No Blacks, No dogs, No Irish!

The title of this Blog refers to the not so distant past when discrimination was an accepted feature of life in the United Kingdom. In the 1950s and 1960s, these types of signs were routinely displayed in the windows of hotels, boarding houses and guest houses in the United Kingdom. They were blatantly racist, but completely legal.

It wasn’t just an unwillingness by White British landlords to rent rooms or properties to Afro-Caribbean and Asian families especially, ethnic minorities were often actively discouraged from purchasing properties in White neighbourhoods.

In 1968, Mahesh Upadhyaya, a young Asian immigrant to the UK, mounted legal challenge in respect of a refusal by a white British builder to sell him a house. It was the first time that anyone could do this. Mr Upadhyaya was able to do this because the Race Relations Act 1968 had just come into force. Although Mr Upadhyaya’s claim was ultimately dismissed on a technicality, the action generated a lot of publicity and greater awareness of the existence of anti-discrimination legislation amongst the British public.

A link can be found below which provides more information about Mr Upadhyaya’s story:

https://eachother.org.uk/racism-1960s-britain/

Even in the 1970s, you could still have a popular television sitcom called Love Thy Neighbour which dealt with the trials and tribulations of an Afro-Caribbean family moving into a white neighbourhood. If you watch it today, you can only cringe at the racist attitudes and name calling on display (see below) – you have been warned!:

https://youtu.be/mGesyvKfAOA

This was the post-War period when Britain was suffering from acute shortages of labour and the solution adopted by successive Governments was to encourage immigration from former colonies such as Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and the British Caribbean islands.

Today, with the Equality Act 2010 firmly in place, it’s unthinkable that this type of blatant discrimination in housing could or would still take place. From time to time, however, stories are reported in the British media which highlight blatant racial discrimination in housing, but most people would now recognise that this type of behaviour is completely unlawful (see link below):

https://www.theguardian.com/money/2017/nov/08/landlord-ban-coloured-tenants-unlawful-court-rules-equality-watchdog

‘No DSS’ tenants

With this historical background, it was with some interest that I read recently about a number of legal actions (which had resulted in out of court settlements) where landlords had refused to let properties to certain individuals. These refusals had nothing to do with the racial backgrounds of prospective tenants, but the cases usefully demonstrate that letting properties can still be something of a legal minefield for landlords.

If the prohibition regarding Asian, Black and Irish people was an example of direct race discrimination (now in terms of Sections 9 and 13 of the Equality Act 2010), what about a prohibition which states ‘No DSS’ tenants? This term refers to individuals who are in receipt of State benefits such as Universal Credit whereby their rent is effectively paid by the Government.

At first you might be forgiven for thinking how such a prohibition could infringe equality laws, but dig a little deeper and think things over. The prohibition is a provision, criterion or practice (PCP) imposed by the landlord. Admittedly, people receiving State benefits are a hugely varied group: they will encompass men and women; White and Black and Minority Ethnic individuals; disabled and non-disabled people; heterosexual and LGBTI individuals; and people with religious/ philosophical beliefs and those with none.

This is to miss the point: could such a PCP be an example of indirect discrimination by reason of a protected characteristic in terms of Section 19 of the Equality Act 2010?

The answer seems to be yes: it would seem that more women than men are adversely affected by the prohibition ‘No DSS’ tenants. In other words, the prohibition is an example of indirect sex discrimination. Indirect discrimination can be understood in basic terms as hidden barriers which lead to unlawful, less favourable treatment.

Landlords may argue that they are not intentionally discriminating against women, but this is precisely the effect of their unwillingness to let properties to people receiving State benefits.

In 2017, the UK Supreme Court clarified the meaning of indirect discrimination in Essop v Home Office; Naeem v Secretary of State for Justice [2017] UKSC 27:

  • There is no obligation for a complainant with the protected characteristic to explain why the PCP puts her at a disadvantage when compared to other groups;
  • Indirect discrimination does not (unlike direct discrimination) have to demonstrate necessarily a causal link between the less favourable treatment and the protected characteristic. All that is required is a causal link between the PCP and the disadvantage suffered by the complainant and her group.
  • Statistical evidence can be used to demonstrate a disadvantage suffered by a group, but a statistical correlation is not of itself enough to establish a causal link between the PCP and the disadvantage suffered;
  • The PCP may not necessarily be unlawful of itself, but it and the disadvantage suffered must be ‘but for’ causes of the disadvantage. Put simply, if the PCP was not there, the complainant and her group would not suffer the detriment.
  • The PCP itself does not have to disadvantage every member of the complainant’s group e.g. some women may be able to comply with it, but , critically, more women than men cannot.
  • The pool of individuals to be scrutinised to assess the impact of the disadvantage should include everyone to which the PCP applies e.g. all those receiving State benefits whether they are negatively affected or not.

A link to the Supreme Court’s judgement can be found below:

https://www.supremecourt.uk/cases/docs/uksc-2015-0161-judgment.pdf

Conclusion

It looks as if the phrase ‘No DSS’ may be consigned to the history books along with the more notorious example of ‘No Blacks, No dogs, No Irish’. Speaking of dogs: a general ban on these animals might constitute another example of indirect discrimination as individuals who are visually impaired (a disability) may be less likely to be able to comply as they rely on their guide dogs.

Links to stories about the legal challenges to the PCP of ‘No DSS’ tenants can be found below on the BBC News App:

Landlords who say ‘no DSS’ breaking equality laws

“No DSS” landlords who turn down housing benefit claimants risk breaching equality laws.

Legal victories over ‘No DSS’ letting agents

Two single mothers win out-of-court settlements against letting agents refusing benefit claimants.

Related Blog Articles:

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2019/03/04/there-aint-nothin-goin-on-but-the-rent/

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2019/07/09/boxing-clever/

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2019/06/21/sickness-absence/

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2019/08/20/beardy-weirdy/

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2019/02/21/indirect-discrimination/

Copyright Seán J Crossan, 13 April 2020

No guide dogs!

Photo by Viktor Forgacs on Unsplash

Disability is a protected characteristic in terms of Sections 4 and 6 of the Equality Act 2010. In terms of Sections 20 and 21 of the Act, employers and service providers have a legal duty to make reasonable adjustments to accommodate the needs of a disabled person.

What about a new prison inmate (a sex offender) who is visually impaired and wishes to bring his assistance (or guide) dog with him?

The prison authorities have said no to this request, it is simply against the rules.

Discrimination or less favourable treatment, of course, can be perfectly legal if it is objectively justified.

It would be very interesting to see if the prison authorities were potentially in breach of the Equality Act (direct or indirect discrimination).

A link to the story on the BBC News App can be found below:

Blind sex offender cannot take guide dog to prison

Neil Nellies arrived in court with his dog, but was told he must serve his sentence without the animal.

Related Blog Articles:

/https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2019/06/21/sickness-absence/

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2019/02/26/jumping-the-gun/

Copyright Seán J Crossan, 2 January 2020

Sickness absence

Photo by Ali Yahya on Unsplash

An issue which many employers will have to deal with is that of long-term sickness and/or frequent absences of certain employees.

In terms of Section 98(2) of the Employment Rights Act 1996, it is open to employers to argue that a dismissal was fair when they terminated the employment relationship by reason of an individual’s sickness absences. The employer would justify such a dismissal on grounds of capability (meaning “in relation to an employee, means his capability assessed by reference to skill, aptitude, health or any other physical or mental quality”).

This is subject, however, to the requirements laid down in Section 98(4) of the Act as to whether the employer has acted reasonably or unreasonably and also having regard to the “equity and substantial merits of the case”.

I also stress to students and to members of the wider public, that an employer does not have a blank cheque (or an automatic right) to dismiss an employee on the basis of sickness absences. Many employers will rightly argue that they have a business to run and they must monitor sickness absence amongst employees.

A particularly problematic issue is the use by many employers of sickness absence trigger points. This is where employers designate a set number of days (usually within a 12 month period) and affected employees may find themselves being summoned to a meeting which, in reality, is a thinly disguised disciplinary action which could ultimately lead to dismissal on capability grounds.

The problem here for employers is that the use of such trigger points can be entirely arbitrary in nature. In other words, they are blunt instrument which take little or no account of individual personal circumstances.

What if the employee in question has a disability in terms of Section 6 of the Equality Act 2010? In such cases, employers would be well advised to tread extremely carefully when dealing with members of the workforce who have (or might have) the protected characteristic of disability. Additionally, a female employee who is pregnant (and is suffering from short term ill health e.g. morning sickness) may fall foul of the trigger point. Again, caution should be exercised here because a pregnant employee will be entitled to the protection of Section 18 of the Equality Act 2010.

Let’s also discuss employees who are undergoing gender reassignment and, as this involves a prolonged medical process, it may be the case that this will involve a significant amount of absences from work for the person undergoing this process.  Section 16 of the Equality Act 2010 makes it very clear that an employer who treats such an individual less favourably by, perhaps, subjecting them to disciplinary action on account of these absences will be acting unlawfully.Let’s also discuss employees who are undergoing gender reassignment.

Indirect discrimination

When applying policies (practices or criteria) to the workforce, employers will have to be very much aware of straying into the perilous territory of the prohibited conduct known as indirect discrimination (Section 19: Equality Act 2010).

The Equality and Human Rights Commission provides guidance on what constitutes indirect discrimination in its Statutory Code of Practice on Employment:

Example 1

An employer has a ‘no headwear’ policy for its staff. Unless this policy can be objectively justified, this will be indirect discrimination against Sikh men who wear the turban, Muslim women who wear a headscarf and observant Jewish men who wear a skullcap as manifestations of their religion.

Example 2

Requiring a UK-based qualification, when equivalent qualifications obtained abroad would also meet the requirement for that particular level of knowledge or skill, may lead to indirect discrimination because of race, if the requirement cannot be objectively justified.

The concept of indirect discrimination in Section 19 of the Equality Act applies to all of the protected characteristics with the exception of pregnancy and maternity (which are specifically addressed elsewhere in the Act (Sections 17 and 18)).

A gung ho or insensitive approach by the employer may be very costly in the longer term as regards dealing with sickness absences (especially as an injury to feelings element could be part of an Employment Tribunal award).

A disability, for example, will affect not only the individual’s ability to perform her job, but also her ability to perform normal day-to-day activities. If this is the case, the employer will have a duty to make reasonable adjustments, in terms of Section 20 of the Equality Act 2010 to the employee’s working conditions, in order to aid her return to work.

A failure to consider reasonable adjustments or to dismiss out of hand certain adjustments may constitute disability discrimination in terms of the Act.

Furthermore, it may be extremely ill advised for employers to place employees with disabilities on some sort of attendance monitor system. This could be an example of harassment (Section 28: Equality Act) and, if the employee in question was eventually dismissed, it may represent a breach of Section 15 of the Act i.e. discrimination arising from disability.

Section 15 is an area where many employers may be caught out and, consequently, they may treat a disabled person less favourably. The issue often arises when employers monitor attendance and time-keeping of employees. It may be the case that disabled employees face greater difficulty when it comes to maintaining an acceptable level of attendance and time-keeping and are thus placed at a disadvantage in comparison with their non-disabled colleagues.

Typically, employers will impose sanctions on all employees who do not meet attendance and time-keeping targets and they will doubtless argue that the issue disability has nothing to do with the way in which they treated an individual.

An example from the Equality and Human Rights Commission’s Statutory Code on Employment makes it very clear the dangers of such a blanket approach being taken by employers (which could leave them open to legal action under Section 15):

Example

A disabled worker periodically requires a limited amount of time off work to attend medical appointments related to the disability. The employer has an attendance management policy which results in potential warnings and ultimately dismissal if the worker’s absence exceeds 20 days in any 12-month period. A combination of the worker’s time off for disability-related medical appointments and general time off for sickness results in the worker consistently exceeding the 20 day limit by a few days. The worker receives a series of warnings and is eventually dismissed. This is likely to amount to disability discrimination.

Discrimination arising as a consequence of disability

Some of the pitfalls which employers face when dealing with employees who are disabled and who have accumulated a number of sickness absences which may trigger the organisation’s intervention policy was demonstrated in a case from 2018.

DL Insurance Ltd v O’Connor Appeal No. UKEAT/0230/17/LA [2018]

O’Connor, a disabled employee, was disciplined by DL Insurance because she had accumulated 60 days sickness absence during a 12 month period (she had been given a final written warning). Her employer had fallen foul of Section 15 of the Equality Act 2010 because both the Employment Tribunal and the Employment Appeal Tribunal were of the view that disciplinary action to deal with her level of sickness was not a proportionate response given that she was a disabled person within the meaning of the Act. Her employer was aware (and had accepted previously) that O’Connor was a disabled person. Reasonable adjustments (principally flexible arrangements) had been put in place by the employer as per their duty under the Act.

Significantly, the employer had failed to involve an independent occupational health service in the matter before it made the decision to discipline O’Connor AND the manager charged with carrying out disciplinary action had not bothered to obtain a full grasp of the facts of the situation i.e. by going to discuss how what impact the absences were having on O’Connor’s colleagues. In particular, the failure by the employer to involve occupational health services in O’Connor’s case was a breach of the company’s own procedures.

In the employer’s defence, however, the Employment Appeal Tribunal did note that O’Connor had been treated sympathetically in the past and that more latitude had been given to her personally in relation to the number of sickness absences she had accrued. This was not enough and by placing O’Connor under disciplinary sanctions, the employer had subjected her to unlawful. less favourable treatment in that she would not receive contractual sick pay if she was absent from work in the future.

The Employment Appeal Tribunal placed particular emphasis on the fact that the employer had failed to explain how a written warning (with all the implications for O’Connor) would actually lead to an improvement in her attendance at work. It was noted that the employer accepted that O’Connor’s absences were genuine and unavoidable and were caused by her disability.

https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5b191137ed915d2cb78ace3a/DL_Insurance_Services_Ltd_v_Mrs_S_O_Connor_UKEAT_0230_17_LA.pdf

Conclusion

Dealing with employee sickness absence (whether of a short or long term nature) can be extremely problematic for employers. The blunt instrument approach where arbitrary trigger points are used to monitor and deal with sickness absence can store up problems for employers over the distance. Quite simply, such policies, criteria or practices (PCPs) may have a disproportionately, adverse effect on certain groups of people within the workforce e.g. individuals with disabilities. There is a very real danger for employees that they end up breaching provisions of the Equality Act 2010 and their argument that a capability dismissal was fair will fall foul on deaf ears at any subsequent Employment Tribunal hearing. Proceed with caution might be the best advice when dealing with employees who have poor sickness records.

Copyright Seán J Crossan, 21 June 2019

Stereotyping = unlawful discrimination?

Photo by Ken Treloar on Unsplash

We can all be guilty of pre-judging other people – sometimes we do this consciously and, at other times, we can do this unconsciously. In other words, we can reduce people to stereotypes.

This becomes a problem if our pre-conceptions about other people cause us to behave in a way that translates into unlawful, less favourable treatment. If we treat others less favourably due to a protected characteristic that they possess (e.g. age, disability, gender, race, sexual orientation etc) in terms of the Equality Act 2010.

Stereotyping or negative perceptions about individuals may well give rise to the victim (with the relevant protected characteristic) having a claim for direct discrimination in terms of Section 13 of the Equality Act 2010).

This recalled a story, from several years ago, in which the BBC reported the experiences of a gay man who was subjected to all sorts of less favourable treatment based on negative stereotyping of LGBTI people. The victim of this offensive behaviour took successful legal action against the individual in question.

A link to this story on the BBC News site can be found below:

Why ‘gay’ gestures are discrimination

Clive Coleman reports on the case of a gay man who has won the first compensation award for discrimination based entirely on homophobic gestures.
More recent examples of negative sterotyping

When glancing through various media stories over the last few days, stereotyping or negative perceptions of people came to mind.

In the first story, sufferers of Parkinson’s Disease spoke about the negative reactions they often experience when going about their daily lives. People with this very serious condition have reported that their symptoms are mistaken by members of the public as drunken behaviour or that they are acting under the influence of drugs. Individuals who suffer from Parkinson’s have a disability in terms of Section 6 of the Equality Act 2010.

A link to this story can be found below:

https://edition.independent.co.uk/editions/uk.co.independent.issue.110419/data/8863856/index.html

In the second story, a person with cerebral palsy (also a disability) speaks about the discrimination that he has suffered.

A link to this story can be found below:

‘My disability is mistaken for drunkenness’

Stuart Devlin, who has cerebral palsy, carries a card to show door staff after being refused entry to pubs.

In the third story, which hails from Russia, the Russian authorities have allowed prisoners to resume yoga exercises during the period of their incarceration.

Previously, the Russian Government had banned this form of exercise for prisoners because it was believed it was linked to homosexuality! In the UK, a person’s sexual orientation is a protected characteristic in terms of Section 12 of the Equality Act 2010.

A link to this story can be found below:

https://edition.independent.co.uk/editions/uk.co.independent.issue.110419/data/8863506/index.html

Photo by Annie Spratt on Unsplash

Copyright Seán J Crossan, 12 April 2019

Jumping the gun?

Photo by Marc Schäfer on Unsplash

In the first semester of this academic year, I was speaking to a group of students about disability discrimination in terms of the Equality Act 2010. Disability is a protected characteristic (Sections 4 and 6 of the Act).

We were discussing, in particular, an employer’s duty to make reasonable adjustments to a post in order to assist a disabled person to continue carrying out their duties. The employer is under a duty in terms of Section 20 of the Act to make reasonable adjustments to a disabled person’s post. A failure to comply with this duty would breach Section 21 of the Act.

According to the Equality and Human Rights Commission’s Statutory Code of Practice on Employment, an example of a reasonable adjustment made by an employer to assist a disabled person could amount to the following:

An employer has a policy that designated car parking spaces are only offered to senior managers. A worker who is not a manager, but has a mobility impairment and needs to park very close to the office, is given a designated car parking space. This is likely to be a reasonable adjustment to the employer’s car parking policy.

 What is reasonable when making adjustments?

This will be a key issue when determining whether to implement the requested adjustment. Each case will turn on its own facts and what is reasonable in one situation may be entirely unreasonable in different context. We can look at two contrasting cases to get a better understanding of this issue:

Cordell v Foreign & Commonwealth Office [2011] UKEAT 0016_11_0510 (5 October 2011) , the Employment Appeal Tribunal concluded that the adjustments requested by a senior diplomat were not reasonable in the sense that they would represent approximately five times the cost her annual salary.

Conversely, in Donnelly v Environment Agency [2013] UKEAT/0914/13 (18 October 2013), the Employment Appeal Tribunal stated that the refusal by the employer to consider providing the employee with a designated parking space was a failure to make reasonable adjustments.

Sharpshooting

So, returning to the discussion with my students, I related a story to them that had stuck in my memory about a disability claim. The story was reported  in the UK national media in 2015 and concerned a Police marksman or sniper who had served in an armed response team with the Sussex and Surrey Force.

Please see the link to the story on website of the Mail Online:

The Police officer in question, Bruce Shields, had a developed a problem with his hearing. This was an issue which rightly concerned his superior officers. There were legitimate questions about his ability to carry out his job – especially so given the potentially serious situations which he often found himself in when carrying out his duties. Hearing loss is, of course, a disability in terms of the Equality Act 2010.

PC Shields took his employer to an Employment Tribunal alleging disability discrimination under the Equality Act 2010. He won his case, which may seem surprising given that you would have thought that his employer had strong grounds for removing him from these types of duties on health and safety grounds. This could be potentially an objective justification for his removal from firearms duties.

That said, however, the Tribunal decided in favour of PC Shields because his employer failed to send him for the appropriate medical test which would have established his suitability for these types of duties. No pun intended, but perhaps the employer “jumped the gun” by acting too hastily before an objective medical assessment was carried out.

Conclusion

The experience of Bruce Shields shows the importance of the employer carrying out independent medical tests before removing a disabled person from a post. Perhaps, if the employer had acted differently and followed procedures, there may have been a different outcome i.e. a more favourable one for the employer.

Copyright Seán J Crossan, February 2019