Sex discrimination – Seán Crossan's Scots Law

Sex or gender?

Sex or gender: which term do you prefer? Can they be used inter-changeably?

These questions have now come into sharp focus as a result of an amendment to the Forensic Medical Services (Victims of Sexual Offences) (Scotland) Bill.

Our understanding of the terms “sex” and “gender” may now have to evolve as a result of the debate surrounding aspects of the Bill, but before we discuss this Bill it’s worth looking at the current legal position surrounding gender recognition issues.

The Equality Act 2010

Section 11(1) of the Equality Act 2010 defines a person’s “sex” in the following terms:

In relation to the protected characteristic of sex — a reference to a person who has a particular protected characteristic is a reference to a man or to a woman

In other words, current UK equality law means that your sex is determined at birth when you will be categorised as ‘Male’ or ‘Female’ and this will be entered on your birth certificate. We, therefore, do not have a choice about our sex when we are born. It is a matter of biology.

What about a person’s gender? Section 7(1) of the Equality Act 2010 provides us with guidance on this matter:

A person has the protected characteristic of gender reassignment if the person is proposing to undergo, is undergoing or has undergone a process (or part of a process) for the purpose of reassigning the person’s sex by changing physiological or other attributes of sex.

The Gender Recognition Act 2004

In April 2005, the Gender Recognition Act 2004 came into force. This Act, which received the Royal Assent on 1 July 2004, currently provides people who have undergone gender reassignment procedures with legal recognition in relation to their newly acquired gender identity. The legislation applies across the United Kingdom and was passed by the Westminster Parliament.

Legal recognition of a person’s decision to reassign the sex or gender they have had from birth will follow from the issuing of a full gender recognition certificate by a Gender Recognition Panel. The individual applying for such a certificate must be able to satisfy certain criteria – the most important criterion will centre around the submission of medical evidence of physiological changes by the applicant.

The Scottish Government was intending to reform the 2004 Act, but in the teeth of strong opposition within the Scottish National Party, such proposals have been dropped for the time being.

Self-identification

Under the Scottish Government’s proposals, an individual would have been permitted effectively to self-identify as a person of the opposite sex without having to undergo invasive medical procedures and provide the evidence of this fact in order to obtain recognition from the Panel.

This meant that an individual wishing to undergo gender reassignment in Scotland would have to have met the following criteria:

A statutory declaration to the effect that they have decided to change gender or sex;
The declaration will contain a statement that the individual has been living as a man or a woman for at a minimum of 3 months;
The individual will have to undertake a compulsory or mandatory period of 3 months to reflect on the decision to undergo gender reassignment (no gender recognition certificate will be issued until this period has been completed).

Forensic Medical Services (Victims of Sexual Offences) (Scotland) Bill

This Bill has proved to be another flashpoint in the often fierce debate over gender recognition.

The Bill, which passed Stage 3 in the Scottish Parliament on Thursday 10 December 2020, has reignited the debate about the terms “sex” and “gender” and their use in legislation.

The Bill passes Stage 3 in the Scottish Parliament

The purpose of the Bill is set out below:

“… to improve the experience, in relation to forensic medical services, of people who have been affected by sexual crime. It does this by providing a clear statutory duty for health boards to provide forensic medical examinations to victims and to ensure that an individual’s healthcare needs are addressed in a holistic way in the context of any such examination (or where such an examination is not proceeded with). As well as placing a duty on health boards to provide forensic medical examinations when a victim is referred for such an examination by the police, the Bill allows victims to “self-refer”. Self-referral means that a victim can request a forensic medical examination without having reported an incident to the police. The Bill provides a statutory framework for the retention by health boards of samples obtained during a forensic medical examination, which may support any future criminal investigation or prosecution. In self-referral cases, this allows the victim time to decide whether to make a police report.”

A controversial amendment?

At first glance, no one could possibly object to the aims of the Bill, but Johann Lamont MSP, a former leader of the Scottish Labour Party, saw an opportunity to introduce an amendment to the Bill.

Such a development is not an unusual practice for parliamentarians to introduce amendments to Bills proceeding through Parliament. The introduction of amendments to Bills often permit reform to earlier pieces of legislation. In this case, the Lamont amendment was directed towards changing the wording of Section 9(2) of the Victims and Witnesses (Scotland) Act 2014.

As things currently stand, Section 9(2) of the 2014 Act states that:

Before a medical examination of the person in relation to the complaint is carried out by a registered medical practitioner in pursuance of section 31 of the Police and Fire Reform (Scotland) Act 2012, the constable must give the person an opportunity to request that any such medical examination be carried out by a registered medical practitioner of a gender specified by the person.

This could mean, under current law, that a victim of a sexual assault e.g. a biological or cis woman might have to undergo an examination by a medical professional who is a transgender female.

The Lamont amendment (which has now been accepted overwhelmingly by the Scottish Parliament) will ensure that the word “gender” will be replaced with the word “sex”.

Johann Lamont’s amendment will remove an anomaly in the law which currently permits a transgender person who is a medical professional to examine a victim of a sexual assault.

Further controversy

When one flashpoint is resolved, another disagreement about sex and gender is never far away in Scotland.

An organisation called forwomen.scot is raising a legal action in the Court of Session in Edinburgh for the express purpose of challenging the Scottish Government’s attempt to redefine the word ‘woman’ (see below):

“… We are challenging the Scottish Ministers over the redefinition of “woman” in the Gender Representation on Public Boards (Scotland) Act 2018 which we believe is outside the legislative competency of the Scottish Parliament under the Scotland Act 1998 and in contravention of the Scottish Ministers’ duties under equality legislation… The new definition includes some men, while, remarkably, excluding some women. This cannot be allowed to stand… The Equality Act 2010 states that a woman is “a female of any age” and maintaining this definition is key to maintaining women’s rights and protections in law…”

forwomen.scot describes rationale on its website in the following terms:

– sex is immutable and is a protected characteristic;
– women are entitled to privacy, dignity, safety and fairness;
– women’s rights should be strengthened.

https://forwomen.scot

All quiet on the Western Front? Hardly … expect this issue to run and run.

Copyright Seán J Crossan, 4 February 2021

The American approach

Equal justice under law?

On Monday 15 June, 2020, the US Supreme Court issued a very important ruling (Bostock v Clayton County, Georgia (Case 17-1618)) that there can be no discrimination on the grounds of a person’s sexual orientation or that they have (or are undergoing) gender reassignment. An attempt by an employer to dismiss a gay person or a transgender person will be an example of unlawful discrimination.

Surprise, surprise you might say: what took the Supreme Court so long?

Such discriminatory behaviour, the US Supreme Court has now declared, is a breach of Title VII of the US Civil Rights Act 1964 (which was enacted by Congress as part of President Lyndon B Johnson’s Great Society programme).

And this is where the American approach to the issue of discrimination on the grounds of a person’s sexual orientation differs quite markedly from the UK.

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 1964 states that it is:

“unlawful . . . for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual . . . because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”

From a British legal perspective, the word “sex” in Title VII of the American legislation is problematic when applied to discrimination involving a person’s sexual orientation.

Why?

Quite simply, in the UK, we would understand the word “sex” in discrimination law as applying to an individual’s gender whether they are male or female; or identify as being male or female.

A link to the US Supreme Court’s judgement can be found below:

https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/19pdf/17-1618_hfci.pdf

A link to an article on the BBC website about the judgement can be found below:

US Supreme Court backs protection for LGBT workers

Readers of this blog might not regard the US Supreme Court’s decision in Bostock v Clayton County, Georgia as in any way unusual. After all, in the United Kingdom and across the EU 27 member states, laws have been in place for a considerable period prohibiting unlawful discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation.

Although the UK has now left the EU, the legislation protecting the LGBTI communities remains very much in place – by way of the Equality Act 2010 and other legislative instruments such as Article 19 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (primary legislation) and numerous Regulations and Directives (secondary legislation). The provisions in the Equality Act are, of course, an example of Westminster legislation and will remain hardwired into our legal system – for the time being at least.

The continuing status of European Treaty Articles, Regulations and Directives (in relation to the laws of the UK) will, of course, be up for debate when the Brexit transition period ends, as expected, on 31 December 20020.

The Equality Act 2010

Section 12 of the Equality Act 2010 addresses the issue of a person’s sexual orientation. This is a protected characteristic under the Act and means a person’s sexual orientation towards:

persons of the same sex
persons of the opposite sex
persons of either sex.

Sexual orientation discrimination: the historical perspective

Before 1 December 2003, in the United Kingdom, it was not unlawful to discriminate against an employee or potential employee by reason of that person’s sexual orientation. The situation changed dramatically with the introduction of the Employment Equality (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2003. The relevant law now being contained in the Equality Act 2010, which prohibits less favourable treatment on the grounds of a person’s sexual orientation generally and such protection is no longer confined to the field of employment.

It should be noted, of course, that the Employment Equality Regulations were primarily brought into force to introduce protection for gay, lesbian and bi-sexual people. If, on the other hand, you were heterosexual, you were very unlikely to face discrimination in the work place due to your sexual orientation.

The primer for this change to the law in 2003 was the European Union’s Employment Equality Directive (as a result of the Treaty of Amsterdam 1999) which meant that the UK, as a member state, had to introduce legislation in order to guarantee that people who had suffered less favourable treatment in relation to employment had a form of legal redress. The Employment Equality Regulations 2003 (and now the Equality Act) implemented this duty on the part of the UK.

Employment Equality Directive was limited in its scope because it applied (unlike the more expansive Racial Equality Directive) to just two sectors: employment and vocational training.

Sexual orientation not sex

It is perhaps now instructive to examine the failure of UK laws to provide protection to individuals who suffered sexual orientation discrimination prior to the Employment Equality Regulations coming into force.

In Macdonald v Advocate General for Scotland and Pearce v Governing Body of Mayfield School [2003] UKHL 34, the House of Lords held that discrimination on the grounds of a person’s sexual orientation was not covered by existing UK equality laws (specifically the area of sex or gender discrimination then contained in the Sex Discrimination Act 1975).

Macdonald was dismissed from the Royal Air Force because he was homosexual or gay. Pearce, a teacher, had suffered an ongoing campaign of harassment while working at Mayfield School because she was a lesbian. Both Macdonald and Pearce claimed that the treatment that they had suffered was an example of direct sex discrimination.

Both claims failed because the treatment suffered by both individuals was an example of direct discrimination on the grounds of their sexual orientation – not because of their sex or gender. At the time of this appeal to the House of Lords, discrimination in employment on the grounds of a person’s sexual orientation was not prohibited by UK equality laws.

In its judgement, the House of Lords drew attention to the ironic fact that a new equality law prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination would soon be introduced, but this admittedly would be too late for Macdonald and Pearce! Small comfort indeed!

Had the cases occurred today, the employers would be liable for direct discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation in terms of Section 12 of the Equality Act 2010.

The perspective of the Court of Justice

Before the European Union’s Employment Equality Directive, the Court of Justice had been reluctant to lay the basis for greater legal protection in relation to a person’s sexual orientation.

In Case C-249/96 Grant v South West Trains Limited [1998] ECR I-621, Lisa Grant had argued that the failure by her employer to extend a concessionary ttavel scheme (worth £1,000 per year) to Gillian Percey, her same sex partner, with whom she had been in a stable relationship for more than 2 years, was an example of unlawful, less favourable treatment. The employer permitted heterosexual spouses (including common law spouses of more than 2 years standing) to enjoy the benefit of the travel scheme. Grant’s predecessor in the post had been male and his female partner had benefited from the travel scheme.

Grant chose her male predecessor as her comparator as part of an equal pay claim. It is important to appreciate that Grant was bringing her claim as a sex or gender discrimination legal action. Although Advocate General Elmer was broadly supportive of the couple’s claim that they had suffered discrimination under what is now Article 157 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the Equal Treatment Directive, the Court of Justice decided not to follow this Opinion.

The Court stated that two men in a same sex relationship would have been treated in exactly the same way as Grant and Percey by the employer. South West Trains did not wish to extend concessionary travel to same sex partners of employees and, currently, there was nothing unlawful about this policy as neither UK or EU equality laws prevented discrimination by reason of a person’s sexual orientation. At the time that this case was decided, it should be appreciated that same sex relationships in the UK were not legally recognised in terms of civil partnership or marriage – such legal recognition was still some way away.

To come back full circle, the European Union would, of course, later redress the situation with the Employment Equality Directive which led to the introduction of the Employment Equality (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2003 into UK law. Had these Regulations been in force when Lisa Grant commenced her legal action against South West Trains, these would have given her and Gillian Percey significant legal protection from the discriminatory action of her employer. Admittedly, this was scant consolation for them and thousands of other same sex couples who experienced less favourable treatment in employment.

The European Convention on Human Rights

The provisions of the Convention have been implemented into Scots law via the Human Rights Act 1998 and the Scotland Act 1998 which means that an individual will enjoy substantial legal protection in relation to his or her sexual orientation. Article 8 of the Convention places a duty on a public authority to have respect for a person’s private life. Fuirthermore, Article 14 of the Convention confers a general right on individuals not to be subjected to discrimionation. Employers who are defined as a public authority will have to ensure that they comply with these provisions. Private employers will also have to be aware of these provisions because there is nothing to stop an employee bringing a discrimination claim against the UK Government if some loophole exists which permits the employer to behave less favourably towards them on the grounds of their sexual orientation.

Interestingly, in Macdonald v Advocate General [2003] (discussed above), the employee did attempt to argue that his dismissal by the Royal Air Force, by reason of his sexual orientation, was a breach of the European Convention, but this argument failed because the Convention had not yet been implemented by the Westminster Parliament.

Today, of course, Macdonald would have a very strong claim against his employer for the treatment that he had suffered. Although the war may ultimately have been won, this was a battle that the unfortunate Macdonald would lose.

Related Blog Articles:

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2020/05/25/the-love-that-dared-not-speak-its-name/

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2020/02/02/the-only-gay-in-the-village/

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2020/01/04/pansexual/

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2019/12/31/civil-partner-i-do/

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2019/12/08/different-standards/

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2019/12/06/biased-blood/

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2019/10/04/a-very-civil-partnership/

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2019/02/20/love-and-marriage/

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2019/02/08/the-gay-cake-row/

Copyright Seán J Crossan, 16 June 2020

No Blacks, No dogs, No Irish!

The title of this Blog refers to the not so distant past when discrimination was an accepted feature of life in the United Kingdom. In the 1950s and 1960s, these types of signs were routinely displayed in the windows of hotels, boarding houses and guest houses in the United Kingdom. They were blatantly racist, but completely legal.

It wasn’t just an unwillingness by White British landlords to rent rooms or properties to Afro-Caribbean and Asian families especially, ethnic minorities were often actively discouraged from purchasing properties in White neighbourhoods.

In 1968, Mahesh Upadhyaya, a young Asian immigrant to the UK, mounted legal challenge in respect of a refusal by a white British builder to sell him a house. It was the first time that anyone could do this. Mr Upadhyaya was able to do this because the Race Relations Act 1968 had just come into force. Although Mr Upadhyaya’s claim was ultimately dismissed on a technicality, the action generated a lot of publicity and greater awareness of the existence of anti-discrimination legislation amongst the British public.

A link can be found below which provides more information about Mr Upadhyaya’s story:

https://eachother.org.uk/racism-1960s-britain/

Even in the 1970s, you could still have a popular television sitcom called Love Thy Neighbour which dealt with the trials and tribulations of an Afro-Caribbean family moving into a white neighbourhood. If you watch it today, you can only cringe at the racist attitudes and name calling on display (see below) – you have been warned!:

https://youtu.be/mGesyvKfAOA

This was the post-War period when Britain was suffering from acute shortages of labour and the solution adopted by successive Governments was to encourage immigration from former colonies such as Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and the British Caribbean islands.

Today, with the Equality Act 2010 firmly in place, it’s unthinkable that this type of blatant discrimination in housing could or would still take place. From time to time, however, stories are reported in the British media which highlight blatant racial discrimination in housing, but most people would now recognise that this type of behaviour is completely unlawful (see link below):

https://www.theguardian.com/money/2017/nov/08/landlord-ban-coloured-tenants-unlawful-court-rules-equality-watchdog

‘No DSS’ tenants

With this historical background, it was with some interest that I read recently about a number of legal actions (which had resulted in out of court settlements) where landlords had refused to let properties to certain individuals. These refusals had nothing to do with the racial backgrounds of prospective tenants, but the cases usefully demonstrate that letting properties can still be something of a legal minefield for landlords.

If the prohibition regarding Asian, Black and Irish people was an example of direct race discrimination (now in terms of Sections 9 and 13 of the Equality Act 2010), what about a prohibition which states ‘No DSS’ tenants? This term refers to individuals who are in receipt of State benefits such as Universal Credit whereby their rent is effectively paid by the Government.

At first you might be forgiven for thinking how such a prohibition could infringe equality laws, but dig a little deeper and think things over. The prohibition is a provision, criterion or practice (PCP) imposed by the landlord. Admittedly, people receiving State benefits are a hugely varied group: they will encompass men and women; White and Black and Minority Ethnic individuals; disabled and non-disabled people; heterosexual and LGBTI individuals; and people with religious/ philosophical beliefs and those with none.

This is to miss the point: could such a PCP be an example of indirect discrimination by reason of a protected characteristic in terms of Section 19 of the Equality Act 2010?

The answer seems to be yes: it would seem that more women than men are adversely affected by the prohibition ‘No DSS’ tenants. In other words, the prohibition is an example of indirect sex discrimination. Indirect discrimination can be understood in basic terms as hidden barriers which lead to unlawful, less favourable treatment.

Landlords may argue that they are not intentionally discriminating against women, but this is precisely the effect of their unwillingness to let properties to people receiving State benefits.

In 2017, the UK Supreme Court clarified the meaning of indirect discrimination in Essop v Home Office; Naeem v Secretary of State for Justice [2017] UKSC 27:

There is no obligation for a complainant with the protected characteristic to explain why the PCP puts her at a disadvantage when compared to other groups;
Indirect discrimination does not (unlike direct discrimination) have to demonstrate necessarily a causal link between the less favourable treatment and the protected characteristic. All that is required is a causal link between the PCP and the disadvantage suffered by the complainant and her group.
Statistical evidence can be used to demonstrate a disadvantage suffered by a group, but a statistical correlation is not of itself enough to establish a causal link between the PCP and the disadvantage suffered;
The PCP may not necessarily be unlawful of itself, but it and the disadvantage suffered must be ‘but for’ causes of the disadvantage. Put simply, if the PCP was not there, the complainant and her group would not suffer the detriment.
The PCP itself does not have to disadvantage every member of the complainant’s group e.g. some women may be able to comply with it, but , critically, more women than men cannot.
The pool of individuals to be scrutinised to assess the impact of the disadvantage should include everyone to which the PCP applies e.g. all those receiving State benefits whether they are negatively affected or not.

A link to the Supreme Court’s judgement can be found below:

https://www.supremecourt.uk/cases/docs/uksc-2015-0161-judgment.pdf

Conclusion

It looks as if the phrase ‘No DSS’ may be consigned to the history books along with the more notorious example of ‘No Blacks, No dogs, No Irish’. Speaking of dogs: a general ban on these animals might constitute another example of indirect discrimination as individuals who are visually impaired (a disability) may be less likely to be able to comply as they rely on their guide dogs.

Links to stories about the legal challenges to the PCP of ‘No DSS’ tenants can be found below on the BBC News App:

Landlords who say ‘no DSS’ breaking equality laws

“No DSS” landlords who turn down housing benefit claimants risk breaching equality laws.

Legal victories over ‘No DSS’ letting agents

Two single mothers win out-of-court settlements against letting agents refusing benefit claimants.

Related Blog Articles:

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2019/03/04/there-aint-nothin-goin-on-but-the-rent/

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2019/07/09/boxing-clever/

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2019/06/21/sickness-absence/

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2019/08/20/beardy-weirdy/

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2019/02/21/indirect-discrimination/

Copyright Seán J Crossan, 13 April 2020

International Women’s Day (What’s so great about it?)

Today is International Women’s Day, but is there much to celebrate in terms of concrete progress since I spoke about this topic last year?

The answer to the question is that progress women’s equality remains very much a mixed picture. If you look at figures produced for the European Gender Equality Institute, the UK is certainly in the top 5 of selected European countries. This is in stark contrast to Central and Eastern European nations (e.g. Bulgaria, Poland and Romania). Surprisingly, Germany does less well amongst its Western European neighbours, whereas Greece and Portugal are way down the index.

A link to a gender equality index for European countries can be found below:

https://edition.independent.co.uk/editions/uk.co.independent.issue.070320/data/9384076/index.html

These figures may not be entirely surprising to regular readers of this Blog: in the first few months of 2020, I have highlighted the continuing gender pay gap (which continues to be stubbornly difficult to close) and pregnancy discrimination.

Speaking of pregnancy discrimination, two recent employment cases have highlighted how much of a problem this continues to be.

In 2019, an Industrial Tribunal (yes, they still exist in Northern Ireland) ruled that McGranes Nurseries Ltd had discriminated against one of its pregnant employees, Laura Gruzdaite, who was unfairly dismissed when she took time off work to attend a scan as part of her ante natal care. Ms Gruzdaite had informed her employer that she was pregnant.

In Northern Ireland, slightly different equality legislation is relevant to cases like that of Ms Gruzdaite, but the general objective is very similar. Had the case occurred in Scotland or England, we would have been discussing the Employment Rights Act 1996 which, of course, gives pregnant women a legal entitlement to take time off work to attend these types of appointment. In Northern Ireland, the relevant legislation is the Employment Rights (Northern Ireland) Order 1996.

As for the actual pregnancy discrimination, we would have been referring to the Equality Act 2010, but in Northern Ireland, the Sex Discrimination (Northern Ireland) Order 1976 contains the relevant law.

Ms Gruzdaite was awarded £28,000 in compensation from her former employers – significantly, £20,000 of this award represented an injury to feelings element.

Interestingly, the employer also got Ms Gruzdaite to sign a blank contract of employment which did not specify whether she was a temporary or permanent employee. All very suspect and an obvious breach of our Employment Rights Act too (and I’m certain of the Northern Ireland Order of 1996), but that’s a different story for now.

A link to the Industrial Tribunal’s decision can be found below:

https://www.equalityni.org/ECNI/media/ECNI/Cases%20and%20Settlements/OITFET%20online%20decisions%20as%20pdfs/Gruzdaite-v-McGranes-Nurseries-Ltd-July19.pdf

Pregnant woman ‘unfairly dismissed’ rules industrial tribunal

In the second case, from England, Maya Georgiev was employed by Hanover Insolvency Ltd. She had not informed her employer that she was pregnant; she had been absent from work due to pregnancy related illnesses; and she was subsequently called to a disciplinary meeting. At this meeting, Ms Georgiev explained the reasons for her absence from work, but to no avail as her manager dismissed her. This was an unfair dismissal in terms of the Equality Act 2010 and the Employment Rights Act 1996.

Ironically, Ms Georgiev would have been better protected had she disclosed her pregnancy to her employer from the outset, but when the employer became aware of her situation it should have recognised that it had a duty not to discriminate against her by reason of her pregnancy. The Employment Tribunal will hold a Hearing on remedy later this year.

A link to the decision of the Employment Tribunal in this case can be found below:

https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5e565151d3bf7f3947cf26a5/Miss_M_Georgiev_v_Hanover_Insolvency_Limited_-2400113_2019-_Judgment.pdf

A link to a story about Ms Georgiev’s experiences can be found below on the People Management website:

https://www.peoplemanagement.co.uk/news/articles/worker-discriminated-against-after-boss-unfairly-dismissed-her-for-pregnancy-related-absences

Even in areas where progress has undoubtedly been made family friendly policies such as maternity leave – the English Court of Appeal recently ruled in Ali v Capita Customer Management Ltd and Hextall v Chief Constable of Leicestershire Police (2019) EWCA Civ 900 that it is not discriminatory to offer more generous family friendly arrangements to female employees. This may seem quite progressive on the face of things, but it continues to place the emphasis on women being the primary carers of children. It doesn’t exactly encourage a cultural shift towards more men taking time off work to care for their children.

The worst case scenario

… And finally, a rather stark reminder that, although progress for women’s rights has undoubtedly occurred, the overall picture remains very uneven. In certain parts of the world, being female means that you are more likely to be murdered. A phenomenon so prevalent in the Central American countries of Honduras and El Salvador that they refer to it as femicide.

You can find a link to this story on the Sky News website below:

https://news.sky.com/story/the-most-dangerous-place-in-the-world-to-be-a-woman-11950981

Related Blog Articles:

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2020/01/30/2020-same-old-sexism-yes-equal-pay-again/

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2020/01/11/pregnancy-discrimination-or-new-year-same-old-story-part-2/

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2020/01/10/new-year-same-old-story/

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2019/03/11/born-leader/

Copyright Seán J Crossan, 8 March 2020

2020: same old sexism (yes, equal pay again)

Photo by Artur Tumasjan on Unsplash

We’re still in the month January and the issue of serious disparities in pay between the sexes raises its ugly head once again. I’ve said it before; but I’ll say it again: we’ve had over 40 years of legislation in the UK (first the Equal Pay Act 1970 and now the Equality Act 2010, not to mention EU primary and secondary legislation) which should have put the issue to rest.

The Equality Act 2010 incorporates an equality clause into contracts of employment which means that employers have a duty to ensure that men and women are paid on equal terms for carrying out like work; work rated equivalent; and work of equal value.

It’s hard to believe that the groundbreaking decision of the Court of Justice of the EU in Case 43/75 Defrenne v Sabena (No 2) [1976] ECR 455 was in the 1970s and here we are, entering the second decade of the 21st Century, still talking about the issue of equal pay – or the lack of it.

There is a depressing familiarity to stories in the UK media about the lack of progress regarding this issue. This is surprising because successful equal pay claims can be be very costly in financial terms for employers. In 2019, after Glasgow City Council female employees won their battle for equal pay, there was much speculation about how the employer was going to pay the bill. One of the (seemingly) more dramatic predictions was that the City Council would have to sell Salvador Dali’s world famous painting Christ of St John of the Cross in order to meet its legal obligations to its underpaid female employees. Susan Aitken, the City Council leader, was forced to issue a denial that this was a possibility. When you realise that the estimated value of Dali’s painting starts at £60 million you begin to get an idea of the scale of the problem.

https://www.glasgowtimes.co.uk/news/16594318.glasgow-city-council-wont-be-flogging-off-famous-dali-painting-to-cover-equal-pay-claims/

That said, some years ago, Birmingham City Council was forced to sell its share in the National Exhibition Centre in order to meet the (awesome) financial burden of thousands of equal pay claims . The price achieved was £307million – although 3 years later, the asset was sold once more for an eye watering figure of £800 million (allegedly).

https://www.ft.com/content/da429608-9d8e-11e4-8946-00144feabdc0

Recent research carried out by the English law firm, Slater+Gordon, suggests that women fail to gain pay increases because they are not negotiating with their employers about this issue. Campaigning groups, such as Close the Gap, are firmly of the opinion that the onus should not be placed on women to push for equal pay; rather it should be the responsibility of the State and/or employers to achieve this goal. There has to be real cultural change in society and women need to be valued more if the gender gap is to become a thing of the past.

Links to articles in The Independent about the equal pay research that Slater+Gordon Solicitors carried out can be found below:

https://edition.independent.co.uk/editions/uk.co.independent.issue.280120/data/9304961/index.html

https://edition.independent.co.uk/editions/uk.co.independent.issue.280120/data/9304901/index.html

https://edition.independent.co.uk/editions/uk.co.independent.issue.280120/data/9304016/index.html

Postscript

And if you remain unconvinced about ingrained gender bias in the corporate world generally, you will find a link below to research carried out by The Independent which demonstrates how many leading tech companies suffer from the lack of women in leadership roles:

https://edition.independent.co.uk/editions/uk.co.independent.issue.200220/data/9344746/index.html

Copyright Seán J Crossan, 30 January & 20 February 2020

Pregnancy discrimination (or New Year, same old story … Part 2)

Photo by Sincerely Media on Unsplash

We’re barely into 2020 and we seem to be on something of a roll with stories about sex discrimination. Yesterday, I discussed the issue of equal pay.

Only this morning I was flicking through the newspaper and came across another story, this time, concerning pregnancy discrimination.

Helen Larkin was dismissed from her post with the Liz Earle Beauty Company on the grounds of her pregnancy. Her employer was restructuring the company and refused to consider Ms Larkin for two alternative posts within the organisation. This refusal to consider suitable, alternative employment appeared to be motivated by the fact that Ms Larkin would shortly be going off on her period of maternity leave.

This treatment amounted to unlawful direct discrimination in terms of Sections 13 and 18 of the Equality Act 2010. Her dismissal would also be automatically unfair in terms of the Employment Rights Act 1996.

Consequently, Ms Larkin was awarded over £17,000 in compensation. This sum, of course, reflects an element to injury to feelings (the so called Vento Bands or Guidelines). In fact, Ms Larkin was awarded £10,000 in compensation to reflect injury to feelings.

A link to the judgement of the Employment Tribunal can be found below:

https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5e2f0300e5274a6c42dcd132/Mrs_H_Larkin_v_Liz_Earle_Beauty_Co._Ltd_-_1403400.2018.pdf

A study carried out jointly by the UK Government Department (Business, Innovation and Skills) and the Equality and Human Rights Commission previously discovered that some 54,000 women per year in this country were forced out of their employment for reasons related to pregnancy and/or maternity.

A link to a summary of the research on the website of the Equality and Human Rights Commission can be found below:

https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/en/managing-pregnancy-and-maternity-workplace/pregnancy-and-maternity-discrimination-research-findings

Again, as I noted in yesterday’s Blog (New Year, same old story …), we have had anti-discrimination laws in the UK for nearly 45 years and yet we still regularly hear stories about pregnancy and maternity discrimination.

Readers might be interested to learn about the work of a pressure group (Pregnant then screwed) which campaigns to end the ‘motherhood penalty’:

https://pregnantthenscrewed.com

A link to Helen Larkin’s story as reported in The Independent can be found below:

https://edition.independent.co.uk/editions/uk.co.independent.issue.110120/data/9278901/index.html

Related Blog articles:

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2020/01/10/new-year-same-old-story/

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2019/02/14/hurt-feelings/

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2019/02/22/sticks-and-stones-may-break-my-bones-but-names-will-never-hurt-me/

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2019/07/08/just-blew-it-again/

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2019/08/22/the-trouble-with-pregnancy/

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2019/09/10/barbaric/

Copyright Seán J Crossan, 11 January 2020

New Year, same old story …

Photo by Markus Spiske on Unsplash

It’s becoming depressingly predictable: the persistence of the gender pay gay in the United Kingdom.

This time last year, I was discussing with my students the struggle that City of Glasgow Council female employees were undertaking to win their claims for equal pay. After a period of industrial action, the women finally won their struggle:

https://www.theguardian.com/society/2019/jan/17/glasgow-council-women-workers-win-12-year-equal-pay-battle

We’ve just entered 2020 and it seems as if nothing much has changed in the wider world (more on this later).

Theoretically, the gender pay gap should be a thing of the past. We have had legislation in place for nearly 45 years in this country: the Equal Pay Act 1970 (which came into force in December 1975) and the current Equality Act 2010.

An info graphic which shows the number of Employment Tribunal cases in the UK involving equal pay claims (2008-2019) can be seen below:

Source: UK Ministry of Justice obtained from BBC News

True, the above figures show the number of equal pay claims in overall decline – effectively being halved (from a high of over 60,000 in 2008 to just over 30,000 in 2019); but my riposte to that would to say still too many.

In today’s edition of The Independent, new research, carried out by the Institute of Public Policy Research, indicates that female General Practitioners (physicians for our overseas readers) are paid up to £40,000 less than their male colleagues every year.

For each £1 that a male colleague earns, a woman earns 35 pence less. To reinforce this point, the article states that female GPs are effectively providing their services free of charge between September and December every year.

In language of the Equality Act 2010, the female GPs are carrying out ‘like work’ when comparing themselves to their male colleagues. There seems to be absolutely no lawful justification for this disparity in pay between the sexes.

A link to the article in The Independent can be found below:

https://edition.independent.co.uk/editions/uk.co.independent.issue.100120/data/9277336/index.html

The equal pay laws imply a sex or gender equality clause into every person’s contract of employment. Employers therefore have a legal duty to ensure gender equality in relation to terms and conditions of service.

It seems pretty simple, so why isn’t it happening in 2020?

An explanation for this situation in the medical profession has centred around the development of a ‘two tier’ system whereby more men are partners in GP surgeries whereas a large number of women take on the role of a salaried GP. Women tend to become salaried GPs because they feel that this allows them to work flexibly around their family commitments. So, again, what we appear to be seeing is women being penalised because they are trying to balance work and family (the so called ‘motherhood’ penalty).

Also on this day …

And purely by coincidence another equal pay story …

… Samira Ahmed, BBC journalist, wins her Employment Tribunal claim for equal pay (see below):

http://news.sky.com/story/samira-ahmed-tv-presenter-wins-sex-discrimination-equal-pay-claim-against-the-bbc-11905304

And if you’re still not convinced …

… read the following article in The Independent about discrimination in pay between male and female apprentices (guess what?; it’s not the men who are the victims):

https://edition.independent.co.uk/editions/uk.co.independent.issue.150120/data/9283611/index.html

Hostile, degrading, humiliating

Thanks to @tchickphoto for making this photo available freely on @unsplash 🎁

Scanning through the papers today for news worthy stories, I found myself looking across the sea (the Irish Sea to be precise) and it was there that I stumbled upon an interesting article in The Irish Times.

Regular readers of this Blog will be aware that I have a particular interest in the areas of discrimination and employment law and this story ticked both boxes.

A female supermarket delicatessen worker was repeatedly subjected to sexual harassment on an almost daily basis by one of her male co-workers. The dreadful treatment appears to have started less than a month after the woman commenced her employment (May 2018). Her manager (a man) was fully aware of the situation, but did nothing to put an end to her ordeal. In fact, he witnessed one of the brazen attempts by her tormentor and made a joke of it. This joke involved comments about people from Limerick. I have to say as someone who has Limerick ancestry, I felt pretty insulted when reading the manager’s gratuitous comment.

A link to the story in The Irish Times can be found below:

https://www.irishtimes.com/news/ireland/irish-news/deli-worker-awarded-20-000-for-almost-daily-sexual-harassment-1.4128207

The woman complained about the situation, but she was not informed about the progress of this by her employer. Eventually, the woman felt that she had little choice but to resign from her employment. This could be viewed as the last straw – her employer’s conduct having led to a complete breakdown in their relationship. It might be said that the implied duty of trust and confidence on the part of the employer had been completely shattered.

In the UK, we would, of course, recognise this situation as one of constructive (unfair) dismissal in terms of the Employment Rights Act 1996 and the Equality Act 2010 (she was being subjected to discrimination/unlawful less favourable treatment on the grounds of her sex).

When the woman’s formal complaint was submitted, her employer did move her male colleague to a different location within the supermarket (the storeroom), but he went absent on sick leave shortly afterwards.

The whole experience was extremely distressing for the woman who has now been awarded €20,000 in compensation.

Again, readers in the UK will make the obvious comparison with our Vento scale (or bands) for compensation for victims of discrimination. The sum awarded to this woman would fall into the middle band in the UK (£8,800 to £26,300).

A link to an article about the current UK Vento scale or bands can be found below:

https://www.crosslandsolicitors.com/site/hr-hub/injury-to-feelings-awards-updated-Vento-guidelines-April-2018

Anyone with a background in discrimination law who reads the article from The Irish Times about this story will immediately recognise the terminology used. The women alleged that her co-worker’s behaviour “was a violation of dignity in that it created an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating and offensive environment for her.”

Such a statement reflects the language of the European Commission’s Code of Practice on Measures to combat sexual harassment. This Code was first formulated as far back as 1991 and has now been largely implemented into the legal systems of EU member states. The Republic of Ireland is, of course for the time being, one of our fellow EU member states and Irish anti-discrimination practitioners will be readily familiar with the terminology. For many years, Employment Tribunals and UK courts routinely used the Commission’s Code of Practice when dealing with cases which involve allegations of sexual harassment.

Current UK law on harassment in the workplace is contained primarily in the Equality Act 2010. More seriously, acts of harassment can also be a criminal offence.

A link to a guidance published by the UK Equality and Human Rights Commission concerning sexual harassment in the workplace can be found below:

https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/sites/default/files/sexual-harassment-and-the-law-guidance-for-employers.docx

The Conciliator appointed by Ireland’s Workplace Relations Commission, an independent statutory body created by Oireachtas – both Houses of the Irish Parliament, concluded that the woman’s employer had “failed to put appropriate measures in place to stop this harassment and sexual harassment from occurring or to reverse its effects”.

The Conciliator also noted that “the supermarket failed to conclude its investigation and make a decision is the most egregious flaw in the process.” The employer tried to justify this failure by saying that, as a matter of natural justice, it could not conclude the investigation because the male colleague had since left Ireland to return to his country of origin. The Conciliator stayed that the employer made this decision “at the expense of the complainant and closure for her of this appalling experience”.

Employers, please take note: failing to follow basic grievance procedures contained in the employment contract can have serious and expensive consequences. Such a failure on your part can contribute to the breakdown of the relationship with the employee and may very well open the door to claims for constructive dismissal against you.

Related Blog Articles

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2019/02/14/hurt-feelings/

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2019/02/22/sticks-and-stones-may-break-my-bones-but-names-will-never-hurt-me/

Barbaric!

Photo by Sharon McCutcheon on Unsplash

We may think that in Western societies we’ve come a long way regarding the advances made by women.

Then, before we get too smug, something happens which forces us to confront the fact that we’re not quite as enlightened or civilised as we like to think.

Such an incident occurred last week in the United States of America when it was reported that a the authorities were negligent when Diana Sanchez, a pregnant woman who was being held in Denver County Jail, was denied proper medical treatment. The woman’s cries for help were allegedly ignored for 5 hours and she was forced to give birth to her son in the prison cell.

Had something similar occurred in the UK, lawyers might have been looking at Section 17 of the Equality Act 2010 (pregnancy and maternity discrimination: non-work cases) to provide grounds for a legal challenge against the operators of a prison. Clearly, this sort of failure by the authorities to implement a basic duty of care could be viewed as blatant sex discrimination.

In 2019, would have been too difficult for the Denver County Jail authorities to have ensured that this particular inmate had access to to the appropriate medical facilities? Surely, given her condition, this was not asking too much?

Lawyers for Ms Sanchez are now, unsurprisingly, pursuing a civil action against Denver County Sheriff’s Department.

A link to the story as reported by Sky News can be found below:

http://news.sky.com/story/woman-who-gave-birth-alone-in-denver-prison-cell-files-lawsuit-11797438

Postscript

Lest we become judgemental about the US Penal system, on 4 October 2019, The Guardian reported that the new born child of an inmate at HM Prison Bronzefield in Surrey had died. The mother had been in an “advanced state” of pregnancy, but had been left alone in her cell overnight when she had given birth to the child.

A link to the story can be found below:

https://www.theguardian.com/society/2019/oct/04/baby-dies-in-uk-prison-after-inmate-gives-birth-alone-in-cell

Copyright Seán J Crossan, 10 September and 4 October 2019

Tickets for “people of colour” … or the problem with positive discrimination

Photo by Ehimetalor Unuabona on Unsplash

Tickets for “people of colour” …

In a previous blog (The force is not with you … published on 28 February and updated on 10 June 2019), I discussed the problems associated with policies of positive discrimination.

So, it is with some interest that I read an item on Sky News today about Afrofuture Fest a music festival which was to take place in the American City of Detroit. The festival organisers had offered tickets for sale to members of the public. Absolutely nothing unusual in that readers will undoubtedly respond, but what was unusual was the fact that the price to be paid in conjunction with an ‘early bird’ promotion was to be determined by the customer’s racial origins (tickets for “people of colour”).

If you were an African American applying for tickets, you would pay less than a White American wanting to go to the gig. I admit that I was intrigued by this marketing approach and I wanted to know what were the underlying motivations of the organisers? I confess: I’m coming from a different cultural perspective here in the UK and, generally, we’re not too keen on the widespread use of positive discrimination as a tool for promoting equality.

Well, it would seem that the pricing policy was motivated by a genuine determination to ensure that African Americans (who happen to be in the disproportionately lower income section of US society) were not deterred from attending the event by high prices. Furthermore, the organisers wanted a racially diverse group of music fans to attend the festival.

All well meaning, but the event has now become mired in controversy with the organisers receiving threats from white supremacist groups and artists deciding not to perform. The ticket policy has now been scrapped.

A link to how the story was reported on Sky News can be found below:

Festival scraps cheaper ‘people of colour’ tickets after ‘white supremacist threats’
http://news.sky.com/story/festival-scraps-cheaper-people-of-colour-tickets-after-white-supremacist-threats-11758953

Positive discrimination: the legal position

Discriminating in favour of one group of people over another (whether this is motivated by a good intention or not) will most likely be regarded as an example of direct discrimination which contravenes Section 13 of the Equality Act 2010.

The judgement of the House of Lords in James v Eastleigh Borough Council [1990] 2 AC 751 was particularly strong on this point and it was irrelevant that the Council was acting from motives of good faith i.e. to promote healthier lifestyles for female residents of the Borough. The simple fact was that the Borough Council was acting unlawfully (in breach of the then Sex Discrimination Act 1975) when it charged men for entry to the swimming pool when women were not charged for access to this facility. The Borough Council had committed an act of direct, sex discrimination.

Positive discrimination has only really been successful in the UK when the Westminster Parliament has given it the full backing of the law and, additionally, it complies with this country’s EU legal obligations.

One notable example of positive discrimination is the Sex Discrimination (Election Candidates) Act 2002 which aimed to encourage more women to enter Parliament by having all women short lists. Previously, such an attempt to promote positive action would have been illegal under the (now repealed) Sex Discrimination Act 1975. Some (male) Labour activists did, in fact, bring successful legal challenges under the former sex discrimination legislation on the grounds that they had suffered discrimination because of their gender in being automatically disqualified from the parliamentary candidates’ selection process (Jepson and Dyas-Elliott v The Labour Party and Others [1996] IRLR 116).

The other example of positive discrimination involves the Police Service of Northern Ireland. The PSNI was created in 2001 following the Belfast or Good Friday Agreement in 1998. The PSNI replaced the old Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) which was largely seen as a biased or sectarian police force by most Roman Catholics in Northern Ireland.

According to figures produced by the official Patten Report, the RUC was overwhelming Protestant in composition (91.7% to 8.3% Roman Catholic).

One of the key recommendations of the Patten Report was that:

“An equal number of Protestants and Catholics should be drawn from the pool of qualified candidates.” [para. 15.10]

This led to a deliberate 50/50 recruitment policy in which half of the candidates recruited to the PSNI had to come from a Roman Catholic background.

That said, there was significant criticism of the 50/50 recruitment policy coming from the Unionist and Loyalist community in Northern Ireland – who were never going to be reconciled to the demise of the RUC in any case. The recruitment policy was only ended in 2011 by Owen Patterson MP, the then Conservative Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. Predictably, this development did not please the Nationalist and Republican community in Northern Ireland.

Affirmative or positive action

In the United States of America, of course, there is a completely different approach to the promotion of diversity and equality from what we would understand in the UK and the European Union. The Americans, for example, are very keen on affirmative action (or positive discrimination) and often employers will speak of filling quotas i.e. recruiting a certain number of African Americans or Hispanic Americans. This practice of affirmative action or positive discrimination is an attempt by the Americans to overcome the problems of historic and entrenched racism in their society. In the UK and the European Union, we too have had our problems with under-representation of certain groups in the work-place, but any attempt to introduce positive discrimination has been much more limited in scope.

Affirmative action has its limits: the ticket policy at Afrofuture Fest would, however, appear to be a breach of the Civil Rights Act 1964 (Title II) which states that:

“All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public accommodation, as defined in this section, without discrimination on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin.”

The UK and EU approaches to positive discrimination

Limited positive action or discrimination has, for some time, been tolerated by the Court of Justice of the European Union where employers gave preference, as part of an equality policy, to female candidates over suitably qualified male candidates in order to address gender imbalances in the work-place (see Kalanke Freie Hansestadt Bremen (1995) C-450/93 and Badeck and Others (2000) C-158/97).

The Equality Act 2010 does, admittedly, permit what is referred to as ‘positive action’ in fairly limited circumstances and it has been observed that it does not really advance the law very much in this area.

Certainly, in terms of the public sector equality duty, organisations may be permitted to take specified forms positive action in the work-place to eradicate or minimise forms of discriminations e.g. ‘the need to tackle prejudice and promote understanding’ (see Section 149(5) of the Equality Act)

Section 158 of the Act permits an employer to take positive action to help individuals with a protected characteristic to overcome or minimise such a disadvantage. Such action on the part of the employer must, however, be a proportionate means of achieving this aim.

Section 159 also permits an employer to take positive action in recruitment and promotion in relation to people with protected characteristics. The employer will only really be able to utilise this provision if candidates for a job or a promoted post have the same or similar qualifications. In such situations, the employer will able to consider if candidates with protected characteristics are at a disadvantage or are under represented in matters of recruitment or promotion.

There is one important exception to the rules on positive action contained in the Act: it will not be illegal for an employer to treat a disabled person more favourably in comparison to a non-disabled person.

Conclusion

In the UK, positive discrimination in recruitment can be lawful under very limited circumstances. In other words, it is a practice which, if objectively justified, can be used to overcome historical patterns of discrimination e.g. to address the woefully low numbers of female politicians or the under-representation of Roman Catholics in the Police Service in Northern Ireland.

Such arrangements permitting limited positive discrimination tend to be governed by ‘sunset clauses’ i.e. they have a built in expiry date, so they will not last forever. Furthermore, positive discrimination is really only legitimate in so called ‘tie-break’ situations where several applicants have the same qualifications and experience, but as a matter of public policy, for example, a female or minority ethnic applicant is given preference in order to address historic diversity imbalances in that particular work-place.

The Americans, on the other hand, have tended to pursue a very explicit policy of positive discrimination or affirmative action by placing an emphasis on the filling of quotas – either, for example, in employment or education. Such an approach places a legal obligation on employers and service providers (colleges and universities) to ensure that certain minimum numbers of people from racial or ethnic minority backgrounds are given a job or a place in training or education.

As we have seen with the ticket policy for events such as Afrofuture Fest, positive discrimination can be controversial and potentially unlawful.

Copyright Seán J Crossan, 8 July 2019