Welcome to Austria?

Photo by rashid khreiss on Unsplash

Willkomen (welcome) to Austria? Not if you’re Italian or someone travelling across the Austro-Italian frontier last weekend.

Why? The dramatic escalation of Coronavirus (COVID-19) outbreaks in Italy is the short answer.

The Austrian Government is very nervous about this and took emergency action by, arguably, suspending free movement provisions – if only briefly. On Sunday 23 February 2020, the Austrian authorities refused entry to its territory of a train coming from Italy for several hours. The Italian railway authorities had informed their Austrian counterparts that at least two of the passengers were exhibiting signs of a fever. The Austrians were taking no chances. The train was eventually permitted to cross the frontier.

The crisis is far from over with controls between Austria and Italy being currently considered by the Government in Vienna to deal with this public health issue.

A link to an article about this incident can be found below:

https://www.dw.com/en/coronavirus-austria-briefly-halts-trains-from-italy-over-covid-19-concerns/a-52493063

What are the legal implications of an EU member state suspending freedom of movement rules?

Italy and Austria are both member states of the European Union and free movement of persons is a key provision or fundamental freedom of the EU’s Single Market. Both countries are also part of the Schengen Agreement (from which the UK opted out whilst in the EU) which allows visa free travel between participating states. This Agreement has seen the abolition of frontier controls, to a a greater or larger extent, in many parts of Europe.

The imposition of frontier controls between EU member states is not a measure which is considered lightly.

Freedom of movement is a right which is fundamentally based on a person holding EU citizenship (or being related to a person who has citizenship). As Article 20 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) which establishes the concept of citizenship states:

Citizenship of the Union is hereby established. Every person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union. Citizenship of the Union shall be additional to and not replace national citizenship.

Article 21 TFEU declares in the following terms:

Every citizen of the [European] Union shall have the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, subject to the limitations and conditions laid down in the Treaties and by the measures adopted to give them effect.”

These freedom of movement provisions would be meaningless and ineffective if EU citizens faced discrimination on the grounds of their nationality in the host member state. Article 18 of the TFEU prohibits discrimination on the grounds of nationality (see Case 197/84 Steinhauser v City of Biarritz).

According to Article 45(5) TFEU, the free movement provisions can be derogated from i.e. disregarded on the following grounds:

  • Public security
  • Public policy
  • Public health

For its part, the Italian Government has since publicly stated that it will not be reintroducing frontier controls as an emergency measure to combat the spread of the Coronavirus:

https://www.schengenvisainfo.com/news/italy-refuses-to-suspend-schengen-agreement-amid-coronavirus-outbreak/

Attempts by member states to derogate or withdraw from the free movement provisions will not be automatically approved and the affected individuals will always be able to challenge such restrictions in the national courts or, ultimately, before the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) (see, for example, Cases 115-116/81 Adoui & Cornaille; Case 41/74 Van Duyn v Home Office; Case 36/75 Rutili v Minister of Interior).

In 2009, Geert Wilders, the far right Dutch politician was refused entry to the UK because the British Government argued that his presence in the country could undermine public safety by harming race and cross-community relationships. Wilders had made a short film, Fitna, which was highly critical of Islam. He had intended to present a showing of his film at the Westminster Parliament.

Please see a link below to an article in The Guardian about the incident involving Wilders’ attempted visit to the UK:

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/feb/12/far-right-dutch-mp-ban-islam

The freedom of movement as originally given to EU (EEC) citizens in the Treaty of Rome had an emphasis on permitting free movement of workers and other economically active individuals. This was perhaps understandable given the labour shortages in certain EU/EEC member states immediately after the Second World War. The postwar economies of France and Belgium, in particular, benefited from hundreds of thousands of economic migrants coming from their partner state, Italy.

Although the UK was not, at this point, a member state, it faced many of the same challenges as the Six EU/EEC Founding Members, but British recruitment of labour would centre on the former (and existing) colonies of its Empire e.g. from the Caribbean (the so called ‘Windrush Generation’).

Some of the most important decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) about free movement were about removing the barriers which prevented foreign (EU/EEC) nationals working or providing services in another member state (see Case 59/85 Netherlands v Reed (workers); Case 2/74 Reyners v Belgium (services); & Case 246/89 Commission v UK (Nationality of Fishermen) (establishment)).

Under the original Treaty of Rome (now to be found in the TFEU), EU citizens could take advantage of the free movement provisions by going to other member states to receive services: education, health and tourism (see Case 286/82 Luisi v Ministero del Tesero) – and many did just that.

Later, the CJEU would cement these rights by permitting family members of workers to claim entitlement to the free movement provisions of the Treaty of Rome.

That said, the freedom of movement provisions really only began to take on the dimensions of European citizenship as recently as the early 1990s after the stormy passage of the Maastricht Treaty (or the Treaty on European Union).

Underpinning the rights of free movement for individuals which are contained in primary legislation (the European Treaties) and decisions of the CJEU is the Citizens’ Directive (Directive 2004/38). This Directive really spells out (in a concrete way) the rights which EU citizens enjoy, namely, entry, residency, exit and the right to pursue employment opportunities in other member states.

Directive 2004/38 (Articles 4-14) also updated the older Directive 1612/68 (Articles 1-5) which guaranteed equal treatment and non-discrimination in employment to EU nationals residing and working in another member state.

Conclusion

The EU’s freedom of movement rules for its citizens and their dependants is a part of its fundamental law. A member state which derogates or withdraws from these rights does not do so for flimsy or superficial reasons. The TFEU does permit member states to suspend free movement provisions, but such action is always subject to the threat of possible legal action by the affected individuals; fellow member states and enforcement action by the European Commission.

Copyright Seán J Crossan, 25 February 2020

Muslim, male, and single: don’t fly with us!

Photo by Kevin Hackert on Unsplash

Michael O’Leary, the motor mouth CEO of Ryanair, could never be accused of being a shrinking violet or one to shy away from a fight. As they say in Ireland: that one would cause trouble in an empty house.

The latest controversy to engulf Mr O’Leary concerns accusations of racism, religious discrimination and, indeed, sexism. Quite a charge sheet. He has suggested that single, males of the “Muslim persuasion” should be turned away from plane flights because “this is where the threat is.”

Ryanair is an Irish airline, but it services a large number of European destinations and many of its customer base will be single Muslim males who have quite lawful travelling plans.

Ryanair is a popular (I probably meant busy) airline that flies to and from destinations in the UK and many of British citizens are, of course, Muslim.

Mr O’Leary’s comments could potentially fall foul of the provisions of the Equality Act 2010 in relation to direct discrimination (Section 13) on the grounds of the following protected characteristics:

  • Religion (Section 10)
  • Sex (Section 11)

Now the Muslim faith is not a racial characteristic, so where could the accusations of race possibly arise? Well, if you are applying a criterion to your customer base, it could have a disproportionately adverse effect on certain groups within the population. Muslims are much more likely to be found amongst non-White British and Irish UK citizens. Indirect discrimination any one? (see Section 19 of the Equality Act 2010)

There’s also the small matter of European Union law (yes, in the UK we continue to follow these rules throughout the Brexit transition period) and Mr O’Leary’s comments could represent a breach of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (primary legislation) and Equal Treatment Directives (secondary legislation).

There may be one get out for Mr O’Leary: if he can show that his comments were an objective (don’t laugh) and proportionate means of achieving a legitimate end. National security and health and safety concerns do, potentially, fall into this category, but Mr O’Leary’s approach to dealing with terrorism might be regarded as using a sledgehammer to crack a nut i.e. totally over the top and disproportionate. Section 192 of the Equality Act states:

A person does not contravene this Act only by doing, for the purpose of safeguarding national security, anything it is proportionate to do for that purpose.

Mr O’Leary may not be too concerned about the latest furore surrounding his comments – after all, as a fellow Irishman (Oscar Wilde) once remarked: “There is only one thing in life worse than being talked about, and that is not being talked about.

In fairness to Mr O’Leary he has since apologised for his remarks, but the Muslim Council of Britain has condemned his comments (made in an interview with The Times).

Many Muslims have logged on Twitter their negative experiences of flying (see below):

#flyingwhilstMuslim

A link to an article on the BBC News App about Mr O’Leary’s comments can be found below:

Michael O’Leary: Ryanair boss criticised for Muslim profiling comments

The Ryanair boss says Muslim men should be profiled at airports because “that is where the threat is”.

Copyright Seán J Crossan, 22 February 2020

Tickets for “people of colour” … or the problem with positive discrimination

Photo by Ehimetalor Unuabona on Unsplash

Tickets for “people of colour” …

In a previous blog (The force is not with you … published on 28 February and updated on 10 June 2019), I discussed the problems associated with policies of positive discrimination.

So, it is with some interest that I read an item on Sky News today about Afrofuture Fest a music festival which was to take place in the American City of Detroit. The festival organisers had offered tickets for sale to members of the public. Absolutely nothing unusual in that readers will undoubtedly respond, but what was unusual was the fact that the price to be paid in conjunction with an ‘early bird’ promotion was to be determined by the customer’s racial origins (tickets for “people of colour”).

If you were an African American applying for tickets, you would pay less than a White American wanting to go to the gig. I admit that I was intrigued by this marketing approach and I wanted to know what were the underlying motivations of the organisers? I confess: I’m coming from a different cultural perspective here in the UK and, generally, we’re not too keen on the widespread use of positive discrimination as a tool for promoting equality.

Well, it would seem that the pricing policy was motivated by a genuine determination to ensure that African Americans (who happen to be in the disproportionately lower income section of US society) were not deterred from attending the event by high prices. Furthermore, the organisers wanted a racially diverse group of music fans to attend the festival.

All well meaning, but the event has now become mired in controversy with the organisers receiving threats from white supremacist groups and artists deciding not to perform. The ticket policy has now been scrapped.

A link to how the story was reported on Sky News can be found below:

Festival scraps cheaper ‘people of colour’ tickets after ‘white supremacist threats’
http://news.sky.com/story/festival-scraps-cheaper-people-of-colour-tickets-after-white-supremacist-threats-11758953

Positive discrimination: the legal position

Discriminating in favour of one group of people over another (whether this is motivated by a good intention or not) will most likely be regarded as an example of direct discrimination which contravenes Section 13 of the Equality Act 2010.

The judgement of the House of Lords in James v Eastleigh Borough Council [1990] 2 AC 751 was particularly strong on this point and it was irrelevant that the Council was acting from motives of good faith i.e. to promote healthier lifestyles for female residents of the Borough. The simple fact was that the Borough Council was acting unlawfully (in breach of the then Sex Discrimination Act 1975) when it charged men for entry to the swimming pool when women were not charged for access to this facility. The Borough Council had committed an act of direct, sex discrimination.

Positive discrimination has only really been successful in the UK when the Westminster Parliament has given it the full backing of the law and, additionally, it complies with this country’s EU legal obligations.

One notable example of positive discrimination is the Sex Discrimination (Election Candidates) Act 2002 which aimed to encourage more women to enter Parliament by having all women short lists. Previously, such an attempt to promote positive action would have been illegal under the (now repealed) Sex Discrimination Act 1975.  Some (male) Labour activists did, in fact, bring successful legal challenges under the former sex discrimination legislation on the grounds that they had suffered discrimination because of their gender in being automatically disqualified from the parliamentary candidates’ selection process (Jepson and Dyas-Elliott v The Labour Party and Others [1996] IRLR 116).

The other example of positive discrimination involves the Police Service of Northern Ireland. The PSNI was created in 2001 following the Belfast or Good Friday Agreement in 1998. The PSNI replaced the old Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) which was largely seen as a biased or sectarian police force by most Roman Catholics in Northern Ireland.

According to figures produced by the official Patten Report, the RUC was overwhelming Protestant in composition (91.7% to 8.3% Roman Catholic).

One of the key recommendations of the Patten Report was that:

“An equal number of Protestants and Catholics should be drawn from the pool of qualified candidates.” [para. 15.10]

This led to a deliberate 50/50 recruitment policy in which half of the candidates recruited to the PSNI had to come from a Roman Catholic background.

That said, there was significant criticism of the 50/50 recruitment policy coming from the Unionist and Loyalist community in Northern Ireland – who were never going to be reconciled to the demise of the RUC in any case. The recruitment policy was only ended in 2011 by Owen Patterson MP, the then Conservative Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. Predictably, this development did not please the Nationalist and Republican community in Northern Ireland.

Affirmative or positive action

In the United States of America, of course, there is a completely different approach to the promotion of diversity and equality from what we would understand in the UK and the European Union. The Americans, for example, are very keen on affirmative action (or positive discrimination) and often employers will speak of filling quotas i.e. recruiting a certain number of African Americans or Hispanic Americans. This practice of affirmative action or positive discrimination is an attempt by the Americans to overcome the problems of historic and entrenched racism in their society. In the UK and the European Union, we too have had our problems with under-representation of certain groups in the work-place, but any attempt to introduce positive discrimination has been much more limited in scope.

Affirmative action has its limits: the ticket policy at Afrofuture Fest would, however, appear to be a breach of the Civil Rights Act 1964 (Title II) which states that:

“All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public accommodation, as defined in this section, without discrimination on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin.

The UK and EU approaches to positive discrimination

Limited positive action or discrimination has, for some time, been tolerated by the Court of Justice of the European Union where employers gave preference, as part of an equality policy, to female candidates over suitably qualified male candidates in order to address gender imbalances in the work-place (see Kalanke Freie Hansestadt Bremen (1995) C-450/93 and Badeck and Others (2000) C-158/97).

The Equality Act 2010 does, admittedly, permit what is referred to as ‘positive action’ in fairly limited circumstances and it has been observed that it does not really advance the law very much in this area.

Certainly, in terms of the public sector equality duty, organisations may be permitted to take specified forms positive action in the work-place to eradicate or minimise forms of discriminations e.g. ‘the need to tackle prejudice and promote understanding’ (see Section 149(5) of the Equality Act)

Section 158 of the Act permits an employer to take positive action to help individuals with a protected characteristic to overcome or minimise such a disadvantage. Such action on the part of the employer must, however, be a proportionate means of achieving this aim.

Section 159 also permits an employer to take positive action in recruitment and promotion in relation to people with protected characteristics. The employer will only really be able to utilise this provision if candidates for a job or a promoted post have the same or similar qualifications. In such situations, the employer will able to consider if candidates with protected characteristics are at a disadvantage or are under represented in matters of recruitment or promotion.

There is one important exception to the rules on positive action contained in the Act: it will not be illegal for an employer to treat a disabled person more favourably in comparison to a non-disabled person.

Conclusion

In the UK, positive discrimination in recruitment can be lawful under very limited circumstances. In other words, it is a practice which, if objectively justified, can be used to overcome historical patterns of discrimination e.g. to address the woefully low numbers of female politicians or the under-representation of Roman Catholics in the Police Service in Northern Ireland.

Such arrangements permitting limited positive discrimination tend to be governed by ‘sunset clauses’ i.e. they have a built in expiry date, so they will not last forever. Furthermore, positive discrimination is really only legitimate  in so called ‘tie-break’ situations where several applicants have the same qualifications and experience, but as a matter of public policy, for example, a female or minority ethnic applicant is given preference in order to address historic diversity imbalances in that particular work-place.

The Americans, on the other hand, have tended to pursue a very explicit policy of positive discrimination or affirmative action by placing an emphasis on the filling of quotas – either, for example, in employment or education. Such an approach places a legal obligation on employers and service providers (colleges and universities) to ensure that certain minimum numbers of people from racial or ethnic minority backgrounds are given a job or a place in training or education.

As we have seen with the ticket policy for events such as Afrofuture Fest, positive discrimination can be controversial and potentially unlawful.

Copyright Seán J Crossan, 8 July 2019

Just blew it? (Again!)

Photo by Jakob Owens on Unsplash

Over the last few months, controversy seems to be dogging global sportswear corporation, Nike.

In a previous blog, I wrote about Nike allegedly withdrawing sponsorship from athletes who became pregnant (Don’t do it! published on 17 May 2019).

The Corporation is again in trouble over its latest version of the Airmax trainer. This product was released to coincide with the USA’s Independence Day celebrations on 4 July.

Good marketing strategy? Alas no: the trainer had an American flag on it. What’s the problem? It was the Betsy Ross version of the Stars and Stripes – a version of the Star Spangled banner which was misappropriated by the the American Nazi Party.

Arguments that the Betsy Ross Flag represents the original British Thirteen Colonies which broke away to form the United States of America has cut little ice. Even Colin Kaepernick, the African American Football star (whom Nike backed in a previous ad campaign) has condemned the Corporation for promoting racism.

So, to add to problems over pregnancy discrimination, we now have Nike in the middle of accusations of racism and anti-semitism.

Just do it! More like just blew it!

A link to a story about Nike’s latest misstep on the Sky News website can be found below:

Offensive’ tennis shoes taken off shelves by Nike selling for £2,000
http://news.sky.com/story/offensive-tennis-shoes-taken-off-shelves-by-nike-selling-for-1632000-11755365

Copyright Seán J Crossan, 8 July 2019

Clean Chinese food???!!!

Photo by Alice on Unsplash

Two white American restaurateurs opened Lucky Lee’s, an establishment in Manhattan, New Your City where they advertised that they were serving “clean Chinese food”.

The accusations of racism and stealing from another ethnic group’s culture soon came thick and fast.

The word “clean” was actually being used to try and attract diners who dietary issues, but Chinese Americans saw this term rather differently: it reinforced harmful stereotypes.

A link to the story in the New York Times can be found below:

A white business owner advertised “clean” Chinese food. Chinese-Americans had something to say about it.

https://apple.news/A1q-z7kJgScaN

Postscript

It would seem that accusations of cultural appropriation or theft in the culinary world aren’t confined to just the USA: our very own celebrity chef, Gordon Ramsay, has got himself into hot water concerning the launch of one of his restaurants in London.

Please see the link to the story on Sky News below:

Gordon Ramsay hits back at ‘prejudice and insults’ after cultural appropriation claims

http://news.sky.com/story/gordon-ramsay-hits-back-at-prejudice-and-insults-after-cultural-appropriation-claims-11694567

Copyright Seán J Crossan, 14 and 15 April 2019

Everyday experiences of racism

Photo by Markus Spiske on Unsplash

In several of my previous blogs (Stick and stones may break my bones, but names will never hurt me? published on 22 February 2019 and Hurt feelings published on 14 February 2019), I considered the psychological impact of racist behaviour on the victim.

A person’s race, of course, is a protected characteristic in terms of the Equality Act 2010.

Courts and Tribunals are permitted to factor into a compensation award an element for the injury to feelings that a victim of discrimination has suffered. This calculation is carried out by reference to a scale known as the Vento Guidelines.

Injury to feelings can encompass, amongst other things, sensations of isolation, exclusion, anxiety and depression, fear, loss of self-esteem and even post traumatic stress.

An interesting example of how black people can encounter racism on a daily occurrence was reported by the BBC today.

The writer, Derek Owusu talks about the fact that, very often, white people do not wish to sit beside him on public transport. Doubtless, these kinds of experiences have a very negative effect on the wellbeing of many individuals in Derek Owusu’s situation. What should otherwise be a routine commute can turn into a nerve-wracking experience.

A link to the article and a video on the BBC News site can be found below:

Derek Owusu: ‘There are always empty seats beside me’

Writer Derek Owusu says his commute on public transport reveals the everyday racist actions black men in particular are subjected to in the UK.

In UK academic circles, it would seem that less favourable treatment in relation to a person’s race is widespread with a looming ethnic pay gap as the story below demonstrates:

Ethnic minority academics earn less than white colleagues

BBC analysis shows a 26% ethnic pay gap at some of the UK’s best-known universities.

Copyright Seán J Crossan, 10 April 2019

There ain’t nothin’ goin’ on but the rent …

Photo by rawpixel on Unsplash

There ain’t nothin’ goin’ on but the rent: so sang Gwen Guthrie in her 1986 R&B hit (older readers may well remember this track). Unfortunately, the same cannot be said for the UK Government which has just lost a human rights case before the English High Court (Mr Justice Spencer being the presiding judge). A link to a report on the BBC website can be found below:

this on the BBC News App and thought you should see it:

‘Right to rent’ checks breach human rights – High Court

Making landlords check the immigration status of tenants leads to racial discrimination, judge rules.

Immigration Act 2014

When Prime Minister, Theresa May was in her previous job as Home Secretary she steered legislation (the Immigration Act 2014) through the UK Parliament which obliged landlords to check the immigration status of tenants. The purpose of this part of the legislation was to create “a hostile and intimidating environment” for illegal immigrants. The scheme was known as the right to rent.

Landlords who failed to carry out this exercise or failed to do it properly, could be charged with a criminal offence in England. The right to rent scheme had not yet been introduced to Northern Ireland, Scotland or Wales, but it was the clear intention of the UK Government to do this. It should be recalled that immigration policy remains an area of law reserved to the UK Parliament.

Introduction of the right to rent policy across the remainder of the UK may now be wishful thinking on the part of Mrs May’s Government. In any event, the Scottish Government had already expressed its hostility to the introduction of this policy.

Between R (Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants) (Claimant) and Secretary of State for the Home Department (Defendant) and (1) Residential Landlords Association; (2) Equality and Human Rights Commission; and (3) Liberty (intervenors)[2019] EWHC 452 

The High Court has determined that the right to rent provisions of the Immigration Act 2016 are a breach of the Human Rights Act 1998 (i.e. are incompatible) because they discriminate against individuals on the basis of their ethnicity, nationality and/or race. In terms of Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights, there is a general prohibition on discrimination. There could also be a breach of Article 8 of the European Convention (right to private life and family life). The Government argued that checking the immigration status of prospective tenants was a necessary means of clamping down on illegal migrants – in other words, it could be objectively justified. The High Court did not share this opinion and stated that the compulsory background checks did nothing to combat illegal migration. In point of fact, it encouraged landlords to discriminate against British citizens from ethnic backgrounds (who not surprisingly had foreign names) and non-UK nationals who were in the country quite legally e.g. EU nationals.

The right to rent scheme also breaches Section 149 of the Equality Act 2010 (the public sector equality duty).

Mr Justice Spencer in his ruling stated:

“The measures have a disproportionately discriminatory effect and I would assume and hope that those legislators who voted in favour of the Scheme would be aghast to learn of its discriminatory effect…”

A link to the High Court’s decision can be found below:

https://www.bailii.org/cgi-bin/format.cgi?doc=/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2019/452.html&query=(joint)+AND+(council)+AND+(for)+AND+(the)+AND+(welfare)+AND+(of)+AND+(immigrants)

The consequences of the judgement?

The right to rent scheme has not yet been rolled out across the rest of the UK. The High Court’s decision (though applicable to England only) will certainly give the UK Government pause for thought. A declaration of incompatibility by a UK court is a very serious matter. Although it will not nullify the legislation (that is for Parliament to decide), it represents a significant criticism that parts of a UK Act of Parliament are not human rights compliant.

Admittedly, the High Court has stated that the Government has the right to appeal and it will be interesting to see what happens next.

Conclusion

Human rights are an area of the law which could be labelled the gift that keeps on giving to legal students and practitioners. In 2019, there is scarcely an area of UK public policy which will be immune from international human rights principles. The UK Government may choose to appeal, but if in the longer term, the decision of the High Court is upheld by the English Court of Appeal (and possibly by the UK Supreme Court), it will be up to the UK Parliament to decide whether to amend the Immigration Act 2016 so that it is compatible with this country’s human rights obligations.

As stated in previously Blogs, the consequences of declaring UK parliamentary legislation incompatible with the European Convention on Human Rights can be fully appreciated if we refer to the Supreme Court’s decision in R (Nicklinson) Ministry of Justice (CNK Alliance Ltd intervening) [2014] UKSC 38:

An essential element of the structure of the Human Rights Act 1998 is the call which Parliament has made on the courts to review the legislation which it passes in order to tell it whether the provisions contained in that legislation comply with the Convention. By responding to that call and sending the message to Parliament that a particular provision is incompatible with the Convention, the courts do not usurp the role of Parliament, much less offend the separation of powers. A declaration of incompatibility is merely an expression of the court’s conclusion as to whether, as enacted, a particular item of legislation cannot be considered compatible with a Convention right. In other words, the courts say to Parliament, ‘This particular piece of legislation is incompatible, now it is for you to decide what to do about it.’ And under the scheme of the Human Rights Act 1998 it is open to Parliament to decide to do nothing.”

Copyright Seán J Crossan, 4 March 2019