principle?

Should the accused in a criminal trial enjoy the presumption of innocence?

This is a long established principle of criminal law in the Western World that I have taken for granted since my first days at university. I always remember Professor Kenny Miller (of Strathclyde University’s Law School) correcting students who spoke in error about the ‘guilty’ person in a Scottish criminal trial. They were quickly admonished and reminded of the maxim that everyone is innocent until proven guilty.

Indeed, Article 11 of the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights takes the view that the presumption of innocence is a fundamental human right.

Furthermore, Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights establishes the right to a fair trial and this includes the presumption of innocence. In the United Kingdom, this very important right has been incorporated into Scots, English and Northern Irish law via the Human Rights Act 1998. In Scotland, we, of course, have an additional layer of protection with the Scotland Act 1998.

Article 48 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights also echoes Article 6 of the European Convention.

Going back to the historical record, the Byzantine or Roman Emperor Justinian I emphasised the presumption of innocence for the accused as part of codification of Roman Law between 529-534 CE. Admittedly, Justinian was building on previous Roman legal practice as the Emperor Antoninus Pius (he of the less well known Wall for our Scottish readers) had introduced the principle during his reign between 138 and 161 CE.

The Romans would say Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat; translated as Proof lies on him who asserts, not on him who denies.

Jewish and Islamic scholars have, historically, also placed huge importance on the presumption of innocence as a cornerstone of their legal practices. Both the Jewish Talmud and Islamic Hadiths (sayings or practices of the Prophet) testify to this.

The Carlos Ghosn Affair

So, why am I reflecting on this area this dull and rainy second day of the New Year?

The escape from Japan of Carlos Ghosn brought the principle forcibly to mind this New Year. Mr Ghosn is the former Chief Executive of Nissan who has been accused of defrauding his former employer.

Mr Ghosn was under effective house arrest in Japan until a few days ago. Allegedly, with the help of his wife, he escaped from that country to the Republic of Lebanon (of which he is a citizen) The escape reads like something from a Hollywood movie script (the Mission: Impossible series anyone?) with Mr Ghosn hiding in a musical instrument case (presumably not a violin case) in order to make good his unauthorised exit from Japan.

A link to an article about Mr Ghosn’s escape in The Independent can be found below:

https://edition.independent.co.uk/editions/uk.co.independent.issue.020120/data/9266461/index.html

A link to a YouTube film about the Affair can be found below:

https://youtu.be/BAxwWW5Ldqo

What is Mr Ghosn’s motivation for leaving Japan in this dramatic way? He claims to have no faith in Japanese justice in that the legal system of that country presumes his guilt.

The Japanese criminal justice system

Not possessing a great deal of knowledge about Japanese criminal practice, I admit that I was somewhat intrigued by Mr Ghosn’s assertions.

I had also just finished reading Owen Matthew’s excellent biography* of Richard Sorge, probably the most successful spy in modern history (and a possible role model for James Bond). Sorge had been spying for the Soviet Union in Japan in the 1930s and 1940s until he was unmasked and arrested in 1941. The treatment of Sorge at the hands of the Japanese criminal justice authorities forms part of the climax to the book.

As Owen Matthews notes:

Japanese justice, surprisingly, for an authoritarian state, turned out to be both thorough and scrupulous. The three volumes of investigative documents prepared by the Tokko [the Japanese Police] are exhaustive, far more professional than the cursory evidence which the NKVD [the forerunner of the Soviet KGB] assembled to convict hundreds of thousands of suspected spies in the 1930s.’ [p345]

Does the Japanese criminal code presume the guilt of persons on trial, as opposed to their innocence?

I decided to investigate …

… what I discovered was something rather more subtle.

The Japanese legal system does recognise the right of the accused to be presumed innocent until proven otherwise – despite Mr Ghosn’s claims. The burden of proof rests on the prosecution to demonstrate the guilt of the accused (as in Scotland, England, the United States etc).

There are indeed criticisms of the Japanese legal system that could be made (but no legal system is immune from criticism). In particular, the practice of not allowing suspects to have access to a lawyer during Police interrogation has been highlighted as a weakness of the system.

Before Scots lawyers get too smug, we would do well to remember the Peter Cadder case which led to an overhaul of Scottish criminal practice (see Cadder v HMA [2010] UKSC 43).

Another criticism of the Japanese legal system seems to centre around the practice of prosecutors rearresting an accused when s/he has been acquitted by a lower court. The accused is then taken before a superior criminal court for a further trial and, possibly, conviction.

That said, in Scotland (and in England), we have abolished the double jeopardy rule, but this does not mean that prosecutors have free range to do what they like.

Finally, an accused who maintains his/her innocence under the Japanese legal system, is often not granted bail and can therefore be expected to undergo a lengthy period of detention until the case is brought to trial (Mr Ghosn was perhaps luckier than most being under house arrest). Critics of this aspect of the legal system have pointed out that it puts suspects under duress making them more likely to make an admission of guilt. Mr Ghosn had apparently spent 120 days in detention before bail (with very strict conditions) was granted last year.

Links to articles about the Japanese legal system from the local media can be found below:

https://www.nippon.com/en/japan-topics/c05403/at-the-mercy-of-the-system-criminal-justice-and-capital-punishment-in-japan.html

https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20190109/p2a/00m/0na/015000c

https://www.japantimes.co.jp/community/2003/12/09/issues/burden-of-proof-impossible-to-bear/#.Xg456i-nyhA

https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2019/01/05/national/media-national/international-scrutiny-japans-criminal-justice-system-fair/#.XhUY0S-nyhA

Conclusion

The principle of presuming the innocence of the accused in a criminal trial until proven otherwise is a deeply rooted one in the Western World. It is a cornerstone of our justice systems. The United Nations regards it as a fundamental human right in terms of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Yet, to assume that it is a Western concept alone, would be a monstrous conceit. Jewish and Islamic legal scholarship have both emphasised the importance of this principle.

Japan, as a member of the United Nations, also recognises the importance of the principle – which makes some of Mr Ghosn’s claims somewhat misjudged. Yes, the operation of the Japanese criminal justice system can and is the subject of criticism, but this observation also applies to every other legal system in the World.

* “An Impeccable Spy – Richard Sorge – Stalin’s Master Agent” by Owen Matthews (Bloomsbury Publishing: 2019)

Copyright Seán J Crossan, 2 January 2020