Gender recognition postponed

Photo by Sharon McCutcheon on Unsplash

The Coronavirus continues to create chaos – legally speaking.

The latest casualty is the Scottish Government’s promised review of the Gender Recognition Act 2004. This exercise will now be postponed for the foreseeable future.

On 20 June 2019, the Scottish Government stated that, following a consultation in 2018, it would be bringing forward a Gender Recognition Bill in order to reform the current Gender Recognition Act 2004.

This exercise was always dogged by a lack of clarity on the Government’s part. Shirley-Anne Sommerville MSP, the Government Minister who had responsibility for this issue had publicly admitted that there was still a need to build a “maximum consensus” before things become clearer. Code for sorting out divisions over the issue within the ranks of the Scottish National Party.

A link to information about the proposed Bill can be found below:

https://www.gov.scot/publications/review-of-gender-recognition-act-2004/

The Gender Recognition Act 2004

In April 2005, the Gender Recognition Act 2004 came into force. This Act, which received the Royal Assent on 1 July 2004, currently provides people who have undergone gender reassignment procedures with legal recognition in relation to their newly acquired gender identity. The legislation applies across the United Kingdom and was passed by the Westminster Parliament.

Legal recognition of a person’s decision to reassign the sex or gender they have had from birth will follow from the issuing of a full gender recognition certificate by a Gender Recognition Panel. The individual applying for such a certificate must be able to satisfy certain criteria – the most important criterion will centre around the submission of medical evidence of physiological changes by the applicant.

Since the introduction of the Act, it has long been the case, therefore, that it will amount be unlawful discrimination to treat a person less favourably because s/he has undergone a a process of gender reassignment. The Equality Act 2010, of course, also bolsters legal protection for transgender people.

The Scottish Government’s proposed Gender Recognition Bill

The proposed Bill was controversial because some Scottish National Party MSPs and MPs (e.g. Joanna Cherry QC, Ash Denham, Kate Forbes and Lindsay Martin) are concerned about its main objective: that an individual who wishes to undergo gender reassignment will no longer have to provide medical evidence to the Gender Recognition Panel. The Panel currently determines the gender or sex of individuals who wish to undergo reassignment by issuing them with a certificate:

https://www.scottishlegal.com/article/joanna-cherry-qc-signs-letter-opposing-rush-to-reform-gender-law

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-48037152

Under the Scottish Government’s proposals, an individual could effectively self-identify as a person of the opposite sex without having to undergo invasive medical procedures and provide the evidence of this fact in order to obtain recognition from the Panel.

Under the proposed legislation, an individual wishing to undergo gender reassignment would have to have met the following criteria:

  • A statutory declaration to the effect that they have decided to change gender or sex;
  • The declaration will contain a statement that the individual has been living as a man or a woman for at a minimum of 3 months;
  • The individual will have to undertake a compulsory or mandatory period of 3 months to reflect on the decision to undergo gender reassignment (no gender recognition certificate will be issued until this period has been completed).

Two academics at the University of Edinburgh, Dr Kath Murray and Lucy Hunter Blackburn have also been extremely critical about the Scottish Government’s approach to transgender rights generally.

A link to an article in The Holyrood Magazine discussing the research conducted by the two academics can be found below:

https://www.holyrood.com/articles/news/scottish-trans-policy-detrimental-women-and-girls

For the time being all of the above is going to be purely academic.

Related Blog articles:

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2019/07/17/whos-the-daddy/

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2019/09/26/im-not-your-daddy/

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2019/06/25/gender-neutral/

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2020/02/18/safe-spaces/

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2019/12/21/say-what-you-want/

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2020/02/16/say-what-you-want-continued/

Copyright Seán J Crossan, 1 April 2020

What a difference a day makes …

Photo by Jim Wilson on Unsplash

Only yesterday, I was discussing provisions of the Coronavirus (Scotland) Bill which would have led to the suspension of trial by jury for indictable offences in Scotland.

It seems that the Scottish Government has had second thoughts about this issue and has decided not to proceed with these proposals – although Humza Yousaf MSP, Cabinet Secretary for Justice has said that the Government will revisit the matter sometime in the next month.

This is the essential problem with emergency legislation – the unexpected consequences which arise in such situations due to the fact that there is a lack of effective oversight or supervision.

Were the Government’s proposals a sinister attempt to undermine trial by jury or were they simply a necessary evil determined by social distancing requirements during the COVID-19 crisis?

Whatever reason you prefer, the Scottish Government has found itself at the centre of a backlash from the usual suspects – the Scottish Criminal Bar Association – and from its own supporters e.g. Joanna Cherry QC MP (see below):

This has led to a situation which no Government (irrespective of its political colours) likes to be in: having to make an embarrassing U-turn.

In normal times, of course, the Government would have circulated its proposals in a discussion paper well in advance of any draft legislation being published. In this way, various interested parties, such as the Faculty of Advocates and the Law Society of Scotland, could have made their views known and, for the Government, this allows a useful measurement of the temperature to be taken.

The Law Society of Scotland, which represents solicitors, bemoaned the lack of consultation by the Scottish Government (see below):

This is why emergency legislation should always contain a clause or a provision which allows it to be regularly reviewed by Parliament. In this way, very simple questions can be posed:

  • Is the law working properly?
  • Is it still necessary?

Please find below a link to the story about this development on the BBC website:

www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-52111412

Related Blog articles:

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2020/03/31/trial-without-jury/

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2020/03/23/tholing-his-assize-alex-salmond-former-scottish-first-minister-acquitted-of-13-charges-of-sexual-offences-some-reflections-on-criminal-prosecutions-in-scotland-the-burden-of-proof-required-to-secu

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2020/02/15/oh-brother/

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2019/05/02/consent/

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2019/02/25/the-jury/

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2020/03/15/kaboom/

Copyright Seán J Crossan, 1 April 2020

Trial without jury?

Screen capture by Seán J Crossan

I seem to be on a theme today due to COVID-19.

The latest legal development is the Scottish Government’s attempt to deal with the crisis by passing an emergency Bill through the Scottish Parliament in one day. The Coronavirus (Scotland) Bill undoubtedly contains welcome measures e.g. protection for tenants against eviction by their landlords throughout the duration of the crisis.

The relevant provisions of the Bill are contained in Section 11(1) and (4) respectively and are as follows:

“The Scottish Ministers may by regulations provide that trials on indictment are to be conducted by the court sitting without a jury.”

This would, in effect, create a situation where a Sheriff or a Lord Commissioner of Justiciary in a solemn trial was both Master of the Law and Master of fact.

Not everyone is welcoming the Bill in its entirety: the Scottish Criminal Bar Association has been extremely critical of proposals which would, in particular, permit the temporary abolition of trial by jury (solemn trials).

Prominent members of the Scottish National Party, such as Joanna Cherry QC MP, have stated their extremely strong opposition to the proposals (see Tweet below):

Ronnie Renucci QC, Chair of the Scottish Criminal Bar Association, issued the following statement attacking the Bill’s provisions in relation to jury trials:

The proposals in this bill include attacks on principles that have been built over 600 years and are at the very cornerstone of Scotland’s criminal justice system and democratic tradition. … Any changes, however temporary, should not erode important principles of our legal system which would have the effect of undermining or ignoring the citizen’s rights to justice. They should not at a stroke remove the fundamental principle of the right of those citizens charged with serious offences to a trial by a jury of their peers within a reasonable time. … The SCBA believes that these draconian measures seeking to bring about seismic changes to our system of justice are premature, disproportionate and ill-advised. They are at best a knee-jerk reaction to an as yet unquantified problem instigated by panic or at worst, something far more sinister.”

As Mr Renucci also points out in his statement, juries have been in existence in Scotland since the reign of King Alexander II (1214-49). Even during the Second World War, the practice of trial by jury continued – albeit restricted to 7 jurors as opposed to the usual number of 15.

I should, of course, point out that the vast majority of criminal trials (95%) in Scotland are conducted in the lower criminal courts – the Justice of the Peace and Sheriff Courts – under summary procedure. In England and Wales, the figures are similar. Yet, the emotional attachment to the right of trial by jury remains very strong in both jurisdictions.

We should not, however, ignore or downplay the value of solemn trials in that they permit someone who is accused of serious criminal offences (e.g. former Scottish First Minister, Alex Salmond) to be tried by a jury of his/her peers. A

There are unhappy precedents for restricting the right to trial by jury.

In Northern Ireland, during the period known euphemistically as ‘The Troubles‘, the Diplock Courts were established under the provisions of the Northern Ireland Act 1973. This legislation abolished the right to trial by jury for terrorism related offences. The rationale behind this development was to curb juror intimidation by paramilitary organisations such as the Provisional IRA and the Ulster Defence Association. These courts, where one judge presided, were highly controversial. They were only abolished comparatively recently as a result of the introduction of the Justice and Security (Northern Ireland) Act 2007.

During the first and second terms of the Blair Government (1997-2001 and 2001-2005 respectively), attempts were made to curtail the right to trial by jury in England and Wales. This would have applied to offences triable either way i.e. they could be tried under summary procedure or on indictment. In such situations, it is the choice of the accused (the defendant) to decide which sort of trial they should face – trial by magistrates or trial by jury. The Blair Government’s proposals were not welcomed and eventually sank beneath the waves of protest from a number of Mr Blair’s own MPs, members of the House of Lords, the Law Society and the Bar Council (to name but a few opponents).

https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2000/jan/21/jurytrials.law2

https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/labour-rebels-to-ambush-blair-over-trial-by-jury-105088.html

Conclusion

Some 20 years ago, when Prime Minister Blair’s Government proposed restrictions on the right to trial by jury, the words of Lord Devlin, a former Law Lord, were often quoted. Lord Devlin’s remarks are worth repeating in the current context:

“…trial by jury is more than an instrument of Justice and more than one wheel of the constitution: it is the lamp that shows that freedom lives.”

Related Blog articles:

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2020/03/23/tholing-his-assize-alex-salmond-former-scottish-first-minister-acquitted-of-13-charges-of-sexual-offences-some-reflections-on-criminal-prosecutions-in-scotland-the-burden-of-proof-required-to-secu

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2020/02/15/oh-brother/

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2019/05/02/consent/

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2019/02/25/the-jury/

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2020/03/15/kaboom/

Copyright Seán J Crossan, 31 March 2020

Right to refuse?

Thanks to @beamomatic9000 for making this photo available freely on @unsplash 🎁

The COVID-19 crisis continues to throw up some interesting legal questions e.g. employment rights, EU freedom of movement rights, frustration of contract etc.

One area which seems somewhat overlooked is in relation to the actions of many retailers – principally supermarkets and grocery stores – which have been restricting sales of particular items. The items in question include soap, hand gel and sanitiser, bleach, anti-septic wipes, paper towels and even toilet rolls.

The COVID-19 situation has led to panic buying of these essential hygiene items and supermarkets have imposed clear limits on their sale.

Can supermarkets and other retailers impose these sorts of restrictions?

This, of course, takes us back to the basic rules governing the formation of a contract. Retailers are especially guilty when applying the term ‘offer’ to the goods which they stock. It is no such thing: goods on the shelves; on display; or in shop windows are invitations to treat. It is the the customer who is being invited to make the offer (see Fisher v Bell [1961] 3 ALL ER 731 where the English Court of Appeal ruled that a knife displayed in a shop window was not being offered for sale, it was merely an invitation to treat. Lord Parker, the Chief Justice being particularly emphatic on this point).

In the seminal case of Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain v Boots Cash Chemists [1953] 1 QB 401, the judges of the English Court of Appeal helpfully distinguished between an offer and an invitation to treat. The case arose as a result of a provision in the Pharmacy and Poisons Act 1933 which stipulated that the sale of certain medicines must take place in the presence of a registered pharmacist.

Boots Chemists operated a self service system whereby it’s customers were able to place the medicines which they wished to purchase in their shopping baskets. The key question was whether Boots was breaking the law by allowing customers to do this. In other words, was the sale completed when the customer placed the medicines in their baskets? Now, if goods on shelves were to be regarded as ‘offers’, Boots would indeed be breaking the law because customers would be deemed to be ‘accepting’ these ‘offers’ by placing the goods in question in their baskets.

If, on the other hand, the sale was concluded elsewhere i.e. at the cash register where there was always a registered pharmacist on duty, Boots would be fully complying with the Act.

The Court of Appeal concluded that it was the customer who made the offer by presenting the goods at the cash register. The sales assistant (properly supervised by the pharmacist) could conclude matters i.e. accept the offer by ringing the sale up on the cash register. Furthermore, it was always open to the assistant to refuse the customer’s offer. Goods on shelves were, therefore, merely an invitation to treat.

In more normal times, a customer’s offer would and should be refused by retailers because they are an underage person who is attempting to purchase e.g. alcohol, cigarettes or video games or DVDs which are age specific.

So, in this way, retailers are generally within their rights to impose strict limits on the numbers of certain items that customers wish to purchase. The customer can offer to buy 20 bottles of hand gel or sanitiser, but the store will have the right to refuse.

Presently, retailers are putting these sorts of restrictions into place in order to protect and promote public health by giving as many customers, as possible, reasonable access to basic hygiene products. If we co-opt the language of the Equality Act 2010, retailers are putting restrictions in place because these are a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. So, hopefully, such restrictions – if fairly implemented and monitored – will not be subject to a legal challenge on grounds of discrimination.

Related Blog Articles:

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2019/12/06/tis-the-season-of-special-offers/

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2019/03/27/special-offers/

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2019/03/14/too-good-to-be-true/

Copyright Seán J Crossan, 26 March 2020

State of emergency

Photo by Markus Spiske on Unsplash

In a Blog published yesterday, I discussed the issue of entitlement to sick pay as a result of the Coronavirus or COVID-19 outbreak.

Related Blog article:

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2020/03/04/sick-pay-or-the-coronavirus-conundrum/

State of emergency

Governor Gavin Newsom of the US State of California declared a state wide emergency on Wednesday 4 March 2020 in order to counter the spread of the virus.

Please see a link below to an article in the Los Angeles’ Times concerning Governor Newsom’s announcement:

https://www.latimes.com/california/newsletter/2020-03-05/coronavirus-cruise-emergency-newsletter

How are the recent developments in California linked to events in the UK?

It should be recalled that Governor Newsom signed into law Assembly Bill 5 of 2019 in January of this year. You don’t remember this? Well, Assembly Bill 5 is better known as the Californian Gig Economy law which, in effect, gives thousands of workers employment status. Significantly, this means that many of these affected individuals will now benefit from greater levels of employment protection – including entitlement to sick pay.

Now, think about this: had the COVID-19 outbreak occurred last year, many Californian workers would have had absolutely no entitlement to receive sick pay if such individuals were forced to self-isolate or take time off because they had been infected. No doubt many of these workers turned employees will be breathing a huge sigh of relief that they are now covered by Assembly Bill 5.

Related Blog article:

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2020/02/13/california-dreamin/

The UK approach

Turning our attention to the UK, the British Government has taken a less generous approach to the issue of entitlement to sick pay. True, employees and other workers who already benefit from entitlement to statutory sick pay (SSP) should now be able to claim this from day 1 of sickness absence. It should be emphasised that this is a temporary measure justified on emergency grounds.

Previously, statutory sick pay was payable only from day 4 of the employee’s absence until Prime Minister Johnson’s announcement in the House of Commons on Tuesday 3 March 2020.

Jeremy Corbyn, Leader of the opposition Labour Party, immediately asked the PM if zero hours workers and self-employed individuals would have this benefit extended to them. The PM’s response to Mr Corbyn’s question will have disappointed many of these individuals. No entitlement to statutory sick pay for them. The problem for these individuals is that they do not meet the eligibility threshold where they earn £118 per week (the Lower Earnings Limit).

There is also the small fact that employment status (which is linked to entitlement to sick pay) is defined by the Employment Rights Act 1996. Section 230 of the Act defines an employee as an individual who has a contract of service. Many employment rights flow from this status and this means that many individuals who are engaged on a contract for services will simply not be eligible to claim statutory sick pay.

A link to an article in The Mirror newspaper about the exchanges in the House of Commons between PM Johnson and Mr Corbyn about SSP entitlement can be found below:

https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/politics/breaking-new-coronavirus-sick-pay-21629942

An evolving position?

… and yet, the UK Government’s thinking on this issue may be quickly evolving. On the BBC’s Question Time television programme broadcast on Thursday 5 March 2020, Matt Hancock MP, the UK Health Secretary said that people on zero hours contracts and self-employed persons should not be financially penalised for doing the right thing i.e. self-isolating themselves or being honest about having the virus.

It will be interesting to see how the story develops and what changes to UK employment law may follow as a result.

Copyright Seán J Crossan, 5 March 2020

Sick Pay? (or the Coronavirus Conundrum)

Photo by Macau Photo Agency on Unsplash

Coronavirus (COVID-19) isn’t just a potential threat to your health; it could also mean that your earnings take a hit.

How so?

If you have to take time off from work (i.e. self-isolate yourself) because you have (or might have) been infected by the virus, will you be entitled to receive sick pay from the organisation that you are working for?

It depends very much on your employment status …

… if you are a zero hours worker or genuinely a self-employed person, the answer is an emphatic no.

If you are deemed to be an employee (an individual who works under a contract of service) within the meaning of Section 230 of the Employment Rights Act 1996, you may be fortunate in that you have an entitlement to receive either contractual sick pay or statutory sick pay.

Contractual sick pay

If a contractual sick pay scheme applies to your employment, you might receive, at its fullest extent, 6 months full pay and then 6 months at half pay. This generous arrangement, of course, will not apply from day 1 of the employment and employees will have to build up their continuous service in order to be eligible for the maximum level of contractual sick pay. It is probably the case that an employee with just over a year’s service would receive 1 month at full pay for sickness absence and then 1 month at half pay.

An example of entitlement to contractual sick pay arrangements taken from the Collective Agreement (the National Working Practices Agreement) between Scottish Further Education lecturers and their employers can be seen below:

Statutory sick pay

What about statutory sick pay or SSP? This is relevant in situations where employees are not entitled to receive contractual sick pay.

It’s also worth pointing out that contractual sick pay is often much more generous than SSP and, even then, not all employees will be entitled to receive this benefit because they fall outside the eligibility criteria. The current weekly rate of sickness pay (in March 2020) is £98.25 and could be paid by employers for a maximum of 28 weeks.

Ordinarily, it becomes payable only from 4th day of sickness absence, but as of Wednesday 4th March 2020, the UK Government has announced that employees who self-isolate themselves because of suspected Coronavirus infection, will be paid SSP from day 1 of their sickness absence.

This is a temporary measure which will apply only for the duration of the current COVID-19 emergency, but people who are off sick with a medical condition other than the virus will also be entitled to benefit from these changes.

See links below to articles on the BBC website about sickness pay entitlement and COVID-19:

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-51628524

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-51738837

The change in Government policy will not be extended to the self-employed; and to zero hours workers (who will not be able to meet the threshold conditions for eligibility). Frances O’Grady, the General Secretary of the UK’s Trades Union Congress (TUC) has stated that as many as 2 million workers may not be eligible for SSP under the current system.

There has been some concern expressed that individuals in these categories may continue to go to work – if they have the virus or suspect as much – because they will not receive SSP during their absence.

Eligibility criteria for SSP

In 2019-20, in order to qualify for SSP you must be an employee earning at least £118 per week or £512 per month (before tax). This is known as the Lower Earnings Limit.

In April 2020, SSP will rise to £95.85 per week, but individuals’ earnings must fall within any of the following bands in order to qualify:

  • £120 per week
  • £520 per month
  • £6,240 per year

Again, this will mean that many zero hours contract workers will simply fail to qualify for SSP payments.

More problems …

There is also another complication concerning eligibility for sickness pay which the COVID-19 outbreak has raised:

Let’s assume that you do qualify for either contractual sick pay or SSP, but you have decided to take the precautionary measure of self-isolation so as not to expose your colleagues to potential risk.

It may be that you have recently returned from a destination such as China or Italy where the virus has been particularly prevalent and you decide to play it safe by not going into work. You contact your HR Department or employer to inform them of your decision; you are thanked for being extremely considerate and responsible; and then you are told that you are not entitled to receive sick pay because you haven’t actually been diagnosed with the virus.

Matt Hancock MP, UK Government Minister for Health, thinks that current legislation does cover such situations and individuals who take precautionary measures, as outlined above, should benefit from sick pay provisions.

With all due respect to Mr Hancock, what he thinks and what current legislation or a contract of employment states might be entirely different realities. That said, Mr Hancock does have the support of the highly regarded Advisory Conciliation and Arbitration Service (ACAS) which is recommending that employers pay self-isolating employees who have taken such a precautionary measure (see link below).

https://www.acas.org.uk/acas-publishes-new-advice-on-handling-coronavirus-at-work

Conclusion

Clearly, COVID-19 is presenting a number of challenges to traditional practices or orthodoxies in the field of employment law. This is a serious issue given that recent estimates are predicting that up to 20% of the UK workforce could be in danger of contracting the virus and, consequently, they will be absent from work.

In some respects, the UK Government has been caught napping on the issue of extending employment protection e.g. entitlement to sick pay to people who do not have a contract of service and the COVID-19 outbreak has really exposed this shortcoming.

As Jonathan Rennie of law firm, TLT, had noted (as recently as this week) the UK Government has failed to implement any of the recommendations of the Taylor Review which favoured extended employment protection to workers who did not have a contract of service. It is somewhat ironic that the virus outbreak has forced the Government to break cover and extend some employment protection rights.

A link to an article on the BBC website about the predicted impact of COVID-19 on the UK workforce can be found below:

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-51718917

Copyright Seán J Crossan, 4 March 2020

Welcome to Austria?

Photo by rashid khreiss on Unsplash

Willkomen (welcome) to Austria? Not if you’re Italian or someone travelling across the Austro-Italian frontier last weekend.

Why? The dramatic escalation of Coronavirus (COVID-19) outbreaks in Italy is the short answer.

The Austrian Government is very nervous about this and took emergency action by, arguably, suspending free movement provisions – if only briefly. On Sunday 23 February 2020, the Austrian authorities refused entry to its territory of a train coming from Italy for several hours. The Italian railway authorities had informed their Austrian counterparts that at least two of the passengers were exhibiting signs of a fever. The Austrians were taking no chances. The train was eventually permitted to cross the frontier.

The crisis is far from over with controls between Austria and Italy being currently considered by the Government in Vienna to deal with this public health issue.

A link to an article about this incident can be found below:

https://www.dw.com/en/coronavirus-austria-briefly-halts-trains-from-italy-over-covid-19-concerns/a-52493063

What are the legal implications of an EU member state suspending freedom of movement rules?

Italy and Austria are both member states of the European Union and free movement of persons is a key provision or fundamental freedom of the EU’s Single Market. Both countries are also part of the Schengen Agreement (from which the UK opted out whilst in the EU) which allows visa free travel between participating states. This Agreement has seen the abolition of frontier controls, to a a greater or larger extent, in many parts of Europe.

The imposition of frontier controls between EU member states is not a measure which is considered lightly.

Freedom of movement is a right which is fundamentally based on a person holding EU citizenship (or being related to a person who has citizenship). As Article 20 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) which establishes the concept of citizenship states:

Citizenship of the Union is hereby established. Every person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union. Citizenship of the Union shall be additional to and not replace national citizenship.

Article 21 TFEU declares in the following terms:

Every citizen of the [European] Union shall have the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, subject to the limitations and conditions laid down in the Treaties and by the measures adopted to give them effect.”

These freedom of movement provisions would be meaningless and ineffective if EU citizens faced discrimination on the grounds of their nationality in the host member state. Article 18 of the TFEU prohibits discrimination on the grounds of nationality (see Case 197/84 Steinhauser v City of Biarritz).

According to Article 45(5) TFEU, the free movement provisions can be derogated from i.e. disregarded on the following grounds:

  • Public security
  • Public policy
  • Public health

For its part, the Italian Government has since publicly stated that it will not be reintroducing frontier controls as an emergency measure to combat the spread of the Coronavirus:

https://www.schengenvisainfo.com/news/italy-refuses-to-suspend-schengen-agreement-amid-coronavirus-outbreak/

Attempts by member states to derogate or withdraw from the free movement provisions will not be automatically approved and the affected individuals will always be able to challenge such restrictions in the national courts or, ultimately, before the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) (see, for example, Cases 115-116/81 Adoui & Cornaille; Case 41/74 Van Duyn v Home Office; Case 36/75 Rutili v Minister of Interior).

In 2009, Geert Wilders, the far right Dutch politician was refused entry to the UK because the British Government argued that his presence in the country could undermine public safety by harming race and cross-community relationships. Wilders had made a short film, Fitna, which was highly critical of Islam. He had intended to present a showing of his film at the Westminster Parliament.

Please see a link below to an article in The Guardian about the incident involving Wilders’ attempted visit to the UK:

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/feb/12/far-right-dutch-mp-ban-islam

The freedom of movement as originally given to EU (EEC) citizens in the Treaty of Rome had an emphasis on permitting free movement of workers and other economically active individuals. This was perhaps understandable given the labour shortages in certain EU/EEC member states immediately after the Second World War. The postwar economies of France and Belgium, in particular, benefited from hundreds of thousands of economic migrants coming from their partner state, Italy.

Although the UK was not, at this point, a member state, it faced many of the same challenges as the Six EU/EEC Founding Members, but British recruitment of labour would centre on the former (and existing) colonies of its Empire e.g. from the Caribbean (the so called ‘Windrush Generation’).

Some of the most important decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) about free movement were about removing the barriers which prevented foreign (EU/EEC) nationals working or providing services in another member state (see Case 59/85 Netherlands v Reed (workers); Case 2/74 Reyners v Belgium (services); & Case 246/89 Commission v UK (Nationality of Fishermen) (establishment)).

Under the original Treaty of Rome (now to be found in the TFEU), EU citizens could take advantage of the free movement provisions by going to other member states to receive services: education, health and tourism (see Case 286/82 Luisi v Ministero del Tesero) – and many did just that.

Later, the CJEU would cement these rights by permitting family members of workers to claim entitlement to the free movement provisions of the Treaty of Rome.

That said, the freedom of movement provisions really only began to take on the dimensions of European citizenship as recently as the early 1990s after the stormy passage of the Maastricht Treaty (or the Treaty on European Union).

Underpinning the rights of free movement for individuals which are contained in primary legislation (the European Treaties) and decisions of the CJEU is the Citizens’ Directive (Directive 2004/38). This Directive really spells out (in a concrete way) the rights which EU citizens enjoy, namely, entry, residency, exit and the right to pursue employment opportunities in other member states.

Directive 2004/38 (Articles 4-14) also updated the older Directive 1612/68 (Articles 1-5) which guaranteed equal treatment and non-discrimination in employment to EU nationals residing and working in another member state.

Conclusion

The EU’s freedom of movement rules for its citizens and their dependants is a part of its fundamental law. A member state which derogates or withdraws from these rights does not do so for flimsy or superficial reasons. The TFEU does permit member states to suspend free movement provisions, but such action is always subject to the threat of possible legal action by the affected individuals; fellow member states and enforcement action by the European Commission.

Copyright Seán J Crossan, 25 February 2020