A very civil partnership

Photo by Han-Hsing Tu on Unsplash

Love and marriage go together like a horse and carriage to paraphrase the words of the old song from the 1950s …

… but not for much longer in Scotland if the Scottish Government has its way. A new Bill lodged by the Government this week will potentially revolutionise legal unions for heterosexual couples who want commitment but not, critically, in the form of marriage.

The Civil Partnerships Act 2004 was originally passed by the UK Government of Prime Minister Tony Blair in order to permit same sex couples to enter a legally binding relationship. At the time, the Blair Government stressed that this type of legal arrangement was not open to heterosexual couples and should not be regarded as “gay marriage”.

This legislation also extended the same employment benefits that married couples already enjoyed to same sex couples who entered a civil partnership. In relation to the field of employment rights, the Act applies to employment and pension benefits e.g. a concessionary travel scheme and civil partners of an employee will be entitled to take advantage of these if existing provisions permit a heterosexual partner or spouse of an employee to claim these benefits.

In Bull and Another v Preddy and Another [2013] UKSC 73, UK Supreme Court Justice, Baroness Hale made the following remarks about civil partnerships:

“Civil partnership is not called marriage but in almost every other respect it is indistinguishable from the status of marriage in United Kingdom law. It was introduced so that same sex couples could voluntarily assume towards one another the same legal responsibilities, and enjoy the same legal rights, as married couples assume and enjoy. It is more than a contract. Like marriage, it is a status, in which some of the terms are prescribed by law, and which has consequences for people other than the couple themselves and for the state.”

Fast forward a decade or so and we now have same sex marriage in Scotland, England and Wales – but not yet Northern Ireland (although the clock may be ticking here on this issue). Admittedly, same sex couples can enter civil partnerships in Northern Ireland, but since the Republic of Ireland made same sex marriage legal in 2015, pressure has been mounting for change in the North.

This means that same sex couples have the option of entering into marriage or civil partnership. This choice is still denied to heterosexual couples – until now, hence the introduction of the Civil Partnership (Scotland) Bill.

Traditional marriage between a man and woman has been criticised on a number of grounds:

• It’s seen as very patriarchal i.e. historically it unduly favours the male partner

• It has religious associations which are not in keeping with the fact that the UK is (in 2019) a much more secular society

• Some heterosexual couples are increasingly attracted to a more equitable and modern form of legal commitment i.e. civil partnership.

Despite these criticisms of traditional marriage, until recently neither the UK or Scottish Governments had shown a desire to extend civil partnerships to heterosexual couples. That is until very recently and a UK Supreme Court decision has now made reform of the institution of marriage and civil partnership essential on the basis of a human rights challenge.

The case which started the ball rolling was Steinfeld and Keidan v Secretary of State for Education [2016].

In Steinfeld and Keidan, an unmarried, heterosexual couple brought a claim for unlawful less favourable treatment against the UK Government on the basis that the law (contained in the Civil Partnership Act 2004) discriminated against them by forcing them to enter marriage as opposed to their preferred option of a civil partnership arrangement. The couple had strong “ideological objections” to marriage (irrespective of whether it took a religious or civil form) and argued, amongst other things, that the failure by the United Kingdom to give them the option of entering a civil partnership was a potential breach of their Article 8 rights (the right to privacy and family life) in terms of the European Convention on Human Rights. The ban on civil partnerships for heterosexual couples was also a potential breach of the Equality Act 2010 in the sense that it represented direct discrimination on grounds of a person’s sexual orientation.

Initially, the English High Court rejected the challenge brought by Steinfeld and Keidan, whereupon the case was allowed to proceed to the English Court of Appeal. Although expressing sympathy for Steinfeld and Keidan’s predicament, the Lord Justices of Appeal refused to overturn the ban.

On 27 June 2018, the Court issued its decision: R (on the application of Steinfeld and Keidan) (Appellants) v Secretary of State for International Development (in substitution for the Home Secretary and the Education Secretary) [2018] UKSC 32.

Lord Kerr gave the leading judgement (with which his fellow Justices concurred) and allowed Steinfeld and Keidan’s appeal:

I would allow the appeal and make a declaration that sections 1 and 3 of CPA [Civil Partnership Act 2004] (to the extent that they preclude a different sex couple from entering into a civil partnership) are incompatible with article 14 of ECHR taken in conjunction with article 8 of the Convention.

If, post Steinfeld and Keidan, the Scottish Government continued to allow civil partnership legislation to operate in its original form, there was a very real risk that the Scottish Ministers would be taken to court and challenged by heterosexual couples (using Steinfeld and Keidan [2018]) on human rights grounds.

The solution?

Letting the status quo prevail in Scotland was not an option because of the implications for human rights, so the Scottish Government announced a public consultation on civil partnerships in September 2018:

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-45675690

This consultation closed on 21 December 2018 and presented two options:

  • Abolishing the option of future civil partnerships for all; or
  • Permitting heterosexual couples to have the option of marriage or civil partnership.

A link to the Scottish Government’s consultation paper can be found below:

https://consult.gov.scot/family-law/the-future-of-civil-partnership-in-scotland/

On the back of this consultation, the Scottish Government has now introduced the Civil Partnership (Scotland) Bill in order to implement option 2.

As the Policy Memorandum accompanying this Bill clearly states:

In Scotland, couples can marry or enter into a civil partnership, or choose to cohabit. Same sex and mixed sex couples can marry, and same sex and mixed sex couples can decide to cohabit. Civil partnership is currently available only to same sex couples, but this Bill will extend the relationship to mixed sex couples.”

It is more than likely that this Bill will command significant support in the Scottish Parliament and will soon become law.

An info graphic showing the current progress of this Bill can be seen below:

A link to BBC Scotland’s website about the introduction of the Bill can be found below:

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-49889498

Postscript

The Equalities and Human Rights Committee of the Scottish Parliament is now seeking the views of the public about the future of civil partnerships and whether allowing heterosexual couples to enter into this type of legal arrangement is desirable.

Interested members of the public have until 31 January 2020 to submit their views to the Committee.

More information about the Committee’s work in this area can be found by accessing the press release at the link below:

https://www.parliament.scot/newsandmediacentre/113453.aspx

Copyright Seán J Crossan, 4 October & 9 November 2019

I’m not your daddy!

Photo by Annie Spratt on Unsplash

In a previous blog (Who’s the daddy? published on 17 July 2019), I discussed the case of Freddy McConnell, a transgender man who wished to be named as his child’s father on the birth certificate.

Mr McConnell, it will be recalled, had been born female and decided to undergo gender reassignment. While undertaking this process, Mr McConnell discovered that he was pregnant. He eventually gave birth to the child and wished to be designated as the father or parent on the child’s birth certificate.

Sir Andrew McFarlane, President of the English High Court has now issued a ruling regarding this matter (See R (on the application of TT v The Registrar General for England and Wales and Others [2019] EWHC 2348 (Fam)).

As the summary of the High Court’s judgement states:

The issue at the centre of this case can be simply stated: where a person, who was born female, but who has subsequently undergone gender transition and acquired full legal recognition as male, becomes pregnant and gives birth to a child, is that person to be registered as their child’s ‘mother’ or ‘father’?”

Well, the simple answer is that Mr McConnell will not be permitted to insist that he be designated (or named) as the child’s father on the birth certificate.

As Sir Andrew McFarlane clearly stated in his judgement (at paragraph 279):

“… there is a material difference between a person’s gender and their status as a parent. Being a ‘mother’, whilst hitherto always associated with being female, is the status afforded to a person who undergoes the physical and biological process of carrying a pregnancy and giving birth. It is now medically and legally possible for an individual, whose gender is recognised in law as male, to become pregnant and give birth to their child. Whilst that person’s gender is ‘male’, their parental status, which derives from their biological role in giving birth, is that of ‘mother’.”

Sir Andrew McFarlane also dismissed Mr McConnell’s secondary argument that, if the court decided he could not be designated the child’s mother under English law, then this would represent a breach of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights i.e. the right to private and family life. English law is not incompatible with the European Convention regarding this matter.

Interestingly, however, Sir Andrew did state (at paragraph 125) that this is an area which the UK Government and Parliament may wish to address in the future:

The issue which has most properly and bravely been raised by the Claimant [Mr McConnell] in this Claim is, at its core, a matter of public policy rather than law. It is an important matter of public interest and a proper cause for public debate. Whilst this judgment will seek to determine the issue by reference to the existing legislation and the extant domestic and ECHR caselaw, as these sources do not themselves directly engage with the central question there would seem to be a pressing need for Government and Parliament to address square-on the question of the status of a trans-male who has become pregnant and given birth to a child.”

Links to Sir Andrew McFarlane’s full judgement and the summary of this can be found below:

https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/TT-and-YY-APPROVED-Substantive-Judgment-McF-25.9.19.pdf

https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/TT-and-YY-Summary.pdf

A link to how the judgement was reported on Sky News can be found below:

http://news.sky.com/story/freddy-mcconnell-transgender-man-who-gave-birth-cannot-be-named-childs-father-11819195

Scotland

As Scotland is a separate legal jurisdiction from England and Wales, the registration of births is primarily governed by the Registration of Births, Deaths and Marriages (Scotland) Act 1965 (as amended).

In Scotland, transgender people can apply to have their birth certificate issued to reflect the fact that they have undergone a process of gender reassignment (as per the terms of the Gender Recognition Act 2004). There is, as yet, no provision in Scots Law for a transgender person who found themselves in Mr McConnell’s position to be designated as the father of a child to which they have physically given birth.

Although an English decision i.e. a persuasive rather than a binding precedent, R (on the application of TT v The Registrar General for England and Wales and Others [2019] EWHC 2348 (Fam) it could be argued that it is likely to be followed by the Scottish courts.

The Scottish Government is, of course, currently carrying out a consultation exercise on changes to the Gender Recognition Act 2004.

See the link to details about this consultation exercise:

https://www2.gov.scot/Topics/Justice/law/17867/gender-recognition-review

Copyright Seán J Crossan, 25 September 2019

Mind your language!

Photo by Ilya Ilford on Unsplash

“Great big girl’s blouse!” or “a girly swot”. Harmless insults; a bit of banter; or perhaps an example of sexist language? Deborah Haynes, a journalist with Sky News, certainly took the view that these remarks were sexist in nature – even though men were the targets (see the link below).

https://news.sky.com/story/sky-views-girly-swot-big-girls-blouse-are-sexist-jibes-and-shouldnt-be-used-by-the-pm-11804690

The first of these remarks was uttered allegedly by Prime Minister Boris Johnson MP in the House of Commons last week and directed towards the Leader of the Opposition, Jeremy Corbyn MP. The second remark was in a memo written by the Prime Minister in which he was critical of David Cameron (one of his predecessors).

Mr Johnson is well known for his colourful language in both print and in his speeches, but he was called out last week in the House of Commons by the Labour MP, Tammanjeet Singh Dhesi who accused him in very blunt terms of making racist remarks about Muslim women who chose to wear the Islamic form of dress known as the burka as an outward sign of their religious beliefs and cultural background.

Mr Tammanjeet drew on his own experiences as a Sikh and the kinds of derogatory remarks that he had to endure. His speech was received very warmly on the Opposition benches of the House of Commons.

On the other hand, Mr Johnson attempted a defence of his language by saying that he had merely spoken up in favour of the good old fashioned liberal value of freedom of speech. It was not an entirely convincing performance from the Prime Minister and far from his finest hour at the despatch box.

The Equality Act 2010 recognises various forms of prohibited conduct such as direct discrimination (Section 13) and harassment (Section 26). Sexist, sectarian and homophobic remarks may well be taken as examples of direct discrimination. A sustained campaign of bullying to which an individual (with a particular protected characteristic) is subjected may amount to harassment.

It will be sensible for employers particularly to spell out to employees what is acceptable (and what is not) in terms of the kinds of language or behaviour in the work-place. If employers do nothing to check discriminatory remarks such as racist or sexist insults, there is a real danger that they could be held vicariously liable.

Had Mr Johnson been a mere mortal, some of his remarks may have come back to haunt him. Employers are entitled to take disciplinary action against those employees who have committed acts of discrimination. After all, they are merely protecting their position by not leaving themselves open to the threat of legal action by the victims.

From the employee’s perspective, engaging in offensive language could give the employer the right to treat this type of behaviour as gross misconduct. It should be recalled that, in terms of Section 98 of the Employment Rights Act 1998, misconduct committed by an employee can be punished by dismissal and such a termination of the employment contract may be entirely reasonable in the circumstances.

In short, no one should have to work in a place where there is a hostile, degrading or intimidating environment. Racist or sexist remarks can be highly suggestive of such a working environment if permitted to go unchecked and unchallenged. Maybe in future the Prime Minister would do well to mind his language.

Links to articles about the Prime Minister’s colourful turn of phrase can be found below:

https://news.sky.com/video/share-11802095

http://news.sky.com/story/boris-johnson-branded-david-cameron-girly-swot-leaked-document-reveals-11803807

Copyright Seán J Crossan, 7 September 2019

The trouble with pregnancy …

Photo by Xavier Mouton Photographie on Unsplash

According to a study just published by the Young Women’s Trust, it would appear that, in 2019, pregnancy discrimination in employment is more common than you might have thought.

The figures seem to show that 10% of those employers who were questioned would be very hesitant to hire a female candidate because of fears that she may decide to have a child in the near to long term future. Male bosses were much more likely to discriminate against female employees in this manner.

Section 18 of the Equality Act 2010 makes it illegal for employers to treat a woman less favourably in relation to pregnancy and maternity. Thankfully, there is no longer a requirement for a women to identify a male comparator in cases of alleged pregnancy and maternity discrimination (Section 17 of the Act deals with discrimination in non-work cases).

The Equality Act was particularly significant for women. Probably, for the first time in UK anti-discrimination law, less favourable treatment in relation to the issues of maternity and pregnancy would be dealt with in a more comprehensive and integrated fashion. Under the older equality laws, such as the now defunct Sex Discrimination Act 1975, women could not always be confident that they would receive protection under the law in connection with these important issues. Regrettably, repeated failures by the UK Parliament in this area meant that the intervention of the European Union had to be called upon when domestic law was found to be inadequate.

Ultimately the Court of Justice of the European Union would improve the legal situation for pregnant women (see Dekker v Stichting Vormingscentrum voor Jonge Volwassen Plus [1991] IRLR 27, a case which originated in the Netherlands).

In Dekker, the Court of Justice stated unequivocally that it is always direct discrimination to refuse to offer employment to a woman for reason of her pregnancy. The Court also made it clear that a pregnant woman does not have to compare herself to that of a male co-worker/employee.

The provisions of Section 18 of the Equality Act implement the European Union’s Equal Treatment Directive (2002/73) in relation to maternity and pregnancy.

The Directive contained far stronger rules expressly forbidding discrimination on the grounds of pregnancy and maternity leave. This should mean that pregnant women now receive much stronger legal protection in employment. Pregnant employees must, however, prove that the less favourable treatment suffered by them was by reason of their pregnancy.

An employer will also commit an act of direct sex discrimination if a female employee is dismissed by reason of her pregnancy (see O’Neill v Governors of St Thomas More [1996] IRLR 27). The dismissal can also be challenged on the grounds that it is automatically unfair in terms of Section 99 of the Employment Rights Act 1996.

Yet, despite all this legal protection, we still hear stories about the prevalence of pregnancy and maternity discrimination in the work-place. The one bright spot in the story is that the number of employers who stated that they would be reluctant to hire a female employee due to pregnancy concerns had actually decreased. That, at least, is a small crumb of comfort, but still not much to be overjoyed about.

Links to the story can be found below

http://news.sky.com/story/dinosaur-bosses-reluctant-to-hire-women-who-may-get-pregnant-11790837

https://www.youngwomenstrust.org/what_we_do/media_centre/press_releases/1011_employers_say_theyd_be_reluctant_to_hire_women_who_may_have_children

A link to a recent case from Northern Ireland where a pregnant woman successfully sued her employer for discrimination can be found below:

Pregnant woman ‘unfairly dismissed’ rules industrial tribunal

Laura Gruzdaite was accused of “skipping work” despite telling bosses about a baby scan.

Copyright Seán J Crossan, 22 August & 25 September 2019

Beardy weirdy?

Photo by Nonsap Visuals on Unsplash

A common theme of this Blog over the last few weeks concerns banning certain forms of dress or appearance (Burka bans and horse racing in a hijab published on 1 August 2019).

Imposing a ban in relation to dress codes or appearance can be problematic legally speaking because such an approach could be tantamount to indirect discrimination in terms of Section 19 of the Equality Act 2010.

Several of my previous blogs have addressed the issue of indirect discrimination.

So it was with some interest that I read a story recently about Burger King’s plans to prevent male staff from wearing beards while working in its restaurants throughout the region of Catalunya/Catalonia in Spain. Immediately, I thought about the legal consequences of such a ban being introduced to UK Burger King outlets. The test for indirect discrimination is whether a provision, criterion or policy (PCP) imposed by an organisation is likely to have a disproportionately adverse effect on certain groups of individuals who possess a characteristic protected by law (in the UK, we are primarily talking about the Equality Act).

Unsurprisingly, this attempt to impose a blanket ban on Burger King’s male employees fell foul of the Spanish Constitution’s provisions on equality. I would be prepared to stick my neck out and argue that a similar result would almost certainly be replicated in the UK had Burger King attempted to introduce such a ban. I wasn’t really surprised by this outcome because Spain, as an EU member state, has very similar equality and discrimination laws to the UK. In fact, the current concept of indirect discrimination in the Equality Act 2010 is derived from EU Law.

So, who might be affected if an employer implements a blanket ban on the wearing of beards in the work place? Quite a lot of male employees as it turns out, for example, very religious and observant Jews, Muslims and Sikhs. Furthermore, members of the Russian and Greek Orthodox faith groups and Rastafarians may also face real issues complying with such a requirement imposed by the employer. In short order, such bans may infringe religious and cultural expression and may not only be a breach of the Equality Act, but could also represent a breach of human rights laws under the Human Rights Act 1998 and Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

It is always open to an organisation, of course, to argue that dress codes or enforcing strict rules about an individual’s personal appearance can be objectively justified. In the past, banning beards or regulating the length of hairstyles in the work place have been justified successfully by employers or organisations on health and safety grounds i.e. primarily concerning hygiene (see Singh v Rowntree Mackintosh (1979) ICR 554 and Panesar v Nestle Co Ltd [1980] IRLR 64 CA).

Each attempt to justify a provision, criterion or policy (PCP) will, of course, turn on its facts and it would be very foolish for organisations to think that there is some sort of magic bullet or get out of jail card which can be used in every situation to justify or excuse conduct which would otherwise amount to unlawful discrimination. Organisations should review policies on a regular basis and, if need be, this may necessitate the carrying out of an equality impact assessment.

Recently, the Royal Air Force (RAF) has significantly relaxed its total ban on male service personnel wearing beards (moustaches were permitted). This change of heart by the RAF has been motivated by the realisation that individuals from ethnic and religious minorities were being actively deterred from applying to join the service because of the ban on beards.

Even the argument that beards are unhygienic is being undermined with Professor Michael Moseley, presenter of the BBC programme “Trust Me I’m a Doctor“, highlighting recent, scientific evidence that clean shaven men represent a greater threat to hygiene than their bearded counterparts.

Links to the stories on Burger King’s attempt to ban the beard, the RAF’s change of policy and whether beards are actually unhygienic can be found below:

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jul/31/burger-king-beard-ban-infringes-workers-rights-says-catalonia

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-49313406

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-35350886

Copyright Seán J Crossan, 16 August 2019

Burka bans and horse racing in a Hijab

Photo by أخٌ في الله on Unsplash

I have just been reading two, contrasting stories about Islamic dress codes which appeared in today’s UK media.

The first story comes from our close neighbour and EU partner, the Netherlands which has decided to bring in a new law banning certain forms of Islamic dress – principally the Burka, Hijab and the Niqab – from being worn by female Muslims in hospitals and schools and while travelling by public transport. This ban imitates similar initiatives in other EU member states such as Austria, Denmark, France and Germany. Those individuals who ignore or flout the ban run the risk of being fined €150. Some Dutch politicians, for example, Geert Wilders of the far right Party for Freedom would like the law to be extended in order to ban Islamic headscarves.

The second story comes from the UK and couldn’t be more different in tone. The BBC reports that a female, Muslim jockey, who wears the Hijab, has made history by winning the Magnolia Cup at Glorious Goodwood.

Links to the two stories can be found below:

http://news.sky.com/story/netherlands-burka-ban-comes-into-force-in-schools-hospitals-and-on-buses-11774887

Khadijah Mellah: Hijab-wearing jockey triumphs on Haverland and makes history

These two stories made me think about the limits of tolerance in relation to the outward signs of religious belief in our communities. Under UK and EU laws, a person’s religion is a protected characteristic and s/he has the right not to be subjected to unlawful, less favourable treatment (discrimination).

The right to enjoy protection from religious discrimination was first introduced to the mainland UK as a result of the EU Directive 2000/78/EC on Equal Treatment in Employment and Occupation. The laws on religious discrimination were to be found in the Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003. It should be noted that the scope of these Regulations was limited in that they applied only to the area of employment – not, for example, the provision of goods and services.

Previously, Northern Ireland was the only part of the UK which had laws on religious discrimination – for understandable reasons given the troubled history of that part of the world. The Regulations did not extend to Northern Ireland because it already had laws in place to deal with this issue.

The Regulations have now been superseded by the provisions of the Equality Act 2010 (primarily Section 10) which are much wider in scope in that they cover both religious discrimination in employment and the provision of goods and services.

Additionally, Article 22 of the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights recognises a person’s right to cultural and religious diversity.

Wearing Islamic dress is obviously a way in which very religious members of this community can express their religious beliefs. Reading both articles today, I found myself asking the question what would be the legal effects if a similar ban on Islamic dress was introduced in the UK?

The new UK Prime Minister, Boris Johnson, has made disparaging remarks about forms of Islamic dress, but admittedly he does not seem willing to introduce a ban.

Countries such as Austria, Denmark, France, Germany and now the Netherlands are just as much bound by laws such as Directive 2000/78/EC and the Charter of Fundamental Rights as the UK is at the time of writing, so how do they justify banning certain forms of Islamic dress?

Freedom of religion is not absolute and sometimes the State can decide that a person’s religious beliefs must take second place if they clash with other people’s human rights (e.g. sexual orientation) or general public safety goals. In the UK, discrimination less favourable treatment in connection with a person’s protected characteristics may be permitted under the Equality Act 2010 if it can be objectively justified i.e. it is a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. Health and safety or concerns about terrorism are often grounds used by States across the EU to justify periodic crackdowns on the wearing of Islamic dress in public places.

Copyright Seán J Crossan, 1 August 2019

Who’s the daddy?

Photo by Sandy Millar on Unsplash

Coming on the back of one of my recent blogs about gender reassignment (Gender Neutral? published on 25 June 2019), I spotted an interesting story appeared on Sky News today.

It concerns a legal action taken by Freddy McConnell, a multimedia journalist with The Guardian newspaper, to have himself declared the father of a child. There would seem to be nothing particularly significant about this. Mr McConnell is a transgender man and he gave birth to the child in 2018 after he had undergone gender reassignment and was no longer legally recognised as female. During the process of gender reassignment, Mr McConnell chose not to have a hysterectomy.

When he attempted to register himself as the child’s father, the registrar refused to do this – hence the lodging of the legal action before the English High Court’s Family Division.

In terms of Section 7 of the Equality Act 2010, a person who has undergone or who is contemplating gender reassignment can bring a legal action under the Act if they believe that they have been subjected to unlawful, less favourable treatment (prohibited conduct).

The story has now hit the headlines because Mr McConnell had enjoyed anonymity while the action is still to be decided. He has now lost this anonymity because he participated in a documentary (partly produced by his employer) about his struggle to be named as his child’s father rather than its mother.

Other media outlets, such as The Telegraph, challenged the anonymity order as they argued that it infringed the right of journalists to comment freely on a matter of legitimate, public interest.

Human rights

Interestingly, the story then became not merely about transgender rights, but also one of human rights (in terms of the Human Rights Act 1998). There was a conflict between Mr McConnell’s right to privacy and a family life and the right of freedom of expression of journalists (Articles 8 and 10 respectively of the European Convention on Human Rights). On this particular matter, Mr McConnell has lost his attempt to remain anonymous as Sir Andrew McFarlane, President of the High Court’s Family Division has found in favour of The Telegraph et al.

It remains to be seen whether Mr McConnell will win his legal action to be named as his child’s father on the birth certificate.

A link to the story on the Sky News website can be found below:

http://news.sky.com/story/man-who-gave-birth-loses-anonymity-in-his-bid-to-be-registered-as-father-on-birth-certificate-11764821

A link to Sir Andrew McFarlane’s judgement can be found below:

TT v YY [2019] EWHC 1823 (Fam) Case No: FD18F00035

https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/TT-anonymity-judgment-150719.pdf

Copyright Seán J Crossan, 17 July 2019