Sex or gender?

Photo by Dainis Graveris on Unsplash

Sex or gender: which term do you prefer? Can they be used inter-changeably?

These questions have now come into sharp focus as a result of an amendment to the Forensic Medical Services (Victims of Sexual Offences) (Scotland) Bill.

Our understanding of the terms “sex” and “gender” may now have to evolve as a result of the debate surrounding aspects of the Bill, but before we discuss this Bill it’s worth looking at the current legal position surrounding gender recognition issues.

The Equality Act 2010

Section 11(1) of the Equality Act 2010 defines a person’s “sex” in the following terms:

In relation to the protected characteristic of sex — a reference to a person who has a particular protected characteristic is a reference to a man or to a woman

In other words, current UK equality law means that your sex is determined at birth when you will be categorised as ‘Male’ or ‘Female’ and this will be entered on your birth certificate. We, therefore, do not have a choice about our sex when we are born. It is a matter of biology.

What about a person’s gender? Section 7(1) of the Equality Act 2010 provides us with guidance on this matter:

A person has the protected characteristic of gender reassignment if the person is proposing to undergo, is undergoing or has undergone a process (or part of a process) for the purpose of reassigning the person’s sex by changing physiological or other attributes of sex.

The Gender Recognition Act 2004

In April 2005, the Gender Recognition Act 2004 came into force. This Act, which received the Royal Assent on 1 July 2004, currently provides people who have undergone gender reassignment procedures with legal recognition in relation to their newly acquired gender identity. The legislation applies across the United Kingdom and was passed by the Westminster Parliament.

Legal recognition of a person’s decision to reassign the sex or gender they have had from birth will follow from the issuing of a full gender recognition certificate by a Gender Recognition Panel. The individual applying for such a certificate must be able to satisfy certain criteria – the most important criterion will centre around the submission of medical evidence of physiological changes by the applicant.

The Scottish Government was intending to reform the 2004 Act, but in the teeth of strong opposition within the Scottish National Party, such proposals have been dropped for the time being.

Self-identification

Under the Scottish Government’s proposals, an individual would have been permitted effectively to self-identify as a person of the opposite sex without having to undergo invasive medical procedures and provide the evidence of this fact in order to obtain recognition from the Panel.

This meant that an individual wishing to undergo gender reassignment in Scotland would have to have met the following criteria:

  • A statutory declaration to the effect that they have decided to change gender or sex;
  • The declaration will contain a statement that the individual has been living as a man or a woman for at a minimum of 3 months;
  • The individual will have to undertake a compulsory or mandatory period of 3 months to reflect on the decision to undergo gender reassignment (no gender recognition certificate will be issued until this period has been completed).

Forensic Medical Services (Victims of Sexual Offences) (Scotland) Bill

This Bill has proved to be another flashpoint in the often fierce debate over gender recognition.

The Bill, which passed Stage 3 in the Scottish Parliament on Thursday 10 December 2020, has reignited the debate about the terms “sex” and “gender” and their use in legislation.

The Bill passes Stage 3 in the Scottish Parliament

The purpose of the Bill is set out below:

“… to improve the experience, in relation to forensic medical services, of people who have been affected by sexual crime. It does this by providing a clear statutory duty for health boards to provide forensic medical examinations to victims and to ensure that an individual’s healthcare needs are addressed in a holistic way in the context of any such examination (or where such an examination is not proceeded with). As well as placing a duty on health boards to provide forensic medical examinations when a victim is referred for such an examination by the police, the Bill allows victims to “self-refer”. Self-referral means that a victim can request a forensic medical examination without having reported an incident to the police. The Bill provides a statutory framework for the retention by health boards of samples obtained during a forensic medical examination, which may support any future criminal investigation or prosecution. In self-referral cases, this allows the victim time to decide whether to make a police report.

A controversial amendment?

At first glance, no one could possibly object to the aims of the Bill, but Johann Lamont MSP, a former leader of the Scottish Labour Party, saw an opportunity to introduce an amendment to the Bill.

Such a development is not an unusual practice for parliamentarians to introduce amendments to Bills proceeding through Parliament. The introduction of amendments to Bills often permit reform to earlier pieces of legislation. In this case, the Lamont amendment was directed towards changing the wording of Section 9(2) of the Victims and Witnesses (Scotland) Act 2014.

As things currently stand, Section 9(2) of the 2014 Act states that:

Before a medical examination of the person in relation to the complaint is carried out by a registered medical practitioner in pursuance of section 31 of the Police and Fire Reform (Scotland) Act 2012, the constable must give the person an opportunity to request that any such medical examination be carried out by a registered medical practitioner of a gender specified by the person.

This could mean, under current law, that a victim of a sexual assault e.g. a biological or cis woman might have to undergo an examination by a medical professional who is a transgender female.

The Lamont amendment (which has now been accepted overwhelmingly by the Scottish Parliament) will ensure that the word “gender” will be replaced with the word “sex”.

Johann Lamont’s amendment will remove an anomaly in the law which currently permits a transgender person who is a medical professional to examine a victim of a sexual assault.

Further controversy

When one flashpoint is resolved, another disagreement about sex and gender is never far away in Scotland.

An organisation called forwomen.scot is raising a legal action in the Court of Session in Edinburgh for the express purpose of challenging the Scottish Government’s attempt to redefine the word ‘woman’ (see below):

“… We are challenging the Scottish Ministers over the redefinition of “woman” in the Gender Representation on Public Boards (Scotland) Act 2018 which we believe is outside the legislative competency of the Scottish Parliament under the Scotland Act 1998 and in contravention of the Scottish Ministers’ duties under equality legislation… The new definition includes some men, while, remarkably, excluding some women. This cannot be allowed to stand… The Equality Act 2010 states that a woman is “a female of any age” and maintaining this definition is key to maintaining women’s rights and protections in law…”

forwomen.scot describes rationale on its website in the following terms:

– sex is immutable and is a protected characteristic;
– women are entitled to privacy, dignity, safety and fairness;
– women’s rights should be strengthened.

https://forwomen.scot

All quiet on the Western Front? Hardly … expect this issue to run and run.

Copyright Seán J Crossan, 4 February 2021

Virtual appeal?

Photo taken from the First Edition of Introductory Scots Law: Theory & Practice (Hodder Gibson, 2004)

The above scene, taken some years ago in Edinburgh’s Court of Session, portrays a normality that has been sadly lost to us in the legal world over the last month or so. It’s very unlikely that our two Advocates (the English equivalent would be Barristers) will be having face to face discussions for the foreseeable future.

Yes, we’re back to the ramifications of the Coronavirus (again) and lawyers, like so many other professionals, are now having to learn to rely on technology in order to deliver services to the public.

It should not have come as a great surprise, therefore, to see that Scotland’s most senior civil court has decided to proceed with a virtual appeal hearing in respect of a high profile defamation claim.

Last year, the well known Scottish independence (not to say controversial) blogger, Stuart Campbell was unhappy with the decision of a Sheriff in his defamation claim against Kezia Dugdale, the former Scottish Labour Party Leader (Campbell v Dugdale [2019] SC EDIN 32).

Mr Campbell sought leave to appeal to the Inner House of the Court of Session – which was granted – but this was before the virus outbreak and life as we know it changing in ways that we could not have foreseen.

The old adage about justice delayed means justice denied is extremely appropriate to the times we are living in. Due to the viral outbreak, both civil and criminal proceedings in Scotland (as in so many other countries) have practically ground to a halt.

How do we deal with this?

Necessity is the mother of invention and a virtual Inner House has been created by the Scottish Courts and Tribunals Service (SCTS). Eric McQueen, SCTS Chief Executive, is confident that the three appeal judges, court staff and lawyers for both litigants will be able to work with these arrangements. Currently, this is a temporary arrangement and jury is still out as to whether virtual court hearings will become a permanent feature of the Scottish, legal landscape. The answer to this question will surely depend on how matters progress in this particular appeal.

Even our legislators in the Scottish and Westminster Parliaments are having to grapple with the opportunities (and disadvantages) that remote working represents. Yesterday, the first virtual session of the House of Commons took place at Westminster.

Strange times indeed, but needs must when the devil drives …

A link to the BBC News website about the virtual Inner House can be found below:

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-52358830

A link to the original decision of the Sheriff (Nigel Ross QC) can be found below:

https://www.scotcourts.gov.uk/docs/default-source/cos-general-docs/pdf-docs-for-opinions/2019scedin32.pdf?sfvrsn=0

Copyright Seán J Crossan, 23 April 2020

Rehab (or I can change)

Photo by Ross Findon on Unsplash

Unlike the fantastic Amy Winehouse track, in the case that I’ll discuss shortly, it was the prisoner who wanted to go to rehab. His perception that the Prison Service had said “no” was the basis of a petition for judicial review.

Yes, we’re barely into 2020 and the human rights’ bandwagon for prisoners rolls on yet again.

Last month, I wrote two Blogs about petitions for judicial review submitted by prisoners to the Court of Session in respect of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (i.e. the right to family and private life). Both applications were unsuccessful (see William Frederick Ian Beggs v The Scottish Ministers [2019] CSOH 95; and Petition of David Gilday for Judicial Review of the actions of the Scottish Ministers [2019] CSOH 103).

The Scottish Government (or Ministers) are legally obligated in terms of both the Scotland Act 1998 and the Human Rights Act 1998 to ensure that public bodies and agencies comply with the State’s obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights. Regular readers of this Blog site will be very familiar with this state of affairs.

In a recent case before Lord Ericht in the Court of Session, a third inmate of one of Her Majesty’s penal institutions fared no better than his fellow hoodlums when he raised a claim for damages of £10,000.

In the Petition: Michael Glancy for Judicial Review of the actions of Scottish Ministers [2020], Michael Glancy [the prisoner] claimed that the alleged failure by the Scottish Prison Service to provide him with proper rehabilitation opportunities represented a breach of his right to liberty in terms of Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights. In essence, Glancy was arguing that the lack of such opportunities was in effect turning his imprisonment into an ongoing period of arbitrary detention with very little prospect of him meeting Parole Board criteria for his release on licence.

The background to the prisoner’s circumstances were as follows:

In June 2015, at the High Court in Edinburgh, the petitioner was sentenced to a period of imprisonment of 4 years with an extension period of 2 years. He had been convicted of assault to injury, two charges of assault, a contravention of the Criminal Law (Consolidation) (Scotland) Act 1995, section 52 (vandalism), two charges of assault (domestic) and assault to injury, permanent disfigurement and danger of life. The petitioner had had previous convictions …

At a Parole Board Hearing in 2016, it was noted that:


In light of the current circumstances, behaviour and attitude of Mr Glancy it is not possible to positively recommend his release on licence. It would appear that he is so engaged in extreme, violent and anti-authority type behaviour there is no possibility of his risk being managed in the community subject to licence conditions.
There are significant concerns as to how Mr Glancy will be managed in the community, not least where he will live.

Glancy’s main bone of contention seems to have centred around his belief that he was denied the opportunity to participate in the Self-Change Programme (“SCP”).

As Lord Ericht noted:

This [SCP] is a high intensity cognitive-behaviour programme that aims to reduce violence in high risk adult male offenders. It is for prisoners with a persistent and persuasive pattern of violence. It is for violent offenders who present the highest risk and is used for the top 2% to 5% of offenders in terms of risk.

While serving his sentence, Glancy had refused certain opportunities to address his criminal offending and, furthermore, he had been the subject of 13 misconduct reports (overwhelmingly connected with fighting and assault). As Lord Ericht observed [at paragraph 50] it was the repeated failures of Glancy to engage with meaningful offers of rehabilitation during his periods of incarceration that led to his exclusion from SCP.

In dismissing Glancy’s Petition, Lord Ericht made the following observations:

Moreover I find that the respondents have not failed to provide information about when rehabilitative work might be offered in terms of article 5, or acted irrationally in failing to provide him with this. The minutes of the various case management meetings show that there was extensive discussion with the petitioner throughout the period of his incarceration about the courses available to him. In response to his complaint, the prisoner was informed that the SCP course for non-protection prisoners was not running at that time but he would be notified of the date of the course applicable for his category of prisoner. No date for such a course has since been fixed.

A link to Lord Ericht’s Opinion in respect of Glancy’s Petition can be found below:

https://www.scotcourts.gov.uk/docs/default-source/cos-general-docs/pdf-docs-for-opinions/2020csoh001.pdf?sfvrsn=0

Related Blog Articles:

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2019/12/04/red-letter-day/

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2019/12/23/serious-drugs/

Copyright Seán J Crossan, 24 January 2020

The plumber’s arm

Photo by pan xiaozhen on Unsplash

The latest Blog title sounds like the name of a quaint English or Scottish public house, but as you might expect it relates to matters legal.

This last week, I have just begun to teach my First Year university students about the law of delict (or tort in other common law jurisdictions) and, as always, I’m looking for relevant cases or stories in the news to illustrate this area.

Obligingly enough, a report of a case came through on Friday 17 January 2020 about a plumber called Darren Conquer who has just been awarded £540,000 in damages by the Outer House of the Court of Session as a result of being the victim of medical negligence (see Darren Conquer v Lothian Health Board [2020] CSOH 8).

As I often say to students the basis of the law of delict is loss or injury wrongfully caused (or as the Romans would have said: damnum injuria datum).

Mr Conquer had injured his arm while playing football and he had, subsequently, undergone medical treatment for this. This is where it gets interesting: the injury had occurred some 16 years ago, but Conquer was not suing the person or persons who had injured him during the football match.

This is, of course, where the issue of volenti non fit injuria arises. When you engage in a physical sport, like football, you must accept the risk of possible injury – on the proviso that all of the players conduct themselves properly and within the rules of the game.

The basis of the pursuer’s claim was that the Health Board, as the employer of the doctors who treated him, was vicariously liable because the injury to the arm been misdiagnosed and, consequently, the proper medical procedures had not been followed. Put simply, the pursuer was arguing that the Health Board was culpable or at fault for his losses.

Had the correct diagnosis been made by the doctors and the correct treatment applied, the pursuer would have made either a full recovery or nearly a full recovery and would have been able to return to his job within 6 months of sustaining the injury. The real issue seems to have centred around the failure by the doctors to carry out surgery on the pursuer at a much earlier and vital stage of his treatment.

In short, the medical negligence was the primary cause (the causa causans) of the pursuer’s losses i.e. his inability to work at his chosen trade of plumber (a skilled trade where he had the potential to make a good living).

The doctors treating Conquer owed a duty of care to him and they had been negligent in the manner of both the diagnosis of the severity of the injury and the treatment which followed (or didn’t follow perhaps more accurately).

A link to the opinion of Lady Carmichael in the Outer House can be found below:

https://www.scotcourts.gov.uk/docs/default-source/cos-general-docs/pdf-docs-for-opinions/2020csoh8.pdf?sfvrsn=0

More medical negligence

For another recent case on medical negligence, please see the Opinion of Lord Pentland in George Andrews v Greater Glasgow Health Board [2019] CSOH 31.

In the above case, the pursuer, the partner of a woman who died as a result of medical negligence, was successful in his claim for damages.

Lord Pentland noted:

Since I have found that (a) Dr Izzath failed to advise the deceased that she should be admitted; (b) that his failure to give her that advice was negligent; and (c) that the deceased would have accepted the advice had it been given, I need not make any separate finding as to the deceased’s mental state.”

His Lordship went on to observe that:

I would merely reiterate that I am in no doubt that if
Dr Izzath had advised the deceased that she required to be admitted to hospital, she would have accepted his advice
.”

A link to Lord Pentland’s Opinion can be found below:

https://www.scotcourts.gov.uk/docs/default-source/default-document-library/2019csoh31.pdf?sfvrsn=0

Related Blog Articles:

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2019/04/03/where-theres-blame-theres-a-claim/

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2019/08/05/an-unfortunate-error/

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2019/12/09/howzat-or-volenti-again/

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2019/12/13/joint-and-several-liability/

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2019/12/10/post-traumatic-stress-or-psychiatric-injuries/

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2019/02/15/i-wish-i-hadnt-done-that/

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2019/11/19/i-wish-i-hadnt-done-that-continued/

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2019/02/22/stress-kills/

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2019/12/23/act-of-god/

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2019/04/19/dont-stop-the-music/

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2019/01/25/foreign-objects-or-ive-got-a-bone-to-pick-with-you/

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2019/12/30/foreign-objects-or-ive-got-a-bone-to-pick-with-you-part-2/

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2019/01/26/volenti-non-fit-injuria-or-hell-mend-you/

Copyright Seán J Crossan, 20 January 2020

For your eyes only?

Photo by camilo jimenez on Unsplash

Two days running and we seem to be on a bit of a theme in this Blog about a person’s right to privacy and the limits of such a right.

If you picked up on yesterday’s Blog article (The limits of privacy), you’ll be aware that generally speaking the common law of Scotland (and indeed that of England) does recognise a person’s right to a private life. This right is also protected in terms of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (as implemented by the Scotland and Human Rights Acts 1998).

That said, privacy is not an absolute right and there may be all sorts of situations where the State (or your employer for that matter) might legitimately take in interest in your activities (whether these happen on the job or are of an extra-curricular nature).

If you’re William Beggs today, you might be feeling rather upset about this. William Beggs, for those of you who don’t know, is currently serving a life sentence for murder in a Scottish Prison. He earned the rather grim moniker, ‘The Limbs in the Loch’ killer because of he dismembered his victim (Barry Wallace).

Well, Mr Beggs – somewhat ironically many would no doubt be quick to pass comment – wished to pursue a legal action in which he alleged that his human rights had been breached by the prison authorities. Specifically, Beggs objected to the practice of the authorities in opening and reading his private correspondence from his doctors and lawyers. In his opinion, the authorities (the Scottish Prison Service and the were in breach of his right to privacy as guaranteed by Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

There were three incidents between October and November 2018 where Beggs objected to the Scottish Prison Service monitoring his correspondence: two letters with the details of hospital appointments and one letter from his lawyer had been opened. The prison official who opened the letter from Beggs’ lawyer had done so mistakenly and the authorities apologised fully for this action.

Beggs submitted a petition for judicial review of the actions of the Scottish Prison Service (and also that of the Scottish Government as the supervising state authority) to the Court of Session in Edinburgh.

Beggs also brought a claim for damages of £5,000 that he was a victim in terms of Section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 and the Section 100(3) of the Scotland Act 1998.

The outcome of Beggs’ petition

Unfortunately, for Beggs the Court of Session (where his application for judicial review was being heard) did not agree.

Yes, there is a general duty in terms of Article 8 for public authorities (the Scottish Prison Service and the Scottish Government to which it is answerable) to guarantee the right to privacy for serving prisoners, but it is not an absolute right.

As Article 8 makes abundantly clear:

There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.

Lord Armstrong (in the Outer House of the Court of Session) was very clear, when arriving at his decision to reject Beggs’ petition, that the Scottish Prison Service had very good reasons for monitoring his confidential correspondence. According to rules 55 and 56 of the Prison and Young Offenders Institutions (Scotland) Rules 2011, such actions could be justified in situations where there was:

“reasonable cause to believe that the contents of the correspondence might endanger the security of the prison, endanger the safety of any person, or relate to criminal activity”.

Although the Prison authorities had erred when they opened Beggs’ legal correspondence, they had recognised this situation and promptly apologised to him.

Consequently, Beggs’ claim for damages was also rejected.

A link to Lord Armstrong’s Opinion can be found below:

William Frederick Ian Beggs v The Scottish Ministers [2019] CSOH 95

https://www.scotcourts.gov.uk/docs/default-source/cos-general-docs/pdf-docs-for-opinions/2019csoh95.pdf?sfvrsn=0

Copyright Seán J Crossan, 4 December 2019

Undue influence?

Photo by Simon Rae on Unsplash

A recent case in the Outer House of the Court of Session dealt with the issue of undue influence between a mother and her daughter, but don’t jump to conclusions – yet.

We often think of parents exercising a huge amount of influence over their children – especially when they are younger. This is a necessary condition of life. We trust and hope that our parents and guardians will use this influence for our benefit.

As the years go by, children naturally enough want to take control and make their own decisions – good or bad – in spite of parental opinions. Making your own decisions can be an example of youthful rebellion or a sign of growing maturity and confidence – depending on the type of relationship that we have with our parents.

I want to flip this discussion around and change focus. What if the influence in the relationship is going in a different direction? What if it is the child rather than the parent who is the influencer (to use a fashionable term)?

This is not a particularly unusual situation: many people with older parents (and we do live in what seems to be a rapidly ageing society in Scotland and the rest of the UK) will be acting in a very sound legal fashion if they set up a power of attorney to make decisions on behalf of their parents.

We all hope that our parents will remain healthy in old age and will continue to enjoy their independence, but what if the day comes when parents can no longer exercise their autonomy in decision making. The power of attorney facility in Scots Law allows children (or other relatives) to make vital decisions on behalf of their ailing parents. In short order, the power of attorney is something most of us would rather not use; it’s an insurance policy when the worst happens allowing us to make those vital decisions about parental healthcare and the management of family assets.

The case in question was Adeline Margaret Wilson v Peter Watkins & Another [2019] CSOH 44 where Lord Brodie concluded in his Opinion that there was no evidence of undue influence which would have rendered the course of dealings (the transfer of ownership of the parental home) between mother and daughter suspect or dubious in any meaningful way.

In this case, the mother (Mrs Wilson) had invited her daughter and her son-in-law (Mr Watkins) in 2012 to come and live with her. Mrs Wilson had gained title to her home following the death of her husband some years before. The Watkins sold their property in order to move in with Mrs Wilson.  The trio enjoyed a good relationship at first and, some time later (2013), Mrs Wilson transferred the ownership of the property to her daughter by way of a disposition (although she reserved a liferent to herself permitting her to remain living in the house). There appears to have been a falling out in 2015 and Mrs Wilson left the home to move in with her other daughter.

A legal challenge was lodged by Mrs Wilson at the Court of Session in order to have the disposition (the conveyance of title) set aside i.e. made voidable on the grounds that Mrs Watkins (and her husband) had exercised undue influence by persuading her to transfer the ownership of the property to them.

As Lord Brodie emphasised, the relevant judicial precedent in Scotland is Gray v Binny (1879) 7 R 332 which contains Lord Shand’s four part  test addressing the issue of undue influence.

In the essence, the key elements of this test are as follows:

(1) that there was a relationship which created a dominant and ascendant influence,

(2) that the relationship was one of confidence and trust,

(3) that a material and gratuitous benefit had been given to the
prejudice of the granter, and

(4) that the granter had been without the benefit of any independent advice at the material time.

Critically, Lord Brodie was of the view that Mrs Wilson’s case failed to satisfy elements 2-4 of the Shand criteria. Put simply, the mere existence of the relationship of parent and child did not of itself prove that undue influence had affected the transaction or legal dealings between the parties to the dispute. Mrs Wilson’s case was therefore without merit and was not permitted to proceed to trial or proof.

As a point of interest, the Watkins had submitted a counter-claim of £45,000 in respect of an allegation of unjust enrichment against Mrs Wilson had the issue of undue influence been permitted to proceed to proof. This figure represented the sum which the Watkins had used from the sale of their own house to make improvements to Mrs Wilson’s home prior to the falling out of the trio.

A link to Lord Brodie’s Opinion can be found below:

https://www.scotcourts.gov.uk/docs/default-source/cos-general-docs/pdf-docs-for-opinions/2019csoh44.pdf?sfvrsn=0

The effect of undue influence

Undue influence potentially renders a contract or legal transaction voidable so that it may be rescinded or cancelled. It is therefore a factor which can undermine the validity of contracts or legal transactions.

If rescission, however, is being sought as a remedy by one of the parties to the contract as a remedy, there must be no delay in claiming relief after the influence has ceased to have an effect. Delay in claiming relief in these circumstances may bar the claim since delay can be used as evidence of affirmation or agreement.

Undue influence can perhaps occur particularly in the following types of relationship: parent and child; and husband and wife.

There will, of course, be other relationships where a stronger party may exert a particularly negative influence on the weaker party, for example, members of a religious cult who unquestionably obey the orders of their spiritual leader (see both the English decision of Allcard v Skinner (1887) 36 Ch D 145 and the Scottish decision of Anderson v The Beacon Fellowship (1992) S.L.T. 111 which I discuss in Chapter 2 of Introductory Scots Law: Theory & Practice )(3rd Edition)).

During the 1990s, the issue of undue influence in connection with the relationship of husband and wife was given much needed judicial clarity Several cases were brought before the Scottish and English courts regarding the issue of undue influence in the marital relationship and all of these cases had remarkably similar facts, whereby the pursuers, a number of wives, alleged that they had agreed to re-mortgage the marital home so that a bank would lend money to their husbands (usually, but not always, for business purposes).

These wives claimed that they had not been given sufficient information by their husbands when they had agreed to approve what later turned out to be very risky transactions. Some of the pursuers had not sought independent legal advice before agreeing to take out the second mortgage.

Initially, the House of Lords, in Barclays Bank plc v O’Brien [1993] UKHL 6, stated that a married woman (or cohabitee) must be regarded as a special, protected class of guarantor when agreeing to guarantee her husband’s (or partner’s) debts because of the nature of the relationship. The bank should be on alert for signs of undue influence which would undermine the validity of the transaction. Their Lordships were of the opinion that the bank should be placed under a duty of care to ensure that the wife or the cohabitee had had the benefit of independent advice.

Their Lordships, however, rowed backed slightly from this position in a subsequent English case: CIBC Mortgages v Pitt [1994] 1 AC 200. In other words, the legal position on undue influence as factor which might undermine a legal transaction was evolving. In Pitt, a wife was not allowed to succeed in her claim of undue influence because the mortgage was in the names of both husband and wife and, therefore, she was benefiting from the transaction.

The decision of their Lordships in Barclays Bank plc v O’Brien was, however, not followed by the Inner House of the Court of Session in Mumford v Bank of Scotland 1996 SLT 392 where it was held that banks are not under a general duty to explain all the material circumstances of a loan to someone who has guaranteed it.

In Smith v Bank of Scotland [1997] UKHL 26, the House of Lords attempted to bring Scots law into line with English law. Lord Clyde stated that there were a number of sound reasons for attempting to harmonise the laws of Scotland and England:

“I am not persuaded that there are any social or economic considerations which would justify a difference in the law between the two jurisdictions in the particular point here under consideration. Indeed when similar transactions with similar institutions or indeed branches of the same institutions may be taking place in both countries there is a clear practical advantage in the preservation of corresponding legal provisions.”

In a further English case, Royal Bank of Scotland PLC v Ettridge (No. 2) [2001] UKHL 44 the House of Lords appeared to retreat from the position that it had originally laid out in Barclays Bank v O’Brien (1993) whereby that married women or cohabitees should be regarded as a special, protected class of guarantor. The House of Lords in Ettridge has stated that undue influence will not be automatically presumed merely because the parties to a transaction are husband and wife.

In a series of of subsequent cases (Forsyth v Royal Bank of Scotland PLC (2000) SLT 1295, Clydesdale Bank Ltd v Black (2002) SLT 764 and Royal Bank of Scotland PLC v Wilson & Ors (2003) ScotCS 396), the Inner House of the Court of Session refused to accept the automatic presumption that wives were unduly influenced by their husbands. Misrepresentations by the husband were more likely to have induced the wives to agree to become guarantors rather than any hint of undue influence. Misrepresentation, of course, a completely separate factor which can potentially render a legal transaction voidable.

In Mumford v Bank of Scotland (1996), Lord Hope made the following statement which (I think) sensibly sums up the approach taken by the Scottish courts in these types of cases between husbands and wives:

There is no indication in this passage that a presumption of undue influence can arise merely from the nature of the transaction and the fact of the relationship. What is important is the effect of that relationship in the particular case, with the result that each case must be examined upon its own facts.” [my emphasis].

In conclusion, I think that Lord Hope hit the nail on the head: the mere existence of a relationship where influence could be abused does not of itself mean that anything underhand has occurred and, therefore, each case will have to be approached on its own merits.

Copyright Seán J Crossan, 26 October 2019

Blond ambition? (or the prorogation game)

Photo by Annie Spratt on Unsplash

Well, its official: as of the morning of Tuesday 24 September 2019, the UK Supreme Court has ruled against the Prime Minister’s prorogation of the Westminster Parliament for 5 weeks.

In a unanimous decision, the 11 Justices of the Supreme Court have declared that the suspension of Parliament was unlawful.

The decision of the Court of Session (in the Petition of Joanna Cherry MP and Others) has been approved by the Supreme Court.

The decision of the English High Court to rule against Gina Miller has also been overturned.

As Baroness Hale succinctly stated:

It is impossible for us to conclude, on the evidence which has been put before us, that there was any reason – let alone a good reason – to advise Her Majesty to prorogue Parliament for five weeks, from 9th or 12th September until 14th October. We cannot speculate, in the absence of further evidence, upon what such reasons might have been. It follows that the decision was unlawful.

Video footage of the decision of the Court, delivered by Baroness Hale of Richmond (its President), can be found below:

The House of Commons will now reconvene on Wednesday 25 September 2019.

Links to the full judgements (and summaries of these decisions) can be found below:

R (on the application of Miller) (Appellant) v The Prime Minister (Respondent) Cherry and others (Respondents) v Advocate General for Scotland (Appellant) (Scotland) [2019] UKSC 41 (On appeals from: [2019] EWHC 2381 (QB) and [2019] CSIH 49)

Click to access uksc-2019-0192-judgment.pdf

Click to access uksc-2019-0192-summary.pdf

Click to access uksc-2019-0192-judgment.pdf

Click to access uksc-2019-0192-summary.pdf

Copyright Seán J Crossan, 24 September 2019

To prorogue or not to prorogue? (That indeed is the question)

Photo by Hugo Sousa on Unsplash

It was all meant to be so different from Theresa May’s chaotic time in Downing Street, but the last few weeks have not been kind to current UK Prime Minister, Boris Johnson.

He has been attacked for seeking the prorogation (suspension) of Parliament for 5 weeks; he has lost several (critical) parliamentary votes; he also lost his majority in the Commons; and he has been denied the General Election (which many of his critics believe that he secretly craves – despite official statements to the contrary). This last problem having arisen as a result of the restrictions imposed by the Fixed Term Parliaments Act 2011 – passed ironically with the votes of Conservative MPs in the more peaceful days of the UK Coalition Government (2010-15). The law of unintended consequences many of the Prime Minister’s supporters will no doubt lament.

The Prime Minister might have felt some relief last week when both the Queen’s Bench Division of the English High Court and the Outer House of the Court of Session ruled in two separate, but connected, cases that his decision to advise the Queen to prorogue Parliament (by using the Royal Prerogative) was not unlawful (see Gina Miller v the Prime Minister & Others; and Joanna Cherry MP and Others, Petition for Judicial Review both 2019).

That was until 11 September 2019), when the Inner House of the Court of Session (Scotland’s Supreme Civil Court) landed nothing less than a bombshell on the UK Government. Lords Carloway, Brodie and Drummond Young issued an opinion that the circumstances which surrounded the proroguing of Parliament was unlawful:

All three First Division judges have decided that the PM’s advice to the HM the Queen is justiciable, that it was motivated by the improper purpose of stymying Parliament and that it, and what has followed from it, is unlawful. …

The Court will accordingly make an Order declaring that the Prime Minister’s advice to HM the Queen and the prorogation which followed thereon was unlawful and is thus null and of no effect.

This decision clearly reverses Lord Doherty’s Opinion in the Outer House of the Court of Session which was issued on 4 September 2019.

Professor Stephen Tierney of Edinburgh University’s Law School referred to the judgement as “remarkable”.

In essence, the prorogation of Parliament was a tactical (underhand?) manoeuvre by the UK Government to make it more difficult for the UK Parliament to scrutinise and block it’s attempt to pursue a no deal Brexit by 31 October 2019. For now, the objective of the Government in this regard have been stopped in tracks.

The UK Government has been given leave to appeal against the decision of the Inner House and the matter will be now be determined by the UK Supreme Court at Guildhall, London.

A link to the full Opinion of the Inner House can be found below:

https://www.scotcourts.gov.uk/docs/default-source/cos-general-docs/pdf-docs-for-opinions/2019csih49.pdf?sfvrsn=0

Copyright Seán J Crossan, 11 & 13 September 2019

Scottish Civil Court Statistics

Photo by Melinda Gimpel on Unsplash

Scottish Legal News reports today that the Scottish Civil Courts have seen a 10% increase in the volume of business in the year 2017/18, according to official statistics published on behalf of the Scottish Government.

Over 81,000 civil cases were commenced in either the Court of Session or the Sheriff Court. The Sheriff Personal Injury Court now dealing with approximately 33% of personal injury cases.

Interestingly, the figures show that, since 2015/16, the volume of cases handled by the Court of Session have seen a decrease of 48%. More cases are now being commenced in the Sheriff Court. This may seem staggering at first glance, but it was always the intention of the Gill Review (discussed in Chapter 1 of Introductory Scots Law) to reduce the workload of the Court of Session in this way.

The Courts Reform (Scotland) Act 2014 implemented many of the recommendations that Lord Gill promoted and this has led to a profound reorganisation of the jurisdiction of both the Court of Session and the Sheriff Court (also discussed in Chapter 1 of Introductory Scots Law).

The official statistics demonstrate that the following three types of civil action are the most common:

  • Debt recovery (bankruptcy and diligence)
  • Family actions
  • Evictions

The Scottish Legal News article can be viewed by clicking on the link below:

https://www.scottishlegal.com/article/10-per-cent-increase-in-civil-court-cases-in-2017-18

Copyright Seán J Crossan, 2 April 2019