Employment Law – Page 3 – Seán Crossan's Scots Law

You’ve got (e)mail! … or will I ever get out of this place?!!!

Email can be a wonderful form of communication. It can also be, quite frankly, something of a curse for many employees and workers. Essentially, you’re never too far away from the work-place and bosses/clients/service users expect to receive an instant reply.

The expectation by bosses and managers that employees and workers should be monitoring their emails (constantly) does tend to be a contributory factor in the rising number of cases of work-related stress. Employers: please note that you have a duty of care to provide a safe working environment and part of this obligation includes monitoring unacceptably high levels of stress in the work-place.

There is a perception (rightly or wrongly) that UK employees suffer from some of the longest working hours in Europe. In 2019, data from the EU’s Eurostat Agency seemed to support this contention but, interestingly, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) took a more sceptical approach by questioning the method of data collection (the old adage about lies, damned lies and statistics springs to mind here).

Links to a BBC article about this issue and the Eurostat figures (and OECD response) can be found below:

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-49795179

https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/tps00071/default/table?lang=en

https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/international-productivity-gaps_5b43c728-en;jsessionid=c_2XYmRNoOJLRgHdT0TJPQqs.ip-10-240-5-115

UK employees are, of course, entitled to receive a written statement of the main terms and particulars of their employment as per Section 1 of the Employment Rights Act 1996. This statement must contain a provision which addresses the employee’s normal weekly working hours.

Despite Brexit (which did occur on 31 January 2020 – in case you missed it), the UK is still following EU rules until the end of this year … One EU Law with particular relevance to this debate is the Working Time Directive ((2003/88/EC) which was transposed into UK employment law by way of the Working Time Regulations 1998.

In theory, the Directive and the Regulations cap the number of hours that employees (and workers) can work at 48 hours per week (technical point: this figure can be averaged out over a reference period – 17 weeks normally). Crucially, however, UK employees and workers can opt out of the 48 hour maximum by signing a declaration (opt-out) that they wish to do so. If they change their minds, they are entitled to do so by giving the employer a minimum seven days’ notice (or in certain cases – 3 months) of this intention.

The legal rules on working hours are all very well in theory, but what about the culture of organisations which may (at an informal level) promote the idea that long hours spent at work (or just working) are a sure fire way to get ahead in your career?

This is where the influence of email (and other instant messaging services) can be quite insidious (pernicious even?). Employees feel under pressure to deal with this work load at weekends, during holidays and evenings. Parents of young children and carers of elderly relatives, who may have negotiated flexible working arrangements, may be under acute pressure to deal with emails etc when they are outside the work-place. In this way, the work-place becomes like the Eagles’ song, Hotel California (‘You can check out any time you like, But you can never leave!‘).

Interestingly, in some of our ex-EU partner countries, there have been initiatives at both the organisational and legal level to curb the smothering influence of email outside the work-place.

There is a real danger here for employers that, by encouraging employee use of email outside working hours, it may constitute a policy, criterion or practice (PCP) – no matter how informal – which could open themselves up to accusations of indirect discrimination on grounds of sex (women are still the primary carers for children and elderly dependents) and disability (by reason of a person’s association with a disabled person) in terms of Section 19 of the Equality Act 2010.

Furthermore, employees might feel that they are under constant surveillance by the employer because it becomes easier to keep tabs on individuals when they are logging in and out of the company’s IT network. For employers, this could lead to legal challenges from employees who are concerned that the right to privacy and family life as enshrined in Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights has been violated.

Is there a better way of doing things? Yes, is the short answer.

In 2011, the German multinational car manufacturer, Volkswagen (VW) introduced major changes to its working practices by curbing the use of emails when employees were off duty. This agreement was negotiated by the company and trade union/labour organisations.

In France, in August 2016, they went further and passed the El Khomri Law (named after the French Government Minister for Labour who introduced the proposal). This law gave employees a right to disconnect from email. In one particular case which involved the French arm of the British company, Rentokil, an employee was awarded €60,000 because his right to disconnect from email had been breached.

Links to stories about the changes to VW’s working practices and the French El Khomri Law can be found below:

https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/08/01/british-firm-ordered-pay-60000-french-court-breaching-employees/

The debate about the right of employees to disconnect from email – whether this is negotiated via some sort of collective agreement or underpinned by law – now seems to have penetrated the British consciousness. Rebecca Long-Bailey MP, one of the leading contenders for leadership of the British Labour Party has thrown her hat into the ring by backing a trade union campaign to introduce a legal right to disconnect in the UK.

One small problem: the Labour Party lost the last British General Election on 12 December 2019 to the Conservatives and is, therefore, in no position to deliver. Over to you Prime Minister Johnson? (a man fond of the populist gesture).

A link to an article in The Independent about Rebecca Long Bailey’s support for the trade union campaign to introduce a law guaranteeing the right to disconnect can be found below:

https://edition.independent.co.uk/editions/uk.co.independent.issue.110220/data/9327866/index.html

Related Blog Articles:

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2019/10/23/a-hard-days-night/

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2019/02/25/the-work-life-balance-or-utopia-reimagined/

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2019/02/22/stress-kills/

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2019/02/11/employment-contracts-read-them-or-weep/

Copyright Seán J Crossan, 11 February 2020

The only gay in the village?

Photo by Steve Johnson on Unsplash

The only gay in the village became a household phrase in the UK thanks to the long running Little Britain sitcom TV and radio series (which has been broadcast by the BBC since 2000).

Daffyd Thomas claimed to be the only gay person in a small, Welsh village (actually he wasn’t), but in some respects his catchphrase reflected the isolation that many people in the LGBTI communities experience – either in their personal or professional lives.

The reason that I mention this topic is because, last week, the LGBTI campaigning organisation, Stonewall, published research about the most inclusive LGBTI friendly employers in the UK (Newcastle City Council topped the list). That said, for many LGBTI employees, an inclusive work place is still a far off dream.

Please find a link to a story on the Sky News website about one employee’s decision to hide his LGBTI identity from his colleagues:

https://news.sky.com/story/i-felt-i-had-to-hide-my-lgbt-identity-at-work-so-i-decided-to-do-something-about-it-11920174

Links to Stonewall’s findings (and a Sky News article) can be found below:

https://www.stonewall.org.uk/system/files/2020_top_100_report.pdf

https://news.sky.com/story/stonewall-reveals-its-most-lgbt-inclusive-employers-11919950

A person’s sexual orientation is, of course, a protected characteristic in terms of Section 12 of the Equality Act 2010. Such individuals should not be subjected to direct discrimination (Section 13); indirect discrimination (Section 19); harassment (Section 26); and victimisation (Section 27).

Many years ago, I remember teaching a group of students who were studying for a professional qualification. Many of them were employed by recruitment agencies and it was my task to highlight the relevant provisions of discrimination law at that time. One evening, we had a discussion about discrimination on the grounds of a person’s sexual orientation – particularly in the context of the ban on gay and lesbian people serving in the UK Armed Forces. This ban would eventually be lifted in 2000 – following the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in Smith and Grady v UK (1999) 29 EHRR 493.

One of the students asked me what protection existed for gay and lesbian people in employment law generally. Very little was my response. Before the introduction of the Scotland Act 1998 and the Human Rights Act 1998, the work place could be very hostile for LGBTI people (see Macdonald v Lord Advocate; Pearce v Governing Body of Mayfield School [2003] UKHL 34).

Yes, admittedly, the UK was (and still is in spite of Brexit) a signatory to the European Convention on Human Rights. In particular, Article 8 of the Convention recognises the right to family and private life. It was this Article which was used to overturn extremely restrictive laws on same sex relationships which existed in Scotland, Northern Ireland, the Isle of Man and the Channel Islands. Reinforcing Article 8 is Article 14 of the Convention is Article 14 which contains a general prohibition on discrimination.

The late 1960s are often referred to as the key period of the start of gay liberation in the UK with the passing of the Sexual Offences Act 1967 which decriminalised homosexual relationships between consenting adults (aged 21 or over) and as long as such conduct was in private. What is often overlooked is that the 1967 Act applied to England and Wales only. The picture was very different (and would remain so for over a decade – sometimes longer) in various parts of the British Isles.

Homosexual relationships were decriminalised in Scotland in 1980; in Northern Ireland in 1982; the UK Crown Dependency of Guernsey in 1983; the UK Crown Dependency of Jersey in 1990; and the UK Crown Dependency of the Isle of Man in 1994. The age of consent was set at 21 for all these parts of the British Isles. Things have since moved on and the age of consent was firstly reduced to 18 and then eventually to 16.

In the last 20 years, the influence of the European Union has been particularly profound regarding measures to combat sexual orientation discrimination.

In 1999, as a result of the Treaty of Amsterdam, the EU adopted two Directives which considerably expanded the scope of its anti-discrimination laws (the Racial Equality Directive (2000/43/EC) and the Employment Equality Directive (2000/78/EC). Of particular interest to this discussion is the Employment Equality Directive which made it unlawful to discriminate against a person on grounds of sexual orientation. Admittedly, this Directive was limited because it covered the areas of employment and vocational training only.

On 1 December 2003, the Employment Equality Directive would eventually become part of UK law in the form of the Employment Equality (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2003. The Regulations were repealed and replaced by the relevant provisions of the Equality Act 2010 (which came into force on 1 October 2010).

It did not extend to the provision of goods and services, so had the case of Bull and Another v Hall and Another [2013] UKSC 73 occurred when the Directive was first transposed into UK domestic law, the same sex couple who were refused a double room at the guest house in Cornwall would not have been successful in their claim for sexual orientation discrimination. Luckily for them, the Equality Act had since come into force and covered unlawful less favourable treatment on grounds of a person’s sexual orientation with regard to the provision of goods and services.

The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) is also worthy of comment. Article 19 prohibits discrimination by reason of a person’s sexual orientation and, notably, this provision is hardwired into UK law by way of the Equality Act 2010. Article 19 extended legal protection to gay and lesbian people more generally – over and above the limited areas of employment and vocational training which the Treaty of Amsterdam and the Employment Equality Directive had originally addressed.

The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (although Poland and the UK had negotiated some opt-outs) contained significant provisions on equality and non-discrimination, namely, Article 20 (equality before the law) and Article 21 (the principle of non-discrimination).

Another massive step forward for the equality of the LGBTI community was the introduction of the Civil Partnerships Act 2004 which would give legal recognition (and protection) to gay and lesbian people who chose to enter such relationships. These rights would be further underpinned by permitting same sex couples to marry (in England and Wales in 2013 and in Scotland in 2014). Currently, Northern Ireland is the only part of the UK not to permit same sex marriage – although this will change from next week onwards (see link below):

Same-sex marriage: Couple ‘excited but nervous’ to become first in NI

Robyn Peoples and Sharni Edwards will celebrate their wedding on Tuesday in Carrickfergus.

This change to the law has come about as a result of the introduction of the Northern Ireland (Executive Formation etc) Act 2019 passed by the UK Parliament (in the absence of of a functioning devolved government for nearly the last 3 years).

Finally, if employers want to do more to create an inclusive work place, they could start by using Stonewall’s inclusive toolkits (see link below):

https://www.stonewall.org.uk/best-practice-toolkits-and-resources

Conclusion

As a society, the UK has certainly moved on from the overtly hostile attitudes towards members of the LGBTI communities over the last 50 years or so. The legal rights and protections which LGBTI people now enjoy would have seemed unthinkable in 1967 when a limited form of tolerance was ushered in as a result of the Sexual Offences Act (in England and Wales). More recently, the UK and Scottish Governments have issued pardons to those individuals who were convicted of criminal offences under the previous laws (in 2017: the Policing and Crime Act 2017 in England and Wales (known as Turing’s Law after Alan Turing, the Enigma Code Breaker) and, in 2018, the Scottish Parliament followed suit by passing the Historical Sexual Offences (Pardons and Disregards) (Scotland) Act 2018).

Postscript

On Friday 7 February 2020, Phillip Schofield, the British TV celebrity announced that he was gay at the age of 57. Mr Schofield is married with 2 children and had lived a heterosexual life – until now. He likened hiding his sexual orientation to being in prison and being consumed by it.

A link to the story on the Sky News website can be found below:

http://news.sky.com/story/phillip-schofield-comes-out-as-gay-11928156

If anyone doubts that homophobia still exists in the UK, please see the story below:

Homophobic graffiti daubed on Polo Lounge entrance in Glasgow

Police have launched an investigation after they were alerted to the vandalism at the Polo Lounge.

Related Blog Articles:

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2020/01/04/pansexual/

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2019/12/31/civil-partner-i-do/

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2019/12/08/different-standards/

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2019/12/06/biased-blood/

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2019/10/04/a-very-civil-partnership/

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2019/02/20/love-and-marriage/

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2019/02/08/the-gay-cake-row/

Copyright Seán J Crossan, 15 February 2020

Pregnancy discrimination (or New Year, same old story … Part 2)

Photo by Sincerely Media on Unsplash

We’re barely into 2020 and we seem to be on something of a roll with stories about sex discrimination. Yesterday, I discussed the issue of equal pay.

Only this morning I was flicking through the newspaper and came across another story, this time, concerning pregnancy discrimination.

Helen Larkin was dismissed from her post with the Liz Earle Beauty Company on the grounds of her pregnancy. Her employer was restructuring the company and refused to consider Ms Larkin for two alternative posts within the organisation. This refusal to consider suitable, alternative employment appeared to be motivated by the fact that Ms Larkin would shortly be going off on her period of maternity leave.

This treatment amounted to unlawful direct discrimination in terms of Sections 13 and 18 of the Equality Act 2010. Her dismissal would also be automatically unfair in terms of the Employment Rights Act 1996.

Consequently, Ms Larkin was awarded over £17,000 in compensation. This sum, of course, reflects an element to injury to feelings (the so called Vento Bands or Guidelines). In fact, Ms Larkin was awarded £10,000 in compensation to reflect injury to feelings.

A link to the judgement of the Employment Tribunal can be found below:

https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5e2f0300e5274a6c42dcd132/Mrs_H_Larkin_v_Liz_Earle_Beauty_Co._Ltd_-_1403400.2018.pdf

A study carried out jointly by the UK Government Department (Business, Innovation and Skills) and the Equality and Human Rights Commission previously discovered that some 54,000 women per year in this country were forced out of their employment for reasons related to pregnancy and/or maternity.

A link to a summary of the research on the website of the Equality and Human Rights Commission can be found below:

https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/en/managing-pregnancy-and-maternity-workplace/pregnancy-and-maternity-discrimination-research-findings

Again, as I noted in yesterday’s Blog (New Year, same old story …), we have had anti-discrimination laws in the UK for nearly 45 years and yet we still regularly hear stories about pregnancy and maternity discrimination.

Readers might be interested to learn about the work of a pressure group (Pregnant then screwed) which campaigns to end the ‘motherhood penalty’:

https://pregnantthenscrewed.com

A link to Helen Larkin’s story as reported in The Independent can be found below:

https://edition.independent.co.uk/editions/uk.co.independent.issue.110120/data/9278901/index.html

Related Blog articles:

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2020/01/10/new-year-same-old-story/

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2019/02/14/hurt-feelings/

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2019/02/22/sticks-and-stones-may-break-my-bones-but-names-will-never-hurt-me/

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2019/07/08/just-blew-it-again/

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2019/08/22/the-trouble-with-pregnancy/

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2019/09/10/barbaric/

Copyright Seán J Crossan, 11 January 2020

New Year, same old story …

Photo by Markus Spiske on Unsplash

It’s becoming depressingly predictable: the persistence of the gender pay gay in the United Kingdom.

This time last year, I was discussing with my students the struggle that City of Glasgow Council female employees were undertaking to win their claims for equal pay. After a period of industrial action, the women finally won their struggle:

https://www.theguardian.com/society/2019/jan/17/glasgow-council-women-workers-win-12-year-equal-pay-battle

We’ve just entered 2020 and it seems as if nothing much has changed in the wider world (more on this later).

Theoretically, the gender pay gap should be a thing of the past. We have had legislation in place for nearly 45 years in this country: the Equal Pay Act 1970 (which came into force in December 1975) and the current Equality Act 2010.

An info graphic which shows the number of Employment Tribunal cases in the UK involving equal pay claims (2008-2019) can be seen below:

Source: UK Ministry of Justice obtained from BBC News

True, the above figures show the number of equal pay claims in overall decline – effectively being halved (from a high of over 60,000 in 2008 to just over 30,000 in 2019); but my riposte to that would to say still too many.

In today’s edition of The Independent, new research, carried out by the Institute of Public Policy Research, indicates that female General Practitioners (physicians for our overseas readers) are paid up to £40,000 less than their male colleagues every year.

For each £1 that a male colleague earns, a woman earns 35 pence less. To reinforce this point, the article states that female GPs are effectively providing their services free of charge between September and December every year.

In language of the Equality Act 2010, the female GPs are carrying out ‘like work’ when comparing themselves to their male colleagues. There seems to be absolutely no lawful justification for this disparity in pay between the sexes.

A link to the article in The Independent can be found below:

https://edition.independent.co.uk/editions/uk.co.independent.issue.100120/data/9277336/index.html

The equal pay laws imply a sex or gender equality clause into every person’s contract of employment. Employers therefore have a legal duty to ensure gender equality in relation to terms and conditions of service.

It seems pretty simple, so why isn’t it happening in 2020?

An explanation for this situation in the medical profession has centred around the development of a ‘two tier’ system whereby more men are partners in GP surgeries whereas a large number of women take on the role of a salaried GP. Women tend to become salaried GPs because they feel that this allows them to work flexibly around their family commitments. So, again, what we appear to be seeing is women being penalised because they are trying to balance work and family (the so called ‘motherhood’ penalty).

Also on this day …

And purely by coincidence another equal pay story …

… Samira Ahmed, BBC journalist, wins her Employment Tribunal claim for equal pay (see below):

http://news.sky.com/story/samira-ahmed-tv-presenter-wins-sex-discrimination-equal-pay-claim-against-the-bbc-11905304

And if you’re still not convinced …

… read the following article in The Independent about discrimination in pay between male and female apprentices (guess what?; it’s not the men who are the victims):

https://edition.independent.co.uk/editions/uk.co.independent.issue.150120/data/9283611/index.html

Copyright – Seán J Crossan, 10 and 15 January 2020

I’m a climate activist, don’t fire me!

Photo by Stock Photography on Unsplash

Today seems to be something of a red letter day for the Blog with regard to the issue of protected philosophical beliefs in terms of the Equality Act 2010.

We have already heard the news that Jordi Casamitjana has won the part of his Employment Tribunal claim that his ethical veganism is a philosophical belief in terms of Sections 4 and 10 of the 2010 Act (see Casamitjana v League Against Cruel Sports [2020]).

It was some interest that another news item popped up today concerning allegations that Amazon stands accused of threatening to dismiss those of its employees who become involved in climate protests. I would hazard a guess that Amazon is making a statement of intent that it may dismiss employees who perhaps break the law when they are involved in climate protests such as those organised by Extinction Rebellion and other similarly minded groups.

Criminal acts by employees committed outside the workplace could be regarded as gross misconduct in terms of Section 98 of the Employment Rights Act 1996. In other words, such behaviour by employees could result in the employer suffering reputational damage and, consequently, any dismissal for misconduct could be potentially fair. That said, employers should always carry out the proper disciplinary procedures when contemplating dismissal as the ultimate sanction for employee misbehaviour.

The real gripe – according to Amazon Employees for Climate Justice – is that the tech company allegedly objects to employees speaking critically about its failure to be more environmentally responsible.

Yet, there are potential dangers here for Amazon in the UK. In Grainger plc v Nicholson (2010) IRLR 4, the Employment Appeal Tribunal established that an employee’s belief in climate change could constitute discrimination on the grounds of a philosophical belief.

So, we could have situation where Amazon employees who are taking part in quite peaceful and lawful climate change protests end up being dismissed. This would open up the possibility that employees of Amazon UK might have the right to bring claims for direct discrimination (Section 13: Equality Act 2010) in respect of their philosophical beliefs (Sections 4 and 10 of the Act).

In the USA, there could be even more serious legal implications – infringing the right to free speech which is protected under the Constitution.

Perhaps Amazon needs to go back to the drawing board …

A link to an article on the BBC News App can be found below:

Amazon ‘threatens to fire’ climate change activists

The company said employees “may receive a notification” from HR if rules were “not being followed”.

Related Blog article:

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2019/06/05/im-a-political-activist-dont-sack-me/

Copyright Seán J Crossan, 3 January 2020

You’re never off duty …

Photo by thom masat on Unsplash

… certainly not when you’re a school teacher.

This is the lesson which a Scottish secondary teacher has learned to his cost. He was filmed by a pupil while drunk in the street wearing only his boxer shorts. Teacher Z (he remains anonymous) was charged with drunkenness and subjecting paramedics to abuse. Apparently, he did not inform his employer and, following a hearing before the General Teaching Council, he has been ruled unfit to continue practising as a teacher.

I often grimace when I hear someone trying to justify bad behaviour on the basis that it happened outside work. If I had a £20 note for each time I heard this remark …

Regular readers of this Blog will be well aware that employers are entitled to dismiss an employee who has committed an act of gross misconduct in terms of Section 98 of the Employment Rights Act 1996. Such behaviour could include misconduct committed outside working hours.

Provided the employer follows the correct disciplinary procedures, the dismissal will almost certainly be regarded as a fair by an Employment Tribunal.

A link to the story on the BBC News App can be found below:

Teacher struck off after pupil filmed him wearing just boxer shorts

Footage of the secondary teacher drunk in a public road was posted online and viewed by teachers and pupils.

Related Blog Articles:

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2019/12/08/different-standards/

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2019/12/03/the-limits-of-privacy/

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2019/09/03/facebook-folly/

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2019/06/05/im-a-political-activist-dont-sack-me/

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2019/05/20/social-media-and-dismissal/

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2019/04/11/social-media-misuse/

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2019/04/09/drunk-and-disorderly/

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2019/02/07/it-happened-outside-work-or-its-my-private-life/

Copyright Seán J Crossan, 2 January 2020

No guide dogs!

Photo by Viktor Forgacs on Unsplash

Disability is a protected characteristic in terms of Sections 4 and 6 of the Equality Act 2010. In terms of Sections 20 and 21 of the Act, employers and service providers have a legal duty to make reasonable adjustments to accommodate the needs of a disabled person.

What about a new prison inmate (a sex offender) who is visually impaired and wishes to bring his assistance (or guide) dog with him?

The prison authorities have said no to this request, it is simply against the rules.

Discrimination or less favourable treatment, of course, can be perfectly legal if it is objectively justified.

It would be very interesting to see if the prison authorities were potentially in breach of the Equality Act (direct or indirect discrimination).

A link to the story on the BBC News App can be found below:

Blind sex offender cannot take guide dog to prison

Neil Nellies arrived in court with his dog, but was told he must serve his sentence without the animal.

Related Blog Articles:

/https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2019/06/21/sickness-absence/

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2019/02/26/jumping-the-gun/

Copyright Seán J Crossan, 2 January 2020

Going mainstream?

Photo by Free To Use Sounds on Unsplash

While we await the judgement of the Employment Tribunal in relation to the case of Casamitjana v League Against Cruel Sports, it’s interesting to note that veganism as a lifestyle choice seems to be on the rise.

Whether the Employment Tribunal will recognise Jordi Casamitjana’s ethical standpoint as a philosophical belief in terms of Sections 4, 10 and 13 of the Equality Act 2010 remains to be seen. Watch this space.

In the meantime, the BBC has produced an interesting article on the rise of veganism which can be found on its News App:

Veganism: Why are vegan diets on the rise?

More and more people are buying plant-powered products. What’s behind the rise?

Related Blog Articles:

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2019/05/12/veganism-discrimination/

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2019/04/08/the-trouble-with-veganism/

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2019/03/26/veganism-is-human-cruelty/

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2019/04/21/the-vegan-athlete/

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2019/04/01/the-shameful-secret-the-vegan-butcher/

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2019/02/19/vegans-should-be-punched-in-the-face/

https://seancrossansscotslaw.com/2019/01/22/philosophical-beliefs/

The limits of privacy

Photo by Tony Liao on Unsplash

Several of my previous blogs (It happened outside work … (or it’s my private life!) published on 7 February 2019; Social Media Misuse published on 11 April 2019; and Social media and dismissal published on 20 May 2019) have addressed the issue of whether employees have a right to privacy in the work-place.

The short answer is yes and no: privacy is not an absolute right.

Privacy in the work-place is becoming more of an issue thanks to the widespread use of social media by employees outwith working hours (and, of course, during the working day).

If you’re working in the public sector (and this, potentially, covers a large number of employees), Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights i.e. the right to family and private life could be particularly relevant to your situation.

Even if you’re employed by a private sector organisation, Article 8 rights are still relevant because they are ultimately guaranteed by the State (the United Kingdom) as a signatory to the European Convention. Furthermore, there are all sorts of situations where private sector organisations may be regarded as ’emanations/entities of the State’ because they carry out some type of work or provide a service which is beneficial to the wider public (think utilities companies or those organisations which benefit from outsourced contracts from local and central government).

Regular readers of this blog will know, of course, that provisions of the European Convention have been incorporated into Scots Law via the Scotland Act 1998 and the Human Rights Act 1998.

Employers, quite rightly, may have legitimate concerns about the type of content or statements that their employees post on social media platforms – especially if such material could cause the organisation to suffer some sort of reputational damage.

In such circumstances, it’s simply not a competent defence for employees to argue that disciplinary action (up to and including dismissal) which might be taken by their employers represents unwarranted interference in their private lives.

That said, it is very important for employers to set out clear guidelines and policies covering social media (mis)use by employees during and outwith working hours. There is a balancing exercise to be had here between the legitimate interests of the employer and the employee.

So, it was with some interest that I read about a case before the Outer House of the Court of Session during the summer which dealt with the boundaries of employee privacy (see Petition of B, C and Others v Chief Constable Police Service of Scotland and Others [2019] CSOH 48).

Lord Bannatyne rejected the Petition for judicial review lodged by a number of serving Police Scotland officers who were accused of (non-criminal) misconduct by their employer. These officers had allegedly used the WhatsApp social media platform to exchange a number of messages between them which were deemed to be offensive in nature and not in keeping with their role as serving members of Police Scotland.

Police Scotland wished to access the content of these messages in order to progress the misconduct hearings, but the officers involved in the disciplinary investigation argued that this constituted a breach of their human rights – specifically their rights to privacy Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. More generally, the officers were also arguing that they had the right to privacy at common law.

His Lordship highlighted the significance of the important decision of the European Court of Human Rights: Von Hannover v Germany [2005] 40 EHRR 1 to the case before him.

Von Hannover raises three important considerations:

“… the width of the concept of private life; the purpose of Article 8, i.e. what it seeks to protect; and the need to examine the particular circumstances of the case in order to decide whether, consonant with that purpose, the applicant had a legitimate expectation of protection in relation to the subject matter of his complaint.”

The key issue which Lord Bannatyne identifies from Von Hannover, is whether the Scottish police officers “had a legitimate expectation of protection” in terms of Article 8; or to draw upon a phrase later formulated by UK Supreme Court Justice, Lord Toulson: “a legitimate expectation of privacy” (see In re JR38 2016 AC 1131).

In rejecting the officers’ petition, Lord Bannatyne focused on the existence of the Standards of Professional Behaviour contained in Schedule 1 to the 2014 Regulations to which all serving Police officers must adhere (in particular the officers had sworn an oath to uphold these Standards both while on and off duty).

His Lordship stated:

“There is a restriction on police officers’ private life and therefore their expectation of privacy. … It is only in relation to these matters that there is a limitation on the officer’s privacy it is not a whole scale intrusion into his private life. Accordingly to achieve the underlying purpose of the Standards, namely: the maintenance of public confidence in the police, police officers have a limitation on their expectation of privacy as above described.“

A link to Lord Banntyne’s judgement can be found below:

https://www.scotcourts.gov.uk/docs/default-source/cos-general-docs/pdf-docs-for-opinions/2019csoh48.pdf?sfvrsn=0

A link to how the story was reported by BBC Scotland can be found below:

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-tayside-central-48799289

As a point of interest, several days after Lord Bannatyne’s judgement was reported, the BBC carried a story about United States Border Patrol officers who were suspended from employment for posting offensive remarks about migrants (and other individuals) on Facebook.

A link to this story can be found below:

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-48834824

Reclaiming motion to the Inner House

Clearly dissatisfied with the judgement of Lord Bannatyne in the Outer House, the Petitioners appealed to the Inner House of the Court of Session by way of a reclaiming motion.

On 16 September 2020, the Inner House issued its judgement in this regard (see Petition of B, C and Others v Chief Constable Police Service of Scotland and Others [2020] CSIH 61). The Petitioners’ arguments (the reclaiming motion) were comprehensively and unanimously rejected by Lady Dorrian, the Lord Justice Clerk, Lords Menzies and Malcolm.

Some of Lord Malcolm’s remarks were especially striking and illuminating:

“Essentially, the touchstone of private life is whether in respect of the disclosed facts the person in question had a reasonable expectation of privacy.” (Lord Nicholls in Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457 at paragraph 21) …

… All of those involved were police officers. Each had solemnly sworn to uphold certain professional responsibilities and standards in both their public and private lives, and had promised, in effect, to take action if informed of the misconduct of others. This was known to each participating officer. To take perhaps an extreme example, if a constable (or indeed any public official) writes to a colleague stating that he accepts bribes, he might hope that it will be treated in confidence; he might even have such an expectation, but if so, it is neither reasonable nor legitimate.”

Lord Malcolm also pithily disposed of an argument put forward by Counsel for the Petitioners:

“Mr Sandison submitted that police officers should enjoy the opportunity to have “off the record” communications between each other in whatever terms they consider to be appropriate. As he put it, the petitioners should be “free to be persons”, presumably as opposed to being members of the police force. The difficulty is that they are both.”

A link to the judgement of the Inner House can be found below:

https://www.scotcourts.gov.uk/docs/default-source/cos-general-docs/pdf-docs-for-opinions/2020csih61.pdf?sfvrsn=0

Pay up! (or Frustration of Contract Part 3)

Photo by Alex on Unsplash

In a number of previous blogs (Stormy Weather, I’m at the end of my tether! Locking Horns; and Frustration of Contract?), I discussed the issue of termination of contract when unforeseen factors outwith the control of the parties intervene.

It might be the destruction of the subject matter of the contract; death of one of the parties in an agreement involving the provision of personal services; or even particularly bad weather or unforeseen events.

Potentially, these factors may frustrate the contract in the sense that it can no longer be carried out or performed in the manner which the parties originally intended. In such cases of genuine frustration, the contract or agreement is terminated and the parties are discharged from their obligations.

There have been some famous cases over the years with frustration of contract at their heart:

Taylor v Caldwell [1863] EWHC QB J1; 122 ER 309;3 B. & S. 826
Krell v Henry [1903] 2 KB 740
Herne Bay Steam Boat v Hutton [1903] 2 KB 683
Vitol S.A. v Esso Australia Ltd. (The Wise) [1989] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 451

A contract is not frustrated if it becomes more expensive or difficult to perform or if the alleged frustrating event could have been foreseen (and presumably dealt with) (see Davis Contractors Ltd v Fareham Urban District Council [1956] AC 696 and Tsakiroglou & Co Ltd v Noblee Thorl GmbH [1962] AC 93).

The Emiliano Sala Affair

This leads me back to a story which I have been following with interest over the last few months: the tragic death of the Argentinian footballer, Emiliano Sala in a plane crash over the English Channel in January 2019.

It will be recalled that Sala’s former Football Club, the French side FC Nantes had just agreed to him transferring to the English Premier League side, Cardiff City FC. The transfer fee was £15 million, but shortly after the accident, Cardiff City claimed that the transfer had not gone through and it had no obligation to pay the first part of this figure. In other words, Sala was never an employee of Cardiff City according to this argument because the paperwork had not been finalised.

In normal circumstances, where a contract involves the provision of personal services (and a contract of employment certainly fits into this category), the death of a new or prospective employee would tend to terminate the agreement. Death is pretty much the ultimate frustrating factor – especially in cases involving unforeseen deaths.

The world of top flight football, however, would seem to be different and does not seem to be bound by the considerations that govern us mere mortals.

FIFA, the governing body, has now spoken and determined that Cardiff City will have to pay the first part of the transfer fee (£5 million in case you’re asking) to FC Nantes. Failure to do so may result in FIFA sanctions being imposed on Cardiff (a signing ban).

Please find a link below to the FIFA press release:

https://www.fifa.com/about-fifa/who-we-are/news/fifa-players-status-committee-renders-decision-on-transfer-of-late-emiliano-sala

It would seem that FIFA rules transcend events such as death which ordinarily would throw a spanner in the works in the context of an ordinary employment contract situation.

Cardiff City can appeal against the decision of FIFA by going to the Court of Arbitration for Sport and, in October 2019, the Club indicated that it would so:

https://www.theguardian.com/football/2019/oct/02/cardiff-appeal-cas-court-of-arbitration-sport-emiliano-sala-transfer-fee-fifa

Ultimately, whatever way this tragic story ends, I can’t help but wonder whether FC Nantes or Cardiff FC had the foresight to insure Sala’s life in the event of untimely and unforeseen death. Sadly, the fact that a young man with a promising future died in a horrible accident seems to have got lost along the way while Nantes and Cardiff polish up their legal arguments.

Links to the story can be found below:

Emiliano Sala: Fifa rules Cardiff must pay first instalment of £5.3m to Nantes