To mark Black History Month, my friend and colleague, Tony Adams recalls a forgotten chapter of the events around ‘Red Clydeside’ in 1919. This article was originally published in the Scottish Left Review.
The year, 1919, in Britain represents a high point in working class struggle and one un-matched since in its breadth and scale. Over 34m working days were not worked due to strikes compared to an average of 4.5m for each of the preceding four years. Two thousand soldiers, ordered to embark for France, instead mutinied and formed a Soldiers’ Union. Even the police force struck and demanded the right to unionise. Britain, it is said, was on the brink of a revolution. On 31 January that year a violent confrontation took place in Glasgow between the police and radical striking workers centred in and around the area around George Square. The workers were striking to demand a reduction of the working week from 54 hours to a 40 hour working week.
At a massive union rally in George Square on the day of the protest, the red flag was raised above 60,000 striking shipbuilding and engineering workers. Newspapers of the next day dubbed the demonstration which saw pitched battles between the police and strikers as ‘Black Friday’ or ‘Bloody Friday’. What began as a protest soon became a riot, with fighting across the city continuing throughout the night and 53 people were recorded injured. This dramatic incident and the leaders of the strike have been mythologised under the banner of ‘Red Clydeside’.
Meanwhile, a lesser known harbour race riot on Thursday 23, January 1919 in which black British colonial sailors were branded as unfair economic competitors by the national seamen’s unions and their local delegates, has been overlooked both in the personal and historical accounts of the general strike until more recently. The riot began in the yard of the mercantile marine office in James Watt Street where sailors gathered for their chance to be signed on to a ship. While waiting to see if they would be hired, competing groups of black and white sailors jostled and shouted insults at each other. This baiting descended into a pitched battle which spilled out of the yard onto the street. More than thirty black sailors fled the sailors’ yard pursued by a large crowd of white sailors. White locals joined the crowd which grew to several hundred strong. The rioters used guns, knives, batons and makeshift weapons including stones and bricks picked from the street. On being chased out of the hiring yard, the group of black sailors initially ran towards the nearby Glasgow sailor’s home on the corner of James Watt Street and Broomielaw Street. The white crowd smashed the windows of the sailor’s home and then invaded it. The two or three beat police officers in the harbour area were overwhelmed and an additional force of 50 police officers was called in. The large police force cleared the two set of rioters from the sailors home.
Though the staging of a general strike in Glasgow, its collapse following ‘Bloody Friday’ and the presence of tanks in the city centre the next day were far more eye-catching than the riot in the harbour a week earlier, the two events were explicitly inter-connected through the activities of the members of the leadership of the 40-hours strike movement. Emanuel Shinwell, leader of the Glasgow branch of the Seafarer’s was in addition, president of the Glasgow trades and labour council and chairman of the workers strike committee. Although a moderate, he advocated direct action in the most inflammatory terms in the days leading up to both the harbour riot and the mass protest of the 40-hours campaign. He and other strike leaders, such as William Gallacher, sought to encourage unskilled workers – including seamen – to take part in the sort of strike action that had been the province of the skilled workforce on wartime Clydeside. The two episodes ought to be viewed together as the harbour riot and the George Square demonstration occurred within a few days of each other. This proximity was much more than coincidental especially as the riot in Glasgow seaport, was soon followed by similar riots in South Shields, Salford, London, Hull, Liverpool, Newport, Cardiff and Barry.
It is important to note that the Glasgow harbour riot was the first instance of a spate of rioting focussed upon black residents in British ports which reached its height in June of that year. It was also part of the wider picture of industrial strife which has been simmering below the surface on Clydeside and other heavily industrialised regions throughout the war years and into 1919.
During these riots, crowds of white working class people targeted black workers, their families, black owned businesses and property. One of the chief sources of the violent confrontation in the run- down port areas was the ‘colour’ bar implemented by the sailors’ unions campaigning to keep black, Arab and Asian sailors off British ships in a time of increasing job competition. The imposition of a ‘colour bar’ on black workers at Glasgow and elsewhere around Britain’s seaports to protect white British sailors’ jobs illustrates the disregard for sections of the working class among many of those who considered themselves protectors of the organised workforce. Historically expressions of racist hostility have been tied to questions of employment. Hostility towards groups of fellow workers among trade unionists was nothing new. The opposition of white union members to the employment (in some cases) of cheaper overseas merchant sailors, violently demonstrated at Glasgow harbour, bears comparison to the wartime industrial action on Clydeside which aimed at preventing the ‘dilution’ of skilled with unskilled job losses and the permanent undercutting of ‘engineers’ wages.
The sea port riots of 1919 in which white crowds attacked black workers, their families and communities, have long presented a painful conundrum as they prefigure a century of conflict and harassment of people of colour in Britain. The causes of the riots are located in the interplay between on-going strikes, riots and other collective violence elsewhere in Britain and the Atlantic basin as well as the local context and meanings (including housing shortages and unemployment). In this light, the British riots appear less an isolated eruption ‘proving’ British racism, as they have often been portrayed. They were part of a broader political movement of resistance against post-war betrayals. This made the role of service and recently demobilised men a significant factor in the riots, one which was commented upon in many local press accounts of the violence. It is also clear that the specific grievances of the white sailors were not the only issues in the riots. The sense that the great sacrifices of the war years had been futile was being experienced at a national level as post-war shortages in housing and increased competition in the job market were the first results of mass demobilisation. Wider frustrations were being focused on the black community in Britain as a means of release. That the authorities in part recognised this is often apparent from the light sentences meted out to the white rioters in various centres around the country. However, there is also an element of racial antipathy revealed by the official response to the riots.
The fear of violence in the immediate post-war period became a worldwide phenomenon, and not without reason. The level of global unrest in the late 1918 and 1919 is also worth considering as it provides a wider context in which the race riots in Britain may be discussed. The Bolshevik revolution in Russia in 1918 provided governments worldwide with a spectre of the overthrow of the state in a situation of crisis. The attempted revolts of the Spartakist movement in Berlin, the establishments of soviets in Bavaria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia and the socialist revolt in Austria fuelled the worldwide fear of Bolshevism. It was not merely in the ‘defeated’ nations that unrest occurred for the politicising effect of war service and the strains placed on every day society by the war resulted in riots in the United States, the Caribbean, Africa as well as in Britain. As one of Scotland’s leading expert calls for a permanent fixture to remember the demonstration which took place on 31 January 1919, the black sailors of the Glasgow harbour riots deserve a place to be commemorated too because there is a single working class in Britain by historic right and present participation.
Tony Adams is a lecturer and EIS equality rep at City of Glasgow College. He has published in the Asian Times, Caribbean Times, Morning Star and Weekly Journal. Jacqueline Jenkinson’s ‘Black 1919 Riots, Racism and Resistance in Imperial Britain’ (Liverpool University Press, 2009) is the best available study of the issues.
By Helan Ali, Rebecca Brodie, Cameron Crossan, Jack Holland and Eve Richmond (Editor: SJ Crossan)
Dismissal occurs where an employers terminates the contract of employment between themselves and the employee. There are several types of dismissal that can arise such as: fair, unfair, wrongful, summary and constructive.
Perhaps the most common mistake amongst members of the public concerning dismissal is the tendency to confuse wrongful and unfair dismissal: they are entirely separate (Crossan, 2017). An unfair dismissal is one which breaches or contravenes statute; whereas wrongful dismissal occurs when the contract of employment is breached.
In all dismissal claims, it is important to determine if the claimant is actually an employee. This status is outlined in S230 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 in that the individual in question must be employed under a contract of service.
Employment law – always a tricky area to navigate as a result of its sheer volume becomes particularly difficult when it comes to the area of dismissal – as there can be a delicacy when it comes to terminating the employee’s contract. If you look at recent media stories, there are several high profile dismissal cases such as former senior civil servant, Sir Philip Rutnam pursuing an unfair dismissal claim against UK Home Secretary, Priti Patel or the UK retailer, Asda (part of the Walmart group) forcing their employees to accept new contracts or to face dismissal.
Fair dismissal occurs when there is a termination of the employment contract, but the employer has the right to act in this manner as per S98(2) of the Employment Rights Act 1996.
The employer may have fair grounds to dismiss an employee under grounds of capability where the employer genuinely does not believe the employee is able to carry out their role any longer. Such a dismissal can be seen in Taylor v Alidair  IRLR 82 where a pilot was dismissed from his contract after he landed a plane negligently and there was serious danger to life and limb. The pilot’s subsequent dismissal was completely fair in the circumstances.
An employer may also have the grounds to dismiss an employee on the grounds of conduct. Generally, one act of gross misconduct could potentially result in an employee’s dismissal. However, employers must have clear guidelines and these must be adhered to, but it does not necessarily mean that in every situation the same same outcome i.e. that of dismissal be the end result. Employers are entitled to have recourse to what is known as a reasonable band of responses, which might include the following:
Verbal or written warnings
Deduction in pay (if the contract so permits)
If the employer has acted reasonably when carrying out the dismissal of the employee, there can be no overturning of that decision by an Employment Tribunal. This is regardless of whether the Tribunal would have taken a more lenient approach i.e. a preference for a final written warning over dismissal (see Iceland Frozen Foods v Jones  ICR 17).
Employees are not exempt from their employer’s code of conduct even when they leave the premises as their actions taken outside of work can still result in a dismissal. This can be seen in McLean v McLane Ltd EAT 682/96 where an employee was drunk and disorderly outside working hours. He was also found to in possession of cannabis (a Class C drug in the UK). This information was released to the media which reported the story and, as a result, the employee was dismissed. This action by the employer was deemed fair by the Employment Tribunal.
Not all employees are fairly dismissed and the actions of the employer might mean that have been unfairly dismissed. To qualify for employment rights regarding unfair dismissal, an employee must normally have a minimum of 2 years’ continuous service (as per the Employment Rights Act 1996), but there are numerous exceptions e.g. discrimination, health and safety and whistle-blowing dismissals.
Employers can, admittedly, find a way around the 2 year continuous service period by employing someone on short-term contracts, thus ensuring that the minimum qualifying period is never met and the employee has not acquired any rights in respect of dismissal.
In some employment roles it is not possible to be unfairly dismissed due to the nature of the role e.g. UK armed forces and/or police service staff. Employees have the right be accompanied to a dismissal meeting if they choose to do so, they can bring a fellow employee or trade union official. Further details on this can be found under S10 of the Employment Relations Act 1999. Employers should adhere to their company guidelines and follow procedural fairness when disciplining employees – especially if dismissal is an option they are considering (as demonstrated in British Homes Stores Ltdv Burchell  IRLR 379).
Moving on to the issue of wrongful dismissal, where the contract is breached due to the dismissal procedure. The most common example is the employee does not receive the requisite notice period from the employer. In this instance the employee would not require two year’s continuous service to raise a claim in this regard. The statutory minimum notice period, according to S86 of the Employment Rights Act 1996, is one week for each year of service up to a maximum of 12 weeks.
Claims for wrongful dismissal must be made within three months’ minus one day of the effective date of the termination of the contract to the Office of Employment Tribunals (OET). The case of Morran v City Council of Tenants (1998) is highly instructive.
Morran claimed wrongful and unfair dismissal when his employer dismissed him without being given the compulsory notice period; he just missed out on accumulating enough continuous service. Held by the Scottish Court of Session, Morran was entitled to claim wrongful dismissal and receive compensation however he could not claim unfair dismissal as he had never acquired the actual right to bring such a claim. Employees who claim wrongful dismissal tend to be reimbursed by compensation. It would be very rare for an employee to go back to their job after claiming wrongful dismissal.
In fact, S236 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act (Consolidation) 1992 states that no court or Tribunal can issue an order for specific implement or anything which will force the parties to work together under an employment contract.
Another type of dismissal is summary: “This is when you dismiss someone instantly without notice or pay in lieu of notice, usually because of gross misconduct (for example theft, fraud, violence).” (UK Government, 2020). Summary dismissal if not handled properly can be wrongful or unfair. An employer will need to prove the employee has committed violent or serious acts or health and safety breaches.
Even if an employer feels summary dismissal is the preferred option, it is worth stepping back and taking stock. It is often better and far safer to suspend an employee on full pay and then investigate the situation to head off a potential claim for unfair and/or wrongful dismissal.
Summary dismissal will be justified if the employer can prove the act committed by the employee amounts to gross misconduct in the workplace. However, if the employee can argue that their actions were not that of gross misconduct and no notice period was given employer will be liable for wrongful dismissal. The remedies available to the employee would be compensation.
One last dismissal claim is that of constructive dismissal. This arises when an employer commits a serious breach of the employment contract and the employee has no alternative but to resign. In these types of claims, employees can treat themselves as dismissed as the employer’s behaviour has effectively destroyed the employment contract.
The individual claiming constructive dismissal is saying S/he has been unfairly dismissed and for this claim to be granted they must prove the employer’s conduct was so severe that it amounted to a fundamental or material breach. Constructive dismissal occurs in “situations where the employer made unauthorised deductions from wages; subjected to bullying and harassment; where the employer refused to follow the proper disciplinary or grievance procedures.” (Crossan, 2020)
In Sharp v Western Excavating Ltd  ICR 221, Lord Denning explained the rules regarding constructive dismissal:
“An employee is entitled to treat himself as constructively dismissed if the employer is guilty of conduct which is a significant breach going to the root of the contract of employment… then the employee is entitled to treat himself as discharged from any further performance.”
As a point of interest, Sharpe was not entitled to claim constructive dismissal: his employer was perfectly within its rights to refuse him time off from work to go and play cards. The employer’s behaviour was entirely reasonable and thus did not represent a material breach of the employment contract.
When contemplating dismissal as an option for disciplinary offences, it is often safer for employers to suspend the relevant employees on full pay and carry out a full investigation, rather than dismiss employee instantly. Employers should ensure that disciplinary procedures are clear and consistent and comply with current ACAS Codes on discipline at work (see link below).
Claims for both unfair and wrongful dismissal must be made within three months’ minus one day of the effective date of the termination of the contract to the Office of Employment Tribunals (OET). Failure by the claimant to submit an application within the time limit will mean that the claim is time barred i.e. it cannot normally be heard by the Tribunal – no matter its merits.
Remedies for dismissal
A claimant who brings a successful action for dismissal may be entitled to the following remedies issued by a court or a Tribunal:
If the employee can claim dismissal, they could be entitled to compensation and/or reinstatement (failing that, re-engagement if reinstatement to their old position is no longer available). An employer does not have to reinstate or re-engage the employee and may find it more acceptable to pay a higher sum of compensation.
Sir Philip Rutnam
A current unfair dismissal case is that of Sir Philip Rutnam, former Permanent Secretary at the UK Home Office. Sir Philip is claiming unfair dismissal against his former boss, the current UK Home Secretary Priti Patel MP.
Sir Philip resigned because he is alleging that he was subjected to bullying by Mrs Patel (she denies these claims). At the time of his resignation, Sir Philip, was the Home Office’s most senior official, and he claimed that there had been a “vicious and orchestrated” operation against him. Sir Philip presented a claim to the Employment Tribunal for unfair (constructive) dismissal against the Home Secretary. A Cabinet Office investigation was initiated in March 2020 concerning the allegations against Mrs Patel in order to establish if she had breached the ministerial code. (Patel faces unfair dismissal claim from ex-adviser, 2020). The case is ongoing, but if Sir Philip is successful in his action, it will be hugely embarrassing to the UK Government.
In another, recent case relating to constructive dismissal, a leading forensic scientist called Jo Millington was a victim of sexual orientation discrimination in the workplace. The scientist was asked by her boss whether she disliked him because of her sexuality. Millington, who is gay, took her case to an Employment Tribunal. She launched claims for sexual orientation discrimination, breach of contract and constructive dismissal against her former employer, ArroGen Forensics after the company’s CEO Joe Arend speculated whether her sexuality was the reason behind her evident dislike of him.
Arend had inquired whether Millington had a problem with him “because of her sexuality”, pointing out he was “big” and “used to play rugby”. The Reading Employment Tribunal was told Millington that she had previously complained about Arend’s behaviour when he referred to the level of her expenses and salary as “crazy”. The Tribunal found the company liable for discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation, constructive dismissal and breach of contract. It concluded that Jo Millington regarded her sexual orientation as a confidential matter; Millington was granted compensation. (Lowe, 2020).
In another unfair dismissal story, a long serving worker at a water bottling plant was sacked for smoking on the premises. The employee took a claim to Tribunal for wrongful and unfair dismissal, which resulted in a successful claim. The claimant, Mr Andrew was a team manager for production at Montgomery Waters Limited, where the no smoking rule was introduced in 2004. Employees were, however, permitted to smoke in a designated ‘smoking hut’.
Bosses were informed that Andrew was seen smoking outside the ‘smoking hut’. CCTV was viewed and appeared to show Andrew smoking, on four occasions, in prohibited areas. The footage showed a man wearing red overalls and Andrew was one of two people to wear these. Andrew, who had 15 years’ service with the company, was suspended during the disciplinary investigation. Andrew denied the allegations, but was still dismissed from his employment. During the Tribunal Hearing, the judge highlighted the vagueness in the firm’s handbook on whether smoking in prohibited areas would amount to misconduct. The judge also observed that it was the employer’s responsibility to enforce strict rules restricting smoking in particular areas. Although Andrew’s claims for both wrongful and unfair dismissal were upheld, the compensation awarded to him was reduced by 50% on the basis that he had contributed to his dismissal (Powys County Times, 2020).
A controversial case regarding the potential threat of dismissal is Asda’s introduction of a new contractual agreement known as ‘Contract 6’, which will replace the existing agreement. It was introduced back in 2017 and, at this time, signing the new contract was voluntary.
‘Contract 6’ abolished paid breaks, introduced compulsory bank holiday working, staff could also be asked to work flexible hours and work in different departments within the store. In August 2019, Asda were accused of forcing employees to agree to accept ‘Contract 6’.
Asda stated that their employees are required to sign the new contract by November 2019 and, if they failed to do so, their contract of employment would be terminated. Employees would not be entitled to sick pay until the contract was signed. The GMB Trade Union attacked the new agreement and claimed that, under the new conditions, employees would be worse off. The main objection raised by the employees and their trade union was the inflexibility of the contract.
Under these new terms, day shift employees had to be more flexible with their working hours – they had to be available for work between 5am and midnight. It also meant employers could give less notice than before with regard to changing shifts. Employees took the view that Asda was disregarding employment law by unilaterally changing key terms and conditions.
In response to the claims being made, Asda may be able to justify their dismissals as fair in terms of Section 98(2) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 on the grounds that the employer can show that some other substantial reason is the justification behind terminating contracts.
In Asda’s case, the company may be able to justify their actions on the grounds that the new contractual arrangements have been necessitated as a result of a company restructuring exercise. This could make the dismissals potentially fair (Crossan, 2017).
Currently, lawyers for Asda and the GMB Trade Union are at loggerheads. One claim for unfair dismissal has so far been submitted by a former Asda employee, Duncan Carson. He was dismissed due to not signing the new ‘Contract 6’. Carson had worked at Asda for 13 years in total, and a large part of his legal argument is that “a contract is an agreement between two parties”. Carson believes, if one person can change the contract unilaterally.
The Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme (CJRS), announced by HMRC on 20 March 2020, is a UK Government funded scheme to provide financial support for employers to allow them to continue to pay part of their employees’ wage costs rather than lay them off during this crisis.
Eligible workers are put into the scheme by employers when agreement is made between both, and these employees are now furloughed workers (Association of Taxation Technicians, 2020)
Nunn (2020) explains that the scheme allows companies to ‘furlough’ their employees, covering 80% of the wage cost, allowing the claim to include 80% of their employee’s gross salary with cap of £2,500 a month.
CIPD (2020) defines furlough as a ‘temporary leave of absence from work’ due to economic conditions of affecting the company or country.
Although this is a new concept for the UK labour-force, the scheme does nothing to change how the fundamentals of UK employment law e.g. it does not mean a break in continuity of employment. The employee must give written agreement to the employer before being enrolled in the scheme.
The CJRS ensures the job security of the British workforce due to employers being unable to provide pay.
The official government site (UK Government, 2020) announced that the scheme is only temporary; set to last a maximum of 4 months, with a 3 consecutive week minimum period for each employee to be furloughed.
The government site explains that employees on sick leave are not eligible for furlough whilst the business is reclaiming Statutory Sick Pay. HMRC allows employers with less that 250 employees to reclaim 2 weeks of Statutory Sick Pay for each employee off work for a coronavirus related cause, although the method to do so has still to be put in place by the HMRC. Employees with multiple jobs can also be furloughed from either or both jobs, as the £2,500 wages’ cap applies to each job.
In order to be eligible for the government scheme, the employer must have PAYE account, and each employee must have been included on RTI submission in the pay period on or before 19 March 2020 (CIPP, 2020).
The UK Government (2020) also announced that any employees made redundant before 28 February, due to the impact of Coronavirus, could be eligible for furlough status – as long as they were on the PAYE scheme before they were dismissed. Employers could claim for them also and this part of the furlough scheme has prevented those in industries, such as hospitality, from being almost certainly made redundant.
It is, of course, up to the employer if they choose to furlough any dismissed employees who are eligible to partake in the CJRS and there is no legal requirement for the employer to go down this path.
Therefore, utilising the CJRS gives employers the cash-flow for the wage costs to be able to keep employees on their payroll for when the business reopens, as an alternative to dismissing them during this global crisis. At this present time,it ensures job security for the employee but it may also mean living with a reduced wage.
To summarise, dismissal is a vast and complex area of employment law yet once broken down becomes that bit clearer to understand. The area is ever changing with cases now coming against the Government itself and what pathway that may open if Rutnam is successful in his claim against Patel. There are also the uncertainties in the world just now surrounding coronavirus and the impact it was have on employee’s not only with their wages but with their employment status when this all ends.
Two days on the trot and I find myself discussing dismissal in connection with former employees of the UK Government. Yesterday, I addressed the case of Sonia Khan, a former Special Adviser to two Chancellors of the Exchequer, who has a very strong case for unfair dismissal.
I now want to turn to the another prominent case of dismissal with which the UK Government has had to face recently. Last month, Sir Philip Rutnam who had been the Permanent Secretary at the UK Home Office (the Ministry of the Interior) took legal action against his former employer. The Permanent Secretary is the top civil service post in a Government Department and the post-holder would work very closely with the Secretary of State and her ministerial team.
The background to Sir Philip’s legal action against the Government is pretty sensational. He alleges that he was forced to resign from his post due to the unreasonable actions of his boss, Priti Patel MP, the Home Secretary. He is alleging that Ms Patel behaved in a bullying manner towards him and other civil servants in her Department. In short order, Sir Philip is claiming that he was constructively dismissed.
A link to the story as reported in The Guardian about Sir Philip’s legal action can be found below:
Constructive dismissal is usually described as an employee jumping ship before s/he can be pushed over the side by the employer. It is a resignation, but it is not treated as such if the employee has good grounds for terminating the contract of employment.
In terms of Section 95(1)(c) of the Employment Rights Act 1996, constructive dismissal is defined in the following terms:
‘the employee terminates the contract under which he is employed (with or without notice) in circumstances in which he is entitled to terminate it without notice by reason of the employer’s conduct.’
The key phrase here is ‘by reason of the employer’s conduct’ and this is the reason why the employee has chosen to end the employment relationship.
The employee’s right to claim constructive dismissal arises in situations where the employer’s conduct is to be regarded as a material breach of the employment contract and the employee is left with no alternative but to resign. Normally, a resignation would not be regarded as a dismissal: if an employee resigned in a fit of pique s/he would not be entitled to claim State benefits (Universal Credit).
The employer’s conduct must be so serious in order to justify the employee’s decision to resign. When an employee claims that he has been constructively dismissed, he is claiming that he was unfairly dismissed. The right of constructive dismissal would arise in situations where the employer made unauthorised deductions from wages; subjected to bullying and harassment; where the employer refused to follow the proper disciplinary or grievance procedures; or where the employee was ordered to use equipment that was clearly dangerous or sub-standard.
In the well known case of Sharp v Western Excavating Ltd  All ER 713,  ICR 221, Lord Denning laid down the essential conditions for constructive dismissal:
“An employee is entitled to treat himself as constructively dismissed if the employer is guilty of conduct which is a significant breach going to the root of the contract of employment, or which shows that the employer no longer intends to be bound by one or more of the essential terms of the contract, then the employee is entitled to treat himself as discharged from any further performance. If he does so, then he terminates the contract by reason of the employer’s conduct. He is then constructively dismissed. The employee is then entitled in those circumstances to leave at that instant without giving any notice at all or, alternatively, he may give notice and say that he is leaving at the end of the notice. But the conduct in either case must be sufficiently serious to entitle him to leave at once. …. the employee must make up his mind soon after the conduct of which he complains. If he continues for any length of time without leaving, he will be treated as having elected to affirm the contract and he will lose his right to treat himself as discharged.”
In Wishaw & District Housing Association v Moncrieff  UKEAT0066/08, the Employment Appeal Tribunal in Scotland provided helpful guidelines for Employment Tribunals when dealing with claims for constructive dismissal.
According to Lady Smith, the President of the Employment Appeal Tribunal, an Employment Tribunal dealing with unfair constructive dismissal must have regard to the following issues:
1. The specific incident which led the employee to resign from employment (the so called last straw) must be pinpointed;
2. Once this incident has been pinpointed, the Tribunal must carry out an objective assessment to judge whether it can contribute to a chain of events which taken together convey the overall impression that the employer has breached its implied duty of trust and confidence; and
3. If the incident has the potential to be viewed as breach of the duty of trust and confidence does it in fact constitute the last straw in a chain of events which would permit the affected employee to treat himself as constructively dismissed?
In constructive dismissal claims, the employee is alleging that the employer’s behaviour has effectively destroyed the employment contract by committing a material breach. However, employees must be careful: the employer’s conduct must be so serious that it allows the employee to treat herself as dismissed.
Employees should take proper legal advice before taking such a step. It could be disastrous if they get it wrong. Get it right and employees can claim unfair dismissal. Stella English, 2010 winner of the BBC’s “The Apprentice” television programme knows all about getting it wrong. Ms English resigned from employment with Lord Sugar and claimed constructive dismissal. Her action failed (see Stella English v Amshold Group Ltd Case No 3200079/12).
In Nationwide Building Society v Niblett  UKEAT/0524/08, was very clear that merely because an employer has behaved unreasonably towards an employee does not necessarily provide grounds for claiming constructive, unfair dismissal:
“It is not the law that an employee can resign without notice merely because an employer has behaved unreasonably in some respect. In the context of the implied term of trust and confidence, the employer’s conduct must be without proper and reasonable cause and must be calculated or likely to destroy or seriously damage the relationship of confidence and trust between employer and employee“.
In August 2019, a story which was widely reported in the British media, caught my attention: the abrupt dismissal of Sonia Khan as a special adviser (or ‘Spad’) with the UK Government. Ms Khan had worked for two previous Chancellors of the Exchequer (the UK Finance Minister). She was summoned to a meeting with Dominic Cummings, the UK Prime Minister’s top political adviser and sacked. Ms Khan was ordered to surrender her security passes and escorted from Downing Street by an armed Police Officer. All in all, it was a very undignified and humiliating exit for Ms Khan. Needless to say, Mr Cummings did not follow any disciplinary procedure when he made the decision to give Ms Khan her marching orders.
This decision was far from wise and Ms Khan has an extremely strong case for unfair dismissal in terms of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (she has the necessary continuous service of more than 2 years required to bring such a claim and no warnings were issued to her).
This affair led to me think about humiliating dismissals by employers and whether the affected employee could claim damages for the manner of their sacking? In other words, can the sacked employee claim that their feelings were injured as a result of the way in which they s/he was dismissed?
Links to articles about Sonia Khan’s dismissal can be found below:
When discussing discrimination claims in terms of the Equality Act 2010 (primarily), I often stress the issue of injury to feelings as an element that will be included in the calculation of a final award by an Employment Tribunal.
In several Blogs (please see the end of this article for the relevant links), I have discussed the importance of the Vento Guidelines or Scale.
In Vento v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police (No 2)  EWCA Civ 1871 compensation limits of £15–25,000 were laid down in situations where injury to feelings was involved in cases involving sex and race discrimination. In Sturdy v Leeds Teaching Hospitals NHS Trust ET Case 1803960/2007 14th and 15th April 2009 the Employment Tribunal decided that, since Vento had been decided in 2003, a higher rate of inflation had to be considered hence the increased award made to a victim of age discrimination.
These awards for injury or hurt feelings have now become known as the Vento Guidelines and in Da’Bell v National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children(2009)EAT/0227/09, the Employment Appeal Tribunal (sitting for England and Wales) brought them into line with inflation.
Since Da’Bell, the Vento guidelines are usually updated annually in line with inflation.
The current bands or scales (from 6 April 2020) are:
♦ £900 to £9,000 for the lower band
♦ £9,000 to £27,000 for the middle band
♦ £27,000 to £45,000 for the top band
What’s the situation with unfair dismissal claims?
In Dunnachie v Kingston upon Hull City Council  EWCA Civ 84, the English Court of Appeal set the cat amongst the pigeons when it stated that a compensatory award for unfair dismissal could also include injury to an employee’s feelings. The Court of Appeal was clearly relying upon an obiter remark made by Lord Hoffman during the decision of the House of Lords in Johnson v Unisys  UKHL 13.
As far back as the decision by the short lived National Industrial Relations Court (1971-1974) in Norton Tool Co Ltd v Tewson EW Misc 1, the position was quite clear: the compensatory award in unfair dismissal claims did not include injury to an employee’s feelings in connection with the manner of the dismissal suffered by him or her.
Lord Hoffman’s obiter statement and the decision by the Court of Appeal in Dunnachie appeared to place this principle in considerable jeopardy and opened the door to what could have been a potentially significant, new development in unfair dismissal case law. Clearly, it would be advantageous for the House of Lords to provide a definitive ruling on this matter.
Subsequently, Kingston upon Hull City Council appealed against the judgement of the Court of Appeal to the House of Lords.
On Thursday 15th July 2004, the House of Lords delivered its judgement in this case ( UKHL 36). Their Lordships (Lord Hoffman amongst them – ironically) killed off any idea that an award for unfair dismissal could include injury to an employee’s feelings for the manner of the dismissal.
Compensation, therefore, in unfair dismissal claims will be concerned with the employee’s economic losses only.
The decision of the House of Lords in Dunnachie v Kingston upon Hull City Council  UKHL 36 was and remains a clear restatement of the orthodox position as set down by Sir John Donaldson all those years ago in Norton Tool Co Ltd.
As Lord Steyn, one of the Law Lords, remarked in Dunnachie:
“On the other hand, the correctness of the Norton Tool decision was not an issue in Johnson v Unisys. It is true that there were references by both sides in the oral argument to Norton Tool. But the House heard no adversarial argument exploring the correctness or otherwise of that decision. In these circumstances a definitive overruling of a decision which had stood for nearly 30 years would have been a little surprising.”
In fact, Lord Hoffman’s observation (and it was nothing more than observation we are now assured) could in no way be interpreted as an attempt to overturn a long-standing and well-established legal principle. Lord Hoffman, in Johnson v Unisys , was not “inviting the House to overrule a longstanding decision on a point of statutory construction that was not in issue and not explored in opposing arguments.” The statement by Lord Hoffman was clearly obiter dictum i.e. things said by the way which do not form part of the actual court’s judgement and that was the end of the matter.
This is the stark choice faced by thousands of Asda employees (US parent company Walmart) in the UK who have been told by their employer that they must accept new contracts of employment.
The GMB Trade Union representing many of the affected employees has publicly stated its opposition to the new contracts. The Union’s argument amounts to the claim that the new terms and conditions will leave employees in a worse position.
Asda has stated that if employees don’t agree to the new contracts of employment by 2 November 2019, they will no longer have a job with the company. Effectively, the employees will be terminating their employment with the company Asda is arguing.
What’s the legal position?
Well, Asda is stating that it wishes to terminate the existing contractual agreement with the affected employees and replace it with a new contract. In this type of situation, Section 86 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 is particularly relevant.
The Act lays down statutory minimum periods of notice that the employer must give to the employees in question. These statutory minimum periods of notice apply to all those employees who have been continuously employed for four weeks or more.
Given the amount of previous Blogs of mine where I have covered the issue of an individual’s employment status, I really shouldn’t have to remind readers that the statutory notice periods apply to employees only i.e. those individuals who work under a contract of service (as per Section 230 of the Employment Rights Act 1996).
The statutory periods are detailed below:
One week’s notice is required to be given to those individuals who have been employed for more than four weeks but under two years
If the employee has between two and 12 years’ continuous service, s/he is entitled to a week’s notice for every year of service
If an employee has more than 12 years’ continuous employment, the maximum notice period is 12 weeks
It is important to note that these are statutory minimum periods of notice and that contracts of employment may actually lay down a requirement for longer periods of notice.
Alternatively, some employers may choose to insert a term in the contract where they can pay off the employee immediately by giving them their full entitlement to notice pay. There is no need for the employee to work whatever notice period they are entitled to receive. This type of contractual term is known as payment in lieu of notice.
Back to Asda: the affected employees are being given their statutory notice period whether that’s 1 week, 2 weeks or up to the maximum notice period of 12 weeks (depending on the individual’s length of service) as per Section 86 of the Employment Rights Act 1996.
What if some people still refuse to sign the new contracts after their statutory period of notice has expired?
There is always the possibility that certain employees (with the requisite length of service or meeting other relevant criteria e.g. protected characteristic discrimination) may be able to raise a claim for unfair dismissal in terms of the Employment Rights Act 1996.
Asda, on the other hand, may be able to justify the dismissals as potentially fair under Section 98(2) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 i.e. for some other substantial reason (the necessity for a wide-scale reorganisation in a tough retail environment).
No doubt lawyers for both Asda and the GMB are already staking out their respective legal positions for a possible battle before the Employment Tribunal.
A link to the story on the Sky News website can be found below:
It has since been reported in the Daily Mirror newspaper that one of Asda’s longer serving employees who was sacked for refusing to accept the new contract is intending to lodge an Employment Tribunal claim.
In Chapter 6 of Introductory Scots Law, I focus on the conduct of employees (or should I rephrase that and say misconduct?).
Misconduct – especially the most serious examples of bad behaviour in the workplace – might be grounds for a fair dismissal of the employee concerned.
Section 95 of the Employment Rights Act 1995 states that an employment contract could be terminated by the employer by reason of the employee’s conduct. Such a dismissal or termination of contract could be regarded as a fair dismissal (Section 98: ERA 1996).
If procedures are properly followed by the employer when contemplating dismissal as the ultimate disciplinary sanction, it will be very difficult for the employee to dispute this.
It’s very important for an employer to spell out to employees the type of conduct which could justify dismissal. This might usefully be done by having a section in the employee handbook which specifically addresses the issue of misconduct in the workplace. Additionally, a proper induction process for new employees might focus on the types of behaviour which the employer would almost certainly not condone. Regular refresher training for existing and longer term employees could also be very useful and, in bigger organisations, this would be an important function of the Human Resources or Personnel Department. The recent introduction of the EU’s General Data Protection Regulations (GDPR) in May 2018 is a case in point. Existing members of staff who handled personal or confidential data under the previous data regime would almost certainly be required to be brought up to speed about the more serious consequences of breaching the GDPR.
Misconduct outside the workplace
What about misconduct committed by employees outside working hours? There is an enduring myth amongst members of the public that what happens in your private life is no business of your employer’s. This is a very naive view to hold: employee misbehaviour – whether during working hours or outside work – can adversely affect the employment relationship. The employer will argue that misconduct committed outside working hours can have serious reputational consequences for the organisation.
As many individuals have found to their cost, extra curricular activities can lead to dismissal from employment or some other disciplinary sanction (see Pay v Lancashire Probation Service  IRLR 129 where a probation officer who was part of a sado-masochistic circus act in his spare time was deemed to be fairly dismissed). On the other hand, the employer has to be careful and must not be heavy handed (see Redfearn v UK ECHR 1878 where the employee suffered unlawful discrimination when he was dismissed on the grounds of his political beliefs).
The case law is full of examples of employees getting themselves into trouble outside working hours as a result of alcohol and drugs misuse or committing criminal acts. Some examples can be seen below:
Richardson v City of Bradford Metropolitan Council IRLR 296 a senior meat inspector employed by the Council lost his claim for unfair dismissal in relation to misconduct committed outside work: he had stolen money from his local rugby club where he held the office of Treasurer. The Council argued successfully that this incident demonstrated a serious lack of integrity on the employee’s part and, thus, made him unsuitable for continuing employment.
Moore v C & A Modes IRLR 71 the employee in question was a section leader in a retail store. He had been caught shoplifting at another store and his employer decided to dismiss him. The dismissal was fair: the employee’s conduct had undermined his employer’s trust and confidence in him, not to mention the potential damage done to its reputation as a result of his criminal behaviour.
X v Y  EWCA Civ 662a charity support worker who worked with with young offenders was cautioned by police officers after committing an indecent act with another male in a public toilet at a motorway service station. He was also placed on the Sex Offenders’ Register as a result of receiving the Police caution. The employee had not been honest to the Police when asked questions about his job and, compounding this, he failed to inform his employer about the situation. The employer decided to dismiss this individual and the dismissal was deemed to be fair. The reputational damage which the employer suffered because of the employee’s failure to disclose what had happened was a significant factor here. The English Court of Appeal was of the view that the employee’s right to respect for a private life (on grounds of his sexual orientation) was not relevant here in terms of Article 8 ECHR as the indecent act in question was not of a private nature because it had been performed in a public toilet.
The right to privacy?
In particular, public sector employers or employers which discharge public functions will have to be aware of the consequences of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights – the right to respect for a person’s private and family life. Unwarranted interference in a employee’s private life may cause the employer to find itself in a legal minefield. There can even be implications for free speech or freedom of expression (in terms of Article 10 ECHR) which could lead to an employee taking legal action against the employer (see Smith v Trafford Housing Trust  EWHC 3221).
As a result of the Scotland Act 1998 and the Human Rights Act 1998, which implemented provisions of the ECHR directly into domestic law, the contract of employment is by no means immune from human rights considerations.
Private employers are also not exempt from the effects of the ECHR. They will be indirectly affected: the UK as a signatory to the Convention must ensure that human rights are adequately protected and this will extend to relationships between private individuals e.g. employers and employees.
The problem(s) with social media
In December 2018, Sky News reported that a Dundee United footballer, Jamie Robson had been subjected to disciplinary action for dressing in a racially offensive costume at a private party. Pictures of Mr Robson dressed in the offensive costume were posted on social media:
With the explosion in the use of social media, there is now a much greater chance of employees being caught behaving in inappropriate ways or posting offensive comments online. In such an environment, employers will have legitimate concerns about the reputational damage done to their organisations as a result of employee misconduct which becomes widely publicised via social media platforms such as Facebook, Instagram or Whatsapp.
That said, however, we now live in a society where it is much easier for employees to be caught out in terms of misconduct committed outside of working hours. In Chapter 6 of Introductory Scots Law, I considered the implications of two Employment Tribunal judgements in relation to employee use of the popular social media platform, Facebook:
StephensvHalfords plc ET Case No. 1700796/10 3rd November 2010 TorquayET
Preece vJD Wetherspoons plc ET Case No. 2104806/10 18th January 2011 Liverpool ET
In Stephens, the employee was deemed to have been unfairly dismissed and was awarded compensation of over £11,350 (ouch!), whereas in Preece, the circumstances surrounding the employee’s use of social media did constitute grounds for a fair dismissal. Preece had signed the employer’s policy on the use of e-mail and social networking sites which contained the following warning that disciplinary action would be taken if comments were “….. found to lower the reputation of the organisation, staff or customers”.
In a more recent decision, Plant v API Microelectronics Ltd (ET Case No. 3401454/2016) 30th March 2016, the Norwich Employment Tribunal held that an employee’s claims that she had been unfairly dismissed and wrongfully dismissed regarding “derogatory” remarks (which she had made on Facebook) about her employer had not been proved. Mrs Plant, the employee in question, had been with the company for 17 years and had a spotless disciplinary record. In December 2015, the employer had introduced a very robust social media which listed the types of online behaviour which could be regarded as misconduct. In particular, employees were reminded that:
In particular, employees were reminded that:
“The document also reminds employees that conversations between friends on Facebook are not truly private and can still have the potential to cause damage, reminding employees that comments can be copied forward onto others without the
permission, it stresses the need to not rely on privacy settings.”
Furthermore, the Employment Tribunal noted that the new policy stated:
“… that any breach of this policy will be taken seriously and may lead to disciplinary action under the respondent’s disciplinary policy. Serious breaches will be regarded as
gross misconduct and may lead to summary dismissal under the respondent’s disciplinary procedure.”
The Employment Judge Postle concluded that:
“The Claimant [Mrs Plant] was aware of the Policy and one assumes she read it, she must have been aware what was and what was not allowed. The Claimant would have been aware of the consequences if she breached that policy despite this her profile referred to her position within respondents as an operator and dogsbody, it was clearly a description of her job with respondent clear to see it was derogatory and insulting if not to the respondents certainly to her colleagues occupying the same position. There is then that reference to that bloody place and the need to hurry up and sue them and pissing myself laughing. In the absence of an adequate explanation from the Claimant which was sadly lacking the respondents were entitled to believe that these comments were aimed at the respondent. …
… I repeat that it might be that one would dismiss and another would not dismiss. It
may be seen as harsh but the respondents taking account of the Claimants long service and clear record nevertheless dismissed for a clear breach of the Policy and that would fall within the range of a reasonable response open to an employer. The dismissal was therefore not unfair and the dismissal was not wrongful. [my emphasis]”
A link to the full Employment Tribunal judgement can be found below:
Bullying and harassment via social media platforms
Social media can also be used by both managers and employees to bully and harass colleagues. In the wake of the #MeToo and Time’s Up movements, employers that ignore allegations of sexual harassment are almost playing with fire if they allow the workplace to become a degrading, humiliating or offensive environment.
Employers should have a clear policy on social media use both within and outwith working hours. Fortunately, organisations such as the Advisory Conciliation and Advice Service (ACAS) are on hand to provide useful guidelines as to employers can develop a coherent social media policy:
Once the social media policy has been formulated, it will be the responsibility of the employer to ensure that employees are aware of its contents and that they understand the consequences of any breach of the rules contained therein.
It’s my private life!
Another issue for employers to grapple with is the personal use by employees of the internet or telecommunications equipment during working hours. Employers may have very good reasons for monitoring internet use e.g. to assess whether work is actually being done properly and to ensure that employees are not doing anything inappropriate during working hours. That said, there is a balance to be struck between the employer’s legitimate interests and the employee’s right to privacy.
In Chapter 6 of Introductory Scots Law, I discussed the implications of the European Court of Human Rights’ decision in Bărbulescu vRomania  (Application No 61496/08). It is worth restating the facts of the case:
Bărbulescu, the employee had his contract terminated by his employer because he had used his professional Yahoo Messenger email account to send messages to his brother and his fiancée. The email account had been set up for the express purpose of communication with clients of the employer. This account was not to be used for personal purposes as per the employer’s internal regulations. Furthermore, the employee was informed that communications with clients would be monitored by the employer. The employee argued that his right to privacy under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights had been breached, but his legal action before the Romanian courts was dismissed. Eventually, he took his case to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg.
The Fourth Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights considered the question as to whether Bărbulescu had a legitimate expectation of privacy in relation to use of the email account?: its conclusion was that he did not.
Bărbulescu’s situation was different from two previous decisions of the European Court – Halford vUnited Kingdom (1997) and CoplandvUnited Kingdom (2007) – where the employers appeared to permit (to a certain extent) employee use of office telephones for personal purposes. A further question pondered by the Fourth Chamber of the Court was that although the employer had forbidden the use of work emails for personal use, did Bărbulescu still have a legitimate expectation that his account was not being monitored? The Fourth Chamber was of the opinion that employers had a legitimate right to check (during working hours) that their employees were fulfilling their job. The employer’s monitoring of Bărbulescu’s email account was far from excessive and satisfied the proportionality test.
Bărbulescu Round 2 (5 September 2017)
Since the Bărbulescu decision in 2016, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights has overruled the judgement of the Fourth Chamber of the Court in September 2017.
At the time of the original Bărbulescu decision, I stated that it did not give employers free rein to read the private emails of employees which they had sent using company accounts as some of the British media were reporting (e.g. the BBC; The Telegraph; and The Mirror). The original judgement was not a snoopers’ charter and the moral to be taken from it was that employers had to be very clear as to how they expected employees to behave in relation to facilities like professional email accounts and company telephones (whether landlines or mobiles) and the fact that these may be monitored. An employer who failed to lay down clear guidelines could be running the risk of breaching the duty of trust and confidence and Article 8 (the right to privacy) of the European Convention.
Bărbulescu vRomania  5 September 2017 the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights held that the employer had violated Bărbulescu’s Article 8 rights.
What are the implications of the judgement for employees and employers in the UK?
Clearly, the Grand Chamber’s judgement will most obviously be welcomed by employees as bolstering the right to privacy in the workplace.
Contracting States to the European Convention on Human Rights have a positive obligation or duty to ensure that the necessary conditions exist to ensure that there is respect for the individual’s right to privacy in terms of Article 8:
“These obligations may involve the adoption of measures designed to secure respect for private life even in the sphere of the relations of individuals between themselves.” [my emphasis]
The European Court of Human Rights did, however, acknowledge that Contracting States to the Convention do enjoy a “wide” margin of appreciation (or discretion) “in assessing the need to establish a legal framework governing the conditions in which an employer may regulate electronic or other communications of a non-professional nature by its employees in the workplace”.
The Grand Chamber went on to note:
“… the Court [the Grand Chamber] is at best concerned with the protection of a core or minimum level of private life and correspondence in the workplace against interference by a private law employer.”
It remains something of an urban myth that employees cannot be disciplined for misconduct committed outside working hours. In extreme cases, the employer will even be entitled to use the nuclear option of dismissal. Each case will turn on its own facts and a key issue to explore will be the impact that the misconduct has on the employment relationship. If out of hours misconduct causes damage to the employer’s reputation e.g. derogatory posts on social media or downright criminal behaviour, these could, in themselves, be compelling reasons for disciplinary action (up to and including dismissal).
It is highly advisable for employers to develop a range of coherent policies which address the issue of misconduct in and outside the workplace and to ensure that employees are aware of these.
The notion that employees have an absoluteright to a private life is also questionable. As we have seen, in the Bărbulescu decision, employers should be mindful of minimum rights to privacy, but this does not mean that employees will automatically be able to cry foul if they discover that their internet and telephone use is being monitored in the workplace. Again, employers should ensure that they have policies in place to address this issue clearly and that employees are aware of any rules.